Garvan Walshe: Could Erdogan’s war against the financial markets be the end of him?

25 Nov

Garvan Walshe is a former National and International Security Policy Adviser to the Conservative Party

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dominated Turkish politics for 20 years with his instrumental attitude to democratic politics.  He took on the secular military establishment created by Attaruk, with the help of liberals tired of military influence.

He then crushed the liberals by allying himself with the Gulen movement (a Sufi cult, whose leader lives in exile in Pennsylvania).

And he then turned on the Gulenists, after a coup in which he was convinced they were involved came close to ousting him, and plunging the country into civil war.

As well as the the coup, which forced him to address the nation from a mobile phone as rebel fighter jets attacked the capital, he has had a number of close poltiical shaves.

In 2015, he lost his parliamentary majority thanks to strong showing by the Kurdish HD party. But since the fractious opposition couldn’t agree on how to replace him, he won fresh elections, and assembled a majority with the help of the secular, but strongly nationalist (i.e anti-Kurdish) MH party.

A referendum in 2017 to free him from parliamentary troubles by giving Turkey an executive presidency passed narrowly with 51 per cent of the vote. But he went on to win the presidency handily with a 20 point lead over his nearest rival. The increasingly autocratic Erdogan has built himself a huge presidential palace, and imagined a vast canal west of Istanbul to rival the Bosphorus itself. Is his decidedly imperious station hoving into view?

All the same, his touch has begun to wear off. He hoped for a similar do-over when Istanbul’s 2019 mayoral election was won by an opposition candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, by a sliver of 14,000 votes, in a city bigger than most European countries.

Erdogan leaned on the country’s supreme electoral commission to force a rerun – only to find Imamoglu’s margin swelling to 800,000. Ankara also fell to the opposition that year. His own AK party lost two of its leaders – the former foreign minister, Ali Babacan, and a former prime minister, Ahmed Davutoglu, fed up with Erdogan’s one-man rule.

Support for the ruling coalition parties now runs at 40 per cent, compared to 50 per cent for the main opposition groupings. One even put his AK, long the single largest, behind the centre-left secular, republican, CHP. The last thing Erdogan needs, one would think, is an economic crisis.

Yet he has been creating just that. Inflation was last below 10 per cent in 2016, and prices are now 40 per cent higher than they were five years ago. The currency has collapsed. In 2016, 100 lira was worth $30. Now it’s worth less than $10.

Normally, the central bank would raise rates to stem the slide, but Erdogan is against high rates, which he ascribes to a myserious “interest rate lobby”, and has fired three central bank governors who raised them. Unsurprisingly, the Lira is dropping like a stoned and ,though government debt is relatively low compared to GDP (at around 60 per cent), it needs to service its debt in foreign currency – since only the most eccentric investor would put their money into one targeted for depreciation by the country’s own president.

A saviour of sorts arrived yesterday in the form of Mohamed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, with which Erdogan has been trying to improve relations. Rumours of Emirati investment stopped the Lira’s descent, but sit ill with Erdogan’s talk of economic “patriotism”, and his dreams of dominating regional politics. For Turkey (pop. 84 million) to go begging to Abu Dhabi (pop. 1.5 million) does little for his patriotic dignity.

Erdogan has survived defections from his own party, the loss of Ankara and Istanbul, a hung parliament and even a coup – not least because of his utter ruthlessness.

His parliamentary loss led him to escalate a war with the Kurdish minority (and give him an excuse to imprison their party’s leader). He instituted massive purges of the civil service and army after the coup. He has kept the philanthropist, Osman Kavala in prison, after having him re=arrested, Putin-style, on new charges immediately after his old ones were quashed. The international financial markets are rather harder to tame, and the effects of his war against them are more keenly felt by ordinary Turks than, say, his occupation of northern Syria.

The next elections are set for June 2023, and the opposition fancy their chances so much that they’re calling for them to be brought forward. Erdogan once compared democracy to a train, that you get off once you have reached your final destination. While it is always too soon to write such a survivor off, the ticket inspector is approaching, and the Lira in his pocket are unlikely to cover the fare.

Simon Schofield: Iceland, the UAE and Vietnam have had some of the best responses to Covid. Here’s what we can learn from them.

22 Apr

Simon Schofield is a long-time Conservative member and activist serving as Deputy Director at the Human Security Centre, a think tank based in London, as well as co-editor of Encyclopedia Geopolitica.

Since the outbreak of Covid-19, our lives have been saturated with debate and argument about which countries are succeeding and which are failing in their responses to the pandemic.

However, these debates are often rooted in “the West”, and the successes of nations outside of this club tend to be passing headlines at most. There are a number of countries outside of the Anglosphere whose approaches to testing, treating, and vaccinating citizens amid the pandemic could hold vital knowledge for the West, both for governments’ Covid-19 response going forward, and also for future pandemics we may face.

In the realms of research, while not strictly “outside the Anglosphere”, the small island nation of Iceland is perhaps not one that immediately comes to mind when thinking of the countries with the most successful responses. But Nature, the premier scientific journal of the age, has described Iceland as having “hammered Covid with science”.

Iceland’s Directorate of Health teamed up with deCODE, a human genomic company, taking a “big data” approach to researching the Coronavirus outbreak. Due to this high-tech partnership and Iceland’s low population, the health authorities were able to track virtually every move the virus made on Iceland’s shores, monitoring every person who tested positive’s health for weeks afterwards to map out the symptoms.

This approach gave some of the earliest insights into the nature of Coronavirus, highlighting the key symptomatic indicators, as well as showing that as many as half of infected people are asymptomatic, and that children are much less likely to fall ill.

Using deCODE’s specialism in genetics, the DNA of the virus identified in each positive test was analysed, allowing mutations to be tracked virtually in real time, as well as having clear lines of transmission that mapped out how each strain of the virus had traversed the population. This genetic-tracing approach has had very real impacts, with Iceland recording an exceptionally low death rate of seven per 100,000.

Another nation under-appreciated for its innovative response to the pandemic is Vietnam. Vietnam has implemented a particularly effective contact-tracing regime, making use of people’s public social media posts to cross-reference with their declarations of where they have been and who they have had contact with.

In order to get ahead of viral transmission, Vietnam has sought to identify first, second, and even third-order contacts, sometimes as many as 200 people for a single positive-testing case, and quarantining all those in the first and second order at designated facilities. As a result of its robust response, fewer than one per cent of those testing positive are listed as having caught the virus from “an unknown source”, a remarkable achievement.

Third, while the United Arab Emirates made waves over the summer by announcing its normalisation of ties with Israel, a welcome development which will fundamentally realign the regional geopolitical tectonics, its Covid-19 response has been somewhat overlooked.

However, it certainly could have provided Europe with inspiration on how to address its vaccine woes. The UAE has partnered with Sinopharm to build its own factory for the Sinovax vaccine, having offered a base from where to carry out clinical trials for the vaccine early on in its development.

This joint venture will eventually have capacity to produce 200 million vaccine doses per year. When produced in Abu Dhabi, the final product will be branded Hayat-Vax and as “Made in the UAE” but it is the same inactivated virus vaccine as Sinovax.

The UAE, having vaccinated much of its own population already, will therefore be in a position to help vaccinate its neighbours in the Gulf and beyond, allowing the region to recover and reopen much more quickly. Conversely, governments in Europe are now being told that they desperately need to increase their own domestic vaccine manufacturing capacity against a backdrop of production shortfalls and squabbles over supplies.

Each of these national responses may not always be replicable, or even desirable, elsewhere. But what they highlight is the need for curiosity and humility, two traits not traditionally associated with politics, when looking to innovate ahead of the next major outbreak.

While calls for an international treaty on pandemics are still at relatively early stages, as many governments focus on the day-to-day response to the outbreak, they cannot come soon enough to ensure we institutionalise this information sharing internationally to ensure the best ideas are noted and implemented.

Tom Tugendhat: It’s time for the Government to stand with its allies – and stand up to Iran

26 Aug

Tom Tugendhat is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, and is MP for Tonbridge and Malling.

Israel is losing its reputation in the Middle East. For decades, it played the role of chief villain with nations around the region blaming Mossad for every mishap. Today, Jerusalem is a partner with the United Arab Emirates – just the latest of many to build ties to Jerusalem and seek cooperation.

Jordan and Egypt are about to be joined by some or all of Bahrain, Oman, Sudan. Even Saudi Arabia, while insisting that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative remains the basis of its policy, is making sympathetic noises. Arab popular opinion may still find Israel a difficult issue. But the higher-level dynamics are changing, as new interest-based alignments emerge blinking into the light of day.

Tehran is seeing to that. Over the past decade or so, Britain’s friends and partners have focussed on one thing – the threat of violent Iranian subversion and perhaps direct attack.

From Syria to Yemen, Arab states know well the danger that Iran poses. Militias paid for by Tehran and controlled by the Revolutionary Guard Corps have turned tension into conflict, and fuelled wars that have cost hundreds of thousands of lives and destroyed whole countries.

That makes the UK’s recent UN vote even more surprising. On 14 August we, along with France, Germany, Belgium and Estonia, abstained on a motion to extend the UN arms embargo on Iran. Only the United States and the Dominican Republic voted in favour.

As Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, put it: “the result of the vote in [the UNSC] on arms embargo against Iran shows—once more—the US’ isolation.” It’s hard to argue that’s in Britain’s interest. Even less so, given how many of our regional allies are counting on us to hold the line.

Should the embargo end, the next step is clear: Iran will be looking to buy Russian or Chinese air defence weapons to put around the nuclear plants that it has long believed is essential to the regime’s survival. The International Atomic Energy Agency has already confirmed that Iran has increased its low-enriched uranium stockpile to more than 300 kilograms, enriched uranium to a purity greater than 3.67 percent, stored excess heavy water, tested advanced centrifuges, refused inspections into suspected nuclear sites and may be concealing more undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

It will seek to accelerate the development of its ballistic missile programme, particularly in the area of guidance systems. It will become even more aggressive in cyberspace. And it will redouble its political and material support for the Shia militias that are corruptly colonising Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Again, it’s hard to see how that helps Britain.

Over the past four years, the approach of the Trump Administration can hardly be described as diplomatic but, despite its tone, its respose to the clear violations of the Iranian regime is based on the actions it’s seeing in Tehran. The UK, by contrast, seems to have an Iran policy more focussed on remaining close to European allies (with a disdain for the current US administration) than on the actions of the dictatorship in Tehran.

That decision to abstain puts us even further apart from our most important security partner and regional allies – undermining a global approach, and pushing us firmly back towards the EU we have just left. Worse, it risks raising questions about the veto that none of us would like to have posed.

Now that the US has lost the vote on renewing the embargo, the White House will, no doubt, use the so-called snapback mechanism to reimpose sanctions as agreed in a 2015 United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR). This poses a problem for us.

The snapback mechanism included in SCR 2231 allows participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran deal’s full name) to reimpose sanctions unilaterally. In 2018, the US withdrew from the deal, so some – Russia and China, no doubt – will claim that Washington can no longer trigger the snapback. UK, France, and others will have to decide: is the deal worth it?

Blocking or even abstaining on the likely vote against the US’s determination to trigger a snapback would undermine the alliance and weaken the UN. The temporary relief of allowing the Iran deal to continue, with the UK standing alongside European allies against the Trump White House, would be overwhelmed in coming years, since no US administration could accept being bound into a UN system without a veto.

“Iran continues to conduct ballistic missile activity that is inconsistent with SCR 2231.” Karen Pierce, our Ambassador to the United States, said in June 2019. That hasn’t changed. But nor has the UK’s posture. We continue to try to perform the diplomatic splits – denouncing Iran, but at the same time remaining committed to a JCPOA that has been consistently violated by Tehran and effectively abandoned by the US.

Iran continues to hold British hostages, most notably Nazanin Zaghari-Radcliffe, and spread terror in the region. In Iraq, its militia allies are assassinating young activists – female and male – with impunity.  They are rocketing Baghdad’s Green Zone and bombing military convoys, with the aim of humiliating the new Prime Minister, Mustafa al Kadhimi, and showing him he cannot depend on the US – or any other Western power – for his survival.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah clearly thinks it will not be held to account for the assassination of Rafiq al Hariri in 2005 or for the massive recent explosion at Beirut’s port.

In Syria, Iran has saved the murderous Bashar al Assad and will want rewarding. Some of the militias it has deployed there recently held a public event in Mashhad to advertise their successes, and announce that Jerusalem was their next target.

And now Tehran is offering Beijing privileged access to its energy resources and perhaps also a trading and naval base on the Indian Ocean. None of this is in our interests. But instead of siding with our allies and giving ourselves more leverage over a dictatorship that respects nothing but strength, we are remaining wedded to a deal that has become irrelevant to the two principal signatories.

The time has come for us to change policy. Even under the Obama administration, it is far from certain the JCPOA would have endured as US strategic interests – no matter who is in the White House – lie with regional allies, not the Iranian autocrats, and it seems unlikely that a new Democratic administration would attempt to breathe life into the deal.

The UK should now be joining the US in calling out the real threat to peace in the Middle East and standing with our friends in the region—from Abu Dhabi to Jerusalem. We need to defend the principles of international cooperation, not see them used as a fig leaf for human rights violations, war and nuclear proliferation.

If we’re going to convince allies around the world our place at the UN Security Council works for them and defends our common interest in a world based on agreements, our policy on Iran has got to change. Abstaining shows we’re not prepared to stand up for our friends and won’t stand with our allies – and that weakens everyone, but most of all us.