Iain Dale: Good luck to Robbie Gibb’s prospective challenger to the BBC and Sky. And to News UK if it has a go, too.

4 Sep

Iain Dale presents the evening show on LBC Radio and the For the Many podcast with Jacqui Smith.

On Wednesday, the German government declared that the Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, had indeed be poisoned, and that the nerve agent used was Novichok.

Predictably the Kremlin denied any involvement whatsoever, thereby taking the West for fools yet again. Novichok appears to have become the poison of choice for the Russian Government’s Federal Security Service (FSB). For an apparently developed country to sanction the use of chemical weapons against its own citizens is both unconscionable, and tells us a lot about the ruthlessness of Valdimir Putin.

It is inconceivable that he doesn’t know it is going on, whether or not he gives the direct orders or not. After Salisbury, he could have read the riot act to his former colleagues in the FSB and said: ‘Never again’. He chose not to – and the poisoning of his main political opponent is the result.

So what should the response be? When he was Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson did brilliantly to persuade 20 countries to expel more than 130 Russian diplomats. That was fine, but it didn’t go far enough. All western countries should now impose the most severe Magnitsky sanctions possible against all senior members of the FSB and every single member of the Russian cabinet, including Putin himself.

Germany will be key here. Angela Merkel has enjoyed a better relationship with Putin than most western leaders, and Russia and Germany enjoy economic ties which Britain and Russia do not have.

For Germany to take serious measures against the Kremlin may be the jolt that Putin needs if he is to re-evaluate his ‘poison policy’. Or he may respond by threatening to switch off the supply of gas to Western Europe. If you appease people like Putin, they just laugh at you. The time for serious action is now.

– – – – – – – – – –

I’ve enjoyed reading Philip Collins in The Times over the last twelve years. Sadly he’s been let go as a weekly columnist, but by most standards he’s had a good innings.

He fired off a parting shot email which was particularly ill-judged and ungracious. Rather than thank The Times for giving him the space to air his views over twelve years, he complained that he’d been let go in a thirty second conversation.

Galling, yes, but it’s always better to leave with your head held high, even if you think your benefactors have made a huge mistake. Bitterness is never a good look.

All columnists, and radio presenters for that matter, know that as each hour passes, their day of departure looms ever nearer. I’ve been on LBC for eleven years now. I hope when my time comes I conduct myself with due decorum, but also  hope that day is a long way off!

– – – – – – – – – –

It is rumoured that two more news channels may appear on our screens before too long. There’s little doubt that there is growing dissatisfaction with the news coverage provided by Sky and the BBC, but there is a big question-mark over whether the news viewing market is big enough to sustain new entrants. And would a news channel with a centre-right slant be able to garner enough of an audience to make it commercially viable?

GB News (let’s hope that if it gets on air it has a snappier name) is led by Robbie Gibb and an ex-head of Sky Australia. News UK is also rumoured to be planning something similar.

Both are at pains to say their vision does not involve becoming a UK version of Fox News. Would conventional advertisers be flocking to advertise on a right of centre TV channel? They advertise in right of centre newspapers, so there is no reason why not, I suppose, but I suspect they will take some convincing.

Whoever the financial backers of these channels may be will need to have some very deep pockets indeed to get them through the initial few years. Running costs will go into the tens of millions of pounds. I wish both enterprises luck, because competition is always good, and new entrants to a market can help shake the existing channels out of their rank complacency.

I remember that when Stephan Shakespeare, Tim Montgomerie, Donal Blaney and I started 18 Doughty Street TV in 2006 how difficult it was to build an audience. In those days few people watched video, live or not, on their laptops. Smartphones hadn’t then been invented. In retrospect, we were ten years ahead of our time. Such a channel would do really well nowadays, I suspect.

Why the Germans don’t always do it better

4 Sep

Every so often it becomes fashionable to use the understated brilliance and modernity of Germany as a stick with which to beat Britain for holding to absurdly antiquated ways of doing things.

I did it myself a few months ago, in a piece for ConHome suggesting that when the pandemic is over, we will have to look at what the NHS can learn from Germany.

Now John Kampfner has devoted a whole book, Why The Germans Do It Better, to this theme. It is a good title, but also a hostage to fortune. Will the Germans go on doing it better? Nobody knows.

And although the book, which I have not yet had the pleasure of reading, doubtless contains all sorts of prudent qualifications to the bold assertion in the title, it is bound to encourage the kind of Briton who already believes that compared to Germany, the United Kingdom is hopelessly old-fashioned and resistant to change.

I love Germany, and in the 1990s had the pleasure of living for almost six years in Berlin. During that time, I wondered in vain how to write a book about modern Germany which could be read for pleasure as well as edification.

For in those days, and I fear this is still  true, while educated Germans often had an almost perfect grasp of the English language, and a detailed knowledge of British society, the reverse was by no means the case.

In some well-to-do parts of German society, Anglophilia raged almost out of control. They dispatched their children to fee-paying schools in Britain, followed by British universities. Even their dogs seemed to come from Yorkshire.

I hope some German author is at work on a study of this phenomenon, entitled Why The British Do It Better, which can sit next to Kampfner’s volume on my shelf.

But the truth about Britain and Germany is more complicated than such compliments, or exercises in self-denigration, can convey. And although it is worth identifying the things the Germans do well, it would be naive to suggest that simply by copying German methods, we can transplant their successes to British soil.

John Major said in March 1991 that he wanted Britain to be “where it belongs, at the very heart of Europe”. This always seemed, from a geographical point of view, an implausible goal.

Germany is at the heart of Europe, surrounded by about 20 other countries, all of them smaller than Germany. This is an inescapable fact, and offers a powerful reason for developing some system of amicable co-operation with those neighbours, so none of them becomes worried by Germany’s preponderant size.

The United Kingdom is on the edge of Europe. We have fewer neighbours and wider choices. We may make a dreadful mess of those choices: the Union with Scotland is now in grave danger.

But there is not much profit in trying to deny that the choices exist. Yet this is what Major and his successors tried to do. They said it would be mad to adopt any policy other than being at the heart of Europe.

This accusation of madness did not prove a happy way of managing Major’s critics within the Conservative Party, who put up a dogged resistance to his European policy.

In the eyes of the kind of people who will feel themselves in instinctive agreement with Kampfner’s title, this protracted row was an embarrassment.

It showed how backward and barbarous some Tory MPs were. Individual parliamentarians were held up as examples of complete madness. None of the care and sympathy which are nowadays supposed to be extended to the mentally ill were extended to these Conservatives.

There was instead a brutal attempt to cast them and their ideas out of polite society.

Germany did not have an argument like that. Although the German people wished by a clear majority to keep the German mark, German MPs voted on 23rd April 1998 by 575 to 35 in favour of replacing it with the euro, with no fewer than 27 of the “no” votes coming from the PDS, successor to the East German communist party.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl assured German MPs that the euro would make Frankfurt a “very big financial centre”, that Britain would be a member of the new currency within a few years, and that Switzerland would join within ten years.

In the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which I rejoiced to read each morning, learned professors of economics argued with anguished pedantry that the new currency could not work. Their opinion was widely shared by German voters, who loved going on holiday in Italy, or at least to the local Italian restaurant, but did not think sharing a currency with the Italians was a good idea, and feared German savers and taxpayers were bound to end up subsidising the weaker members of the euro.

Kohl promised them their fears were groundless, and kept the political class solidly behind the project. He was a power politician of genius, who exploited the fact that the opposition Social Democrats believed more devoutly in his European policy than his own Christian Democrats did.

Nor was he above maintaining his dominance with the use of illegal bank accounts. High ideals and low methods were yoked together, but for a long time only the former got much coverage in the German press.

Perhaps it is a good thing that Kohl succeeded: it is hard to tell, for we have not reached the end of the story.

But it is in some ways a pity that German politicians failed to have the argument among themselves which created such animosity within the Conservative Party.

German public opinion was not prepared, and the assumption took hold that one’s duty, as a member of the political class, is not to rock the boat, and to suppress any details which might create the wrong impression.

There wasn’t, in Bonn, the open parliamentary debate which should have preceded so a momentous an experiment as subsuming the national currency, proud symbol of post-war recovery, within a new, supranational currency, as yet unsupported by a new, supranational state.

Dissent was stifled: something more easily done in a system with party lists. Many Germans saw with indignation the herd mentality that had developed among their representatives.

It has become a commonplace of commentary on foreign affairs that Germany is failing to rise to the great responsibilities which now rest on her shoulders.

Again, one may argue that this is a good thing: that being undramatic is better than being over-dramatic: that all difficult questions should be left in the calm hands of Angela Merkel, who long ago had the ruthlessness to knife Kohl.

But this preference for a quiet life has its drawbacks too. For years, Wirecard was held up as a German success story, a rare example of a national tech champion which could beat the Americans at their own game.

German regulators declined to investigate persistent allegations of irregular accounting and the company frightened into silence anyone who suggested its figures were too good to be true.

Only a year ago, Merkel promoted Wirecard’s efforts to get a licence to operate in China.

The German press failed to expose the Wirecard scandal. That was left to a troublesome newspaper based in London, The Financial Times, which took a courageous, principled, long-term view of the story, and wanted to tell its readers what was actually going on. Those qualities are not only found in Germany.

Stephen Booth: With four months left to get a Brexit deal, state aid is the major stumbling block for the UK and EU.

3 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

At this delicate stage, predictions of whether the Brexit negotiations will conclude with a trade agreement or not are bound to be no more than guesswork. With only four months until the end of the Brexit transition period, the chances of a UK-EU trade deal being ready for January 1, 2021 are in fifty-fifty territory.

The EU’s “parallelism” policy – blocking progress in one area as long as there isn’t progress elsewhere – means that Michel Barnier is refusing to discuss British proposals on fishing until the UK moves on other issues, including the most difficult of them all: the EU’s desire to establish a “level playing field” for state aid. It could be argued that Brussels’ insistence on solving the difficult issues first prevents rather than permits progress.

Ultimately, fishing is not likely to be the deal-breaker. The eight EU member states with significant fishing fleets will completely lose access to UK waters if there is no deal at all, so cutting a deal is clearly better than the default, even if it falls well short of the desire for “relative stability” for existing EU quotas.

At the start of the summer there were reasons for optimism about a deal. The EU had signalled a willingness to water down its most ambitious demands on fishing and state aid and the UK had acknowledged the EU’s concerns about the overall structure of the agreement.

However, the mood appears to have turned and the last negotiating round yielded very little, according to the readouts from both sides. This week Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Foreign Minister, cited the “intransigent and frankly unrealistic attitude” of the UK for the lack of progress. Barnier yesterday gave a speech outlining the continued areas of disagreement. Equally, recent media reports suggest the UK is preparing the ground to walk away from the talks if the stalemate continues much longer.

State aid is the major stumbling block. The impasse would appear to be a bigger problem in theory than in practice. UK orthodoxy has seen past governments refrain from major interventions in the economy. According to the European Commission’s “State aid Scoreboard”, the UK spent state aid equivalent to 0.34 per cent of GDP in 2018, compared to an EU average of 0.76 per cent. Meanwhile, France spent 0.79 per cent, slightly above the EU average, and Germany spent a much larger per cent.

The perception in Brussels is that this UK Government is different. David McAllister, the German MEP who chairs the European Parliament’s Brexit committee and who is close to Angela Merkel, has said the “UK’s interest in subsidising sectors”, such as steel and cars, would have “direct consequences for EU industries and jobs if these goods have ‘duty-free, quota-free’ access to the single market”.

This precise fear of the UK turning to a historically continental strategy of promoting “national champions” may be wide of the mark. Nevertheless, it is clear that some members of this Government view industrial policy and strategic investment as important levers at its disposal.

In this area, the devil will be in the detail. In the post-Covid world, it is difficult to predict what will be required of the state and nimbleness may be critical. Therefore, it is understandable that the UK would not want to find itself bound permanently by treaty into the EU state-aid regime, much of which is “temporarily” suspended in any case due to the pressures of the crisis on national and regional governments.

Little headway appears likely until the UK sets out its blueprint for domestic state subsidy control, which is expected to be later this month. At a minimum, the UK will need to comply with WTO rules, but these fall far short of the requirements of the current EU regime.

WTO rules only apply to goods, while the EU rules apply to both goods and services. The EU rules are prescriptive in what and what is not permitted, whereas, in practice, WTO rules set a high threshold because complainant countries must demonstrate that disputed aid is harmful in its effect.

The EU appears to have walked back from its initial position – clearly unacceptable to the Government – that the UK should continue to be bound by EU state aid rules into the future, with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) having the final say in respect of enforcement. In contrast, the EU’s agreement with Canada simply uses the WTO model as a basis and expands it to services, but there are limited options for enforcement.

A possible compromise would be for the UK to implement domestic legislation, adopting some aspects of the status quo, enforced by an independent UK authority and subject to review by Parliament and the UK courts (not the ECJ). Subject to dispute settlement, set out in the UK-EU trade agreement, the EU (and the UK) would retain the right to adopt countermeasures, such as tariffs, against any state aid deemed to be trade-distorting.

Whether this would be acceptable to the EU remains to be seen. The essential objective from the UK’s perspective is to depart from the EU’s desire to micromanage the UK’s subsidy policy by treaty. However, the UK would need to accept the principle that the EU could deal with the consequences of UK subsidies with countermeasures such as retaliatory tariffs.

A bust up in September or October does not necessarily preclude a deal at the last minute. Weighed against these important, yet technocratic considerations, is the prospect of no agreement at all.

A trade agreement, with no tariffs on UK-EU trade and regulatory cooperation, would better enable the UK to implement the Northern Ireland Protocol in the light-touch way the Government has outlined.

Any disruption attributed to a no deal exit, however transient, would give Keir Starmer ammunition in his continued attack on Government competence. Against this, the Government is in a much stronger position than it was in the autumn of 2019 when renegotiating the Withdrawal Agreement.

Failure would have economic and geopolitical consequences for the EU too. The UK may only be Germany’s seventh largest trade partner, but it ranks second in contributing to Germany’s trade surplus.

It is notable that Tom Tugendhat MP has on this site recently called for the UK to break with EU policy on Iran to adopt an approach closer to the United States. In the event of a breakdown in the trade relationship, Brussels should not be surprised to encounter a more muscularly independent UK in other fields.

We are now approaching the end game. The technical negotiations have probably achieved as much as they can at this stage. It will soon be up to the politicians on both sides of the table to make the big call about whether to make the deal or not.

Matt Kilcoyne: Anti-democratic China is testing the West’s resolve, and it’s CANZUK that has risen to the occasion

11 Aug

Matt Kilcoyne is Deputy Director of the Adam Smith Institute

When I was growing up, I believed that the West had won. Not just won militarily, economically, or even culturally. But philosophically.

The enlightenment values of the United Kingdom, the free market popularised by thinkers in the United States, and the pragmatism of European countries converging after decades spent tearing each other asunder. No more a half-century long battle between communism and capitalism, no more chance of fascism or socialism holding down the liberties of the world’s peoples.

Slowly, but surely, the world had changed. Gradual liberalisation was inevitable. I thought, foolishly, that the empirics of a world made richer, with more choice, happier, freer, more tolerant people, engaged in commerce with others right across the world would be obvious to all.

I had not yet got that old enmities die hard and traditions die harder, or even that institutions really matter. I had misunderstood that, to a great degree, the victory of the liberal world order was one built on universal claims of the rights of men, but predicated on an uneasy realist peace between American, CANZUK (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK), and European ideals.

I had mistaken the peace and prosperity that coincided with the end of the Cold War as a victory of our civilisations – when really other rulers, some far colder and more cruel, were always waiting to stake their claim.

To do so was wrong. Russian expansionism has re-emerged in Ukraine and Georgia and Putin has spent the past decade sabre rattling at Middle Eastern and Baltic states. Erdogan’s Ottomanite expressions in Turkey and his dalliances in Syria and Libya stand out too. And, of course, China – in its outwardly hostile relations to Taiwan, military skirmishes over the border with India, and treaty-defying legislation over Hong Kong.

Each of these states are nations, but I suspect that the leaders of them think of the international order they find themselves in as too limiting of their ambitions. They mean to mould the world around their vision for their own seemingly exceptional civilisations.

I suspect you know this in your heart of hearts. Russia’s consecration of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces was egregious in its scale and its pomp. Christ has been co-opted to glorify the victories of the Red Army. Erdogan’s reconversion of the Hagia Sophia to a mosque marks the effective end of the secular republic of Ataturk. China’s placement of party power in Hong Kong, in silencing critics and arresting students for holding flags, shows a commitment to its communist ideology above that of international treaty obligations.

Foreign policy is not something the Adam Smith Institute focuses on too heavily. We prefer the domestic, and learning from the best of the rest around the world. The relations between foreign governments and our own is a fascination of some policy wonks, but we’d far rather ambassadors were left handing out Ferrero Rocher than having any real bearing on the everyday dealings between companies, scholars, friends, and family.

To that end our policies are focused on trying to make life as free as possible for people here, while proposing policy that would open up new opportunities overseas for trade and exchange. Sometimes though, the rest of the world comes knocking and you should not ignore when wolves are at the door.

Adam Smith said in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that “Opulence and Freedom, [are] the two greatest blessings men can possess.” I do not for a second suppose that he mistook the order of his words. People can tolerate lower levels of freedom if they’re rich enough to have choices left. However, there comes a point where a lack of freedom threatens the peace of a place.

In his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith makes the correct observation that “little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.”

I’m afraid to say that Hong Kong’s opulence looks set to diminish. Yesterday the tolerable administration of justice was tested right to breaking point.

The arrest of the founder of Apple Daily, journalist Jimmy Lai, the arrest of ITV News freelancer and British National Wilson Li, young pro-democracy activist Agnes Chow and the likes of Reuters, AP and AFP from a news conference show that individuals are now targets of the state. It shows too that the commitment under Article 4 of the new National Security Law supposedly upholding freedom of the press is not worth the paper it is printed upon.

This is a test of the West’s resolve and our ability to act. But the West is splintered. Macron’s acquiescence to Xi Jingping showed up a coward’s response. The French president is a man of action as his stint in Lebanon shows but no action is forthcoming on China. Merkel decided her little chats with Beijing were worth more than the rights of Chinese people. The EU Commission called the National Security Law deplorable but again did nothing beyond pushing the press release to save face at home.

The CANZUK states though, and the US, have risen to the occasion. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom joined the USA in condemning moves to shut down free and fair elections in Hong Kong this autumn. Australia and the UK joined Taiwan in offering refuge from those looking to escape communist control of the city.

The universal values that we preached, that we set in the basic law of Hong Kong, have been an inspiration to Hong Kongers that took to the streets. It was the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes that flew in protestors hands.

Yes the fact of easy geography plays to regional blocs strengths. But our common cause in recent months with CANZUK states on Russia and Chinese aggression has shown the ease with which we, with common language, common political systems, common history, common sense of purpose, translate into a sheer force of fact re-emergence of a global role that has eluded the mandarins in the foreign office for far too long.

Our civilisation needs champions to save it from opponents and challengers abroad, but also nationalists at home. Greater freedoms for us all, and expanded out to include those in our sister countries overseas allow us all to be the champions of it through our deeds. We must defend the gains of globalisation for the whole of the world, while challenging those that seek to usurp the norms that made those gains possible.

Adam Smith was right when he argued that there was a great deal of ruin in a nation. But there might yet be a great deal of good in our civilisation.

At 6-7pm tonight, the Adam Smith Institute is hosting an event titled: In Defence of Globalisation. Click this link to register your place.

Matt Kilcoyne: Anti-democratic China is testing the West’s resolve, and it’s CANZUK that has risen to the occasion

11 Aug

Matt Kilcoyne is Deputy Director of the Adam Smith Institute

When I was growing up, I believed that the West had won. Not just won militarily, economically, or even culturally. But philosophically.

The enlightenment values of the United Kingdom, the free market popularised by thinkers in the United States, and the pragmatism of European countries converging after decades spent tearing each other asunder. No more a half-century long battle between communism and capitalism, no more chance of fascism or socialism holding down the liberties of the world’s peoples.

Slowly, but surely, the world had changed. Gradual liberalisation was inevitable. I thought, foolishly, that the empirics of a world made richer, with more choice, happier, freer, more tolerant people, engaged in commerce with others right across the world would be obvious to all.

I had not yet got that old enmities die hard and traditions die harder, or even that institutions really matter. I had misunderstood that, to a great degree, the victory of the liberal world order was one built on universal claims of the rights of men, but predicated on an uneasy realist peace between American, CANZUK (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK), and European ideals.

I had mistaken the peace and prosperity that coincided with the end of the Cold War as a victory of our civilisations – when really other rulers, some far colder and more cruel, were always waiting to stake their claim.

To do so was wrong. Russian expansionism has re-emerged in Ukraine and Georgia and Putin has spent the past decade sabre rattling at Middle Eastern and Baltic states. Erdogan’s Ottomanite expressions in Turkey and his dalliances in Syria and Libya stand out too. And, of course, China – in its outwardly hostile relations to Taiwan, military skirmishes over the border with India, and treaty-defying legislation over Hong Kong.

Each of these states are nations, but I suspect that the leaders of them think of the international order they find themselves in as too limiting of their ambitions. They mean to mould the world around their vision for their own seemingly exceptional civilisations.

I suspect you know this in your heart of hearts. Russia’s consecration of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces was egregious in its scale and its pomp. Christ has been co-opted to glorify the victories of the Red Army. Erdogan’s reconversion of the Hagia Sophia to a mosque marks the effective end of the secular republic of Ataturk. China’s placement of party power in Hong Kong, in silencing critics and arresting students for holding flags, shows a commitment to its communist ideology above that of international treaty obligations.

Foreign policy is not something the Adam Smith Institute focuses on too heavily. We prefer the domestic, and learning from the best of the rest around the world. The relations between foreign governments and our own is a fascination of some policy wonks, but we’d far rather ambassadors were left handing out Ferrero Rocher than having any real bearing on the everyday dealings between companies, scholars, friends, and family.

To that end our policies are focused on trying to make life as free as possible for people here, while proposing policy that would open up new opportunities overseas for trade and exchange. Sometimes though, the rest of the world comes knocking and you should not ignore when wolves are at the door.

Adam Smith said in his Lectures on Jurisprudence that “Opulence and Freedom, [are] the two greatest blessings men can possess.” I do not for a second suppose that he mistook the order of his words. People can tolerate lower levels of freedom if they’re rich enough to have choices left. However, there comes a point where a lack of freedom threatens the peace of a place.

In his first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith makes the correct observation that “little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.”

I’m afraid to say that Hong Kong’s opulence looks set to diminish. Yesterday the tolerable administration of justice was tested right to breaking point.

The arrest of the founder of Apple Daily, journalist Jimmy Lai, the arrest of ITV News freelancer and British National Wilson Li, young pro-democracy activist Agnes Chow and the likes of Reuters, AP and AFP from a news conference show that individuals are now targets of the state. It shows too that the commitment under Article 4 of the new National Security Law supposedly upholding freedom of the press is not worth the paper it is printed upon.

This is a test of the West’s resolve and our ability to act. But the West is splintered. Macron’s acquiescence to Xi Jingping showed up a coward’s response. The French president is a man of action as his stint in Lebanon shows but no action is forthcoming on China. Merkel decided her little chats with Beijing were worth more than the rights of Chinese people. The EU Commission called the National Security Law deplorable but again did nothing beyond pushing the press release to save face at home.

The CANZUK states though, and the US, have risen to the occasion. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom joined the USA in condemning moves to shut down free and fair elections in Hong Kong this autumn. Australia and the UK joined Taiwan in offering refuge from those looking to escape communist control of the city.

The universal values that we preached, that we set in the basic law of Hong Kong, have been an inspiration to Hong Kongers that took to the streets. It was the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes that flew in protestors hands.

Yes the fact of easy geography plays to regional blocs strengths. But our common cause in recent months with CANZUK states on Russia and Chinese aggression has shown the ease with which we, with common language, common political systems, common history, common sense of purpose, translate into a sheer force of fact re-emergence of a global role that has eluded the mandarins in the foreign office for far too long.

Our civilisation needs champions to save it from opponents and challengers abroad, but also nationalists at home. Greater freedoms for us all, and expanded out to include those in our sister countries overseas allow us all to be the champions of it through our deeds. We must defend the gains of globalisation for the whole of the world, while challenging those that seek to usurp the norms that made those gains possible.

Adam Smith was right when he argued that there was a great deal of ruin in a nation. But there might yet be a great deal of good in our civilisation.

At 6-7pm tonight, the Adam Smith Institute is hosting an event titled: In Defence of Globalisation. Click this link to register your place.