Anand Menon: Europe and the war. Will the unity engendered by Russia’s invasion last?

18 Apr

Anand Menon is Director of the UK in a Changing Europe.

‘Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.’ If ever there were a moment to ponder the import of Jean Monnet’s words, it is now. The war in Ukraine has come as a shock to the system of a union that, for years, has failed to deliver when it comes to its security ambitions.

Unlike, say, the Eurozone or migration crises, events in Ukraine have not proven intrinsically divisive. In the face of the armed invasion of a neighbouring sovereign state by a country already recognised as a potential threat, and acting in lockstep with the United States, unity amongst member states has been (relatively) easy to maintain. If the Donald Trump presidency (and accompanying threats – at least according to John Bolton – to leave NATO) had illustrated the fragility of the NATO shield, Ukraine has rammed home its continued importance by underlining the reality of the Russian sword.

The shock delivered to the collective EU system seems to have spawned a realisation, going beyond the usual cheap talk, that its ‘geopolitical holiday’ is over. And not simply because of the conflict itself. More broadly, many of the other challenges the Union faces in its neighbourhood – in the Middle East, Africa, the Sahel, and the Balkans – will be exacerbated by the war. As the EU’s newly minted ‘Strategic Compass’ puts it, the EU is ‘surrounded by instability and conflicts’.

How has the EU responded?

At Versailles in March, EU leaders declared their intention to ensure the EU could ‘take more responsibility for its own security’. The Strategic Compass published ten days later declared that the ‘EU and its Member States must invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor.’

And, crucially, member states seem intent on rising to the challenge. In a dramatic half hour on 27 February, Olaf Scholtz reversed decades of German strategic thinking. German defence spending will rise from 1.5 per cent in 2021 to two per cent; a 100-billion-euro fund will be created for the armed forces. Germany will become the world’s third biggest military spender.

Nor is Germany alone. Denmark and Poland have also announced increases in defence spending. The former has announced a referendum on its opt-out from EU security policies. Finland and Sweden are reconsidering the issue of NATO membership. And, in a stark break with past reticence, the EU itself pledged to provide Ukraine with €1 billion in military assistance.

There is of course a long way to go before rousing words are translated into meaningful action. Yet it does seem that one consequence of the current crisis will be significantly enhanced European military capabilities.

So far, so overdue. Europeans have been free riders on American power for far too long. However, capabilities are one thing. Deploying them is quite another. Taking greater responsibility for European security implies working collectively. Working collectively, in turn, requires consensus (because a genuine ‘European Army’ is not on the cards). Perhaps the biggest question emerging from the present crisis is whether the unity engendered by the Russian invasion will last.

While the EU has imposed five separate sanctions packages on Russia, the longer the conflict lasts, or the nastier it gets, the greater the pressure will be to extend these to cover oil and gas. Germany, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria, however, are highly dependent on Russian gas exports, raising the prospect of bitter arguments to come.

Which raises the thornier question as to how member states might respond to Russian attempts to negotiate a settlement. Emmanuel Macron has maintained a dialogue with Vladimir Putin, despite the obvious irritation this caused among some of the former’s partners (‘nobody negotiated with Hitler’, as the Polish Prime Minister put it). A firm offer of de-escalation in return for concessions on sanctions might well exacerbate such tensions.

Then there is Ukraine itself. While many of the Central European and Baltic states favour a rapid path to EU membership, the French and Dutch have expressed reservations. The Versailles declaration was typically vague, promising support for Ukraine in ‘pursuing its European path’ whilst affirming (meaninglessly) that ‘Ukraine belongs to our European family’. Again, it is not hard to imagine the debate about the appropriate relationship with a post-war Ukraine becoming a running sore within the EU.

And of course such sores existed well before the current conflict. Internal disputes over the rule of law are now being viewed through the lens of events in Ukraine. The European Commission is preparing to release billions in recovery funds for Poland, which has been in the frontline of the refugee crisis. In contrast, two days after the re-election of Viktor Orbán (with his clear sympathies for Putin), the Commission announced plans to trigger a rule of law mechanism allowing it to deprive Hungary of millions of euros in scheduled payments.

It is too early to predict the possible medium-term consequences of all this. On the one hand, the crisis might prompt Poland to reconcile with the European Union. Or, it might encourage political leaders in Warsaw to believe they can act as they like at home as long as they keep in step with EU external policy. As for Hungary, with Orbán’s refusal to countenance weapons deliveries or sanctions on Russian gas exports already straining relations with other member states, it seems reasonable to assume that tensions between Budapest and Brussels will continue to bedevil the Union.

However endless the conflict in Ukraine may be coming to feel, we are still in its early phase. And this might be the easy phase as far as the EU is concerned. How long the war lasts, and the circumstances in which it ends will obviously help shape its longer-term consequences for the Union. It seems likely, though, that member states will emerge with enhanced military capabilities. Whether or not they agree on the foreign policy objectives to which these capabilities will contribute, however, is far from certain.

Jack Brereton: The regulated betting and gaming industry is crucial to the UK’s post-pandemic recovery

9 Nov

Jack Brereton MP is the Conservative Member of Parliament for Stoke-on-Trent South. This is a sponsored post by the Betting and Gaming Council.

A few weeks ago, my fellow Stoke-on-Trent MPs and I were pleased to visit bet365’s headquarters in the city. It was an enjoyable occasion and a useful reminder of the huge economic contribution that the betting giant makes to our constituencies.

In all, the family-owned company employs over 4,500 staff in Stoke-on-Trent. These are high-skilled, good quality – jobs – providing excellent long-term career opportunities for families across the area.

In turn, they spend money in shops and other businesses, helping to boost the local economy to the tune of £390 million a year. In a city where the average wage level is over £80 a week less than the national average, the skilled jobs and the investment it attracts is unmatched. And as an example of the Government’s levelling up agenda in action, it’s pretty hard to beat.

But it’s not just about jobs, important as they are. bet365 has also donated £531 million to the Denise Coates Foundation, enabling it to support local, national and international UK-registered charities.

The company’s ownership of Stoke City has seen season tickets frozen for several years and free away travel provided for the club’s supporters. Meanwhile, the Stoke City Community Trust carries out a range of programmes, many of which I’ve seen first-hand. This includes a college community education football scheme, support to schools encourage participation of young people in sport and the Every Player Counts disability initiative.

It should also not be forgotten that bet365 and its founders are the highest taxpayers in the UK, paying some £614.6 million to the Treasury in 2019/20 – money which will have helped fund vital public services like health and education, not just in Stoke-on-Trent but across the whole country.

bet365 is a great example of how a well-regulated betting and gaming industry can play a vital role in the economic health of the nation. According to a report by EY, in 2019 members of the Betting and Gaming Council supported 119,000 jobs, generated £4.5 billion in tax and contributed £7.7 billion to the economy in gross value added. And just last month, BGC members pledged to create 5,000 apprenticeships by 2025.

As the Government’s Gambling Review continues – something which I strongly support as an opportunity to raise standards – it’s important for Ministers to bear in mind this economic contribution and do nothing to put the industry’s competitiveness at risk.

It’s not all about pounds, shillings and pence, of course. I am acutely aware of the importance of safer gambling, and believe the regulated industry has taken great strides in recent years to address this issue. bet365 has been at the forefront of this work in raising the bar for high standards within the sector. There is still of course more to do, but compare the approach of licensed operators to that of the illegal, online black market.

The ‘Take Time To Think’ campaign recently launched by the BGC highlights the range of safer gambling tools which are offered by their members, such as the ability to set deposit limits, take time outs and self-exclude. None of these are provided in the black market.

Evidence from abroad shows that unlicensed gambling sites stand to benefit when the regulated sector is uncompetitive, using their unscrupulous means to target the most vulnerable.In Norway, where there is a state monopoly, the black marketaccounts for 66 per cent of all money staked; in Bulgaria,which has a higher effective tax rate, the black market accounts for 47 cent of all money staked; and in Italy, where betting advertising is banned, the black market accounts for 23 per cent of all money staked.

And we can’t afford to be complacent in this country. According to a report by PwC, the amount of money staked with unlicensed operators in the UK doubled from £1.4 billion in 2018 to £2.8 billion in 2020, while the number of customers using unlicensed websites increased from 210,000 to 460,000.

If you’ll pardon the pun, there’s a lot at stake when the Government publishes its White Paper in the coming months. While change is necessary to further the work already started by those leading the sector, nothing should be done which puts at risk the continued success of the regulated industry – and the vital revenues it provides to the Exchequer.

Lee Rotherham: Europe’s new radical alliance is brittle, but offers the EU an important warning

15 Jul

Dr Lee Rotherham is a member of the advisory board of Kids Count.

In a recent piece on this site, Garvan Walshe pondered the development of a new continental Eurosceptic coalition. This “rassemblement des patriotes” brings together the parties of Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orban, and Jaroslaw Kaczynski among others. The phenomenon serves as a marker not only of the EU’s past mistakes, but also its future ones.

As the piece noted, it is not a simple alliance nor a very deep one. It excludes a number of Eurosceptic players, most notably the Czech ODS and some key Scandinavians. The definition of “Euroscepticism” among signatories is elastic: in addition to the Italian contingent navigating a coalition government, Le Pen’s own Rassemblement National accepts the Euro and rejects Frexit. The fact that Orban, having been forced out of the EPP, is now jumping into a new grouping he originally turned down in 2019 certainly demonstrates an element of instability.

Yet the simple fact of this arrangement is a milestone. It reminds one of the quote attributed to a continental diplomat at the time of Maastricht that, “If the British did not exist, we would have to invent them.” After Brexit, that is precisely what is happening.

To explain why, we need to first understand where the impetus to generate a group comes from. It is an institutional response to an institutional problem.

European bodies in recent years have increasingly formalised political alliances for administrative purposes. Even within the Council of Europe, you may recall several years back how United Russia formally sitting alongside the Conservatives suddenly became an issue.

Within the EU this has become very developed. Political groups have a composite budget and employ staff (on healthy wages) for policy drafting, committee work, negotiations with counterparts, and generating the whip.

Group size determines budget share, speaking time, share of posts and committee places, PR money for MEP freebies, and the very significant think tank money for the likes of the Wilfried Martens Centre. It also guarantees a seat at the Conference of Presidents running EP business. Being able to generate a group is therefore important, and the bigger the better, though the dynamic limits are evident if we remember Conservative membership of the EPP.

There is a threshold for setting up a group. Currently, 23 MEPs are needed, and at least one-quarter of the member states must be represented. Look back to my 1998 edition of the Vademecum though, and it’s 29 from one member state, 23 from two, 18 from three or 14 from four or more.

Why this jump to get members from at least seven countries? In large part, it was ruthless cynicism. It was assumed by the main groups that it would difficult for Eurosceptic groups to reach that threshold given both ideological differences and the lack of pan-Europeanism. They weren’t wrong.

The net result was four Eurosceptic blocs. There was a “soft Eurosceptic” element in the ED subsumed in the EPP, emerging again to become the ECR. There was the “hard Eurosceptic” group (variously EdN, EDD, Ind/Dem), dependent on small MEP delegations and ever hovering on dissolution.

Then there were the small group of Left/Green “Europe is a capitalist plot” Eurosceptics, counterpoised with their fellow Left/Greens who saw the EU as a mechanism to smash big industry. That left the “political untouchables” often sitting as the ragtag leftover Non-Inscrits (an attempt to formalise this as a group was defeated in the courts).

This then generated an EU political scene dominated by ideologically-overlapping Centre Left and Centre Right groups, largely operating in a state of formalised compromise; and on the edges a marginalised and divided Eurosceptic opposition, obliged to make its appeal directly to the electorate.

With Brexit though the group maths has changed, and I would suggest it is generating contradictory imperatives. Strategically, it encourages radical parties to soften in order to cooperate internationally; but there is also a competing domestic pull to harden their positions more, to secure support among increasingly alienated social conservatives at home. It is not yet clear which force will win out; following how Estonia’s new EKRE party plays out will perhaps be an early pointer.

Set in the context of group politics, the arrival of this new “rassemblement des patriotes” correspondingly suggests three significant conclusions.

First, it is significant that the named trigger was the Conference on the Future of Europe – basically a second Convention on the Future of Europe, which last time round offered up an EU Constitution. The EU is already repeating the same mistakes it made before, anticipating more integration rather than questioning assumptions and remembering lost referenda.

So far the ECR Eurosceptics around veteran MEP Jan Zahradil have been doing the running in the fightback. This new group though is now giving notice that it intends a massive organised pile-on as well. Expect the Conference to heat up and its findings to generate a political crisis next year, and quite possibly several.

Second, it’s clear there are enduring splits among Eurosceptics about who is and who isn’t an appropriate partner. Sharing a broad opposition to EU integration is still not enough. It is nevertheless a fact that parts of “New Europe” are very socially conservative and reject the EU’s direction both conceptually and emotionally.

This social conservatism also happens to be shared with large parts of Russian society. It is hardly surprising in that context if Putin’s domestic politics give him a certain specific appeal, not as a border revanchist but as someone who dares push back against a Western “policy consensus gone wrong”.

Third, we can predict that EU politicians will botch their response. Brussels players too lazily conflate extremism with populism, and populism with popularity. Experience suggests that this is often down to a combination of a lack of intellectual curiosity plus short-term political advantage.

But attempts to marginalise, delegitimise and humiliate only serve to polarise by disenfranchising. Even a more tempered approach that ignores the core grievances still produces asymmetric and anti-establishment figures in response, from Beppe Grillo to now Slavi Trifonov in Bulgaria.

This is certainly not an endorsement of any political party’s stance: it is simply a warning that serious EU policy failures especially over immigration and Eurozone management need to be fixed and not rendered taboo. Liberal campaigners also need to recognise that the European Courts are a counterproductive mechanism for pursuing major social change by lawfare.

This new radical alliance (for want of a better term) is indeed brittle. It is uncemented, frangible, and perhaps ephemeral. But if Brussels commuters physically need to see an early warning sign that any move to grab more EU powers next year is going to end badly, then this is it, plastered all over a billboard.

Andrew Green: As unemployment soars, why are Ministers harming our young people – by helping migrants compete for their jobs?

9 Sep

Lord Green is President of MigrationWatch UK and a cross-bench peer.

This week, the Government is promoting its “Kickstart” scheme – a £2 billion programme which Ministers claim will put young people at the heart of our economic recovery.

Really? So what about their “new entrant” route in the immigration system that will come into force in January? Perhaps this is another case of the left hand having no idea what the right hand is doing?

Very few people have realised what an impact this new route could have on our youngsters. Their employment prospects are already very worrying. Unemployment is likely to run into millions across the whole workforce, and our school leavers will already face strong competition from British workers who will have lost their jobs and who already have several years of work experience.

That is a daunting prospect, but it is made even worse by the special deal that the Government is planning to offer to employers to recruit young workers from all over the world.

The Government already intends to lower the qualifications required to work in the UK from degree level to A level, thus placing migrants in direct competition with our school leavers. Worse, there will be a special scheme for younger workers, under 26 when they first arrive, for whom the salary requirement will be only £20,480 per year – little more than the National Living Wage.

As if that was not enough, the Government is also planning to remove the current requirement that jobs should be advertised in the UK before being offered to workers from abroad. This has been a requirement for decades and for a very good reason – to require employers to give British workers a shot at applying before a job is given to a foreign applicant.

However, employers say this is inconvenient (no surprise there), so the Government is deferring to their wishes, and will abolish it from next January when the new immigration system comes into force.

And, on top of all that, there is to be no limit on the numbers, from all over the world and of whatever age, permitted to come to work in the UK.

Will they come? Of course they will, and not just “new entrants”. The number of foreign workers who meet these requirements and are likely to have the necessary level of English (so far unspecified) runs literally into tens of millions.

For many, the salary is far more than they could earn at home. Furthermore, some will have relatives already here who will encourage them. Others will be attracted by the right to settle here after five years – a right that also extends to “new entrants”

That in turn will bring the possibility of eventually bringing a wife, children and other dependants over from their home country with free education for any children and, after settlement, free health care for all. What is there not to like about such an offer?

As for the employers who have ruthlessly pressed for these arrangements, how will they respond? Well, of course, they will be out recruiting. Cheaper, obedient labour unlikely to unionise. What more could they ask for?

And, if you are in any doubt consider what happened when we opened our labour market to East European workers with no limit on numbers. Within four years, there were half a million in the UK, and hundreds of thousands more were taken on in the years following the Great Financial Crash while the number of unemployed British workers remained stubbornly high.

Then, some half a million Romanians and Bulgarians came following the opening up of the employment market to them in 2014. Remember that firm in Northampton that recruited a plane load of 300 Hungarians to make sandwiches? When the Government checked afterwards, they found that the firm had not even approached the local job centre to see if there were any British workers available.

So, in a nutshell, there is to be no limit on the number of foreign workers that employers can bring in to the UK and if they are under 26, have the equivalent of A Levels, and speak some English they can be brought in on pay not much higher than the living wage.

This scheme threatens the jobs, training and future of our young people. The number of young British workers who will be directly affected by this scheme is roughly one and a half million. They have had disruption enough in their young lives. The least that the Government can do in the current crisis is to withdraw this dangerous proposal.