Jamie Green: Now that Brexit has finally happened, Scotland’s ambitions must stretch beyond Europe

12 Jan

Jamie Green is Shadow Cabinet Secretary for Education and an MSP for West Scotland.

They say that January is a time for renewal, new starts and new resolutions. After the 2020 we’ve just had, that message of renewal is more important than ever, but I can think of nobody in greater need of wiping the slate clean and replacing the broken record than our very own First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon.

I appreciate that it’s difficult for a veteran politician of 30 years to find somewhere to start fresh, but I might gently suggest to the First Minister that she embraces 2021 with a more positive vision of what Scotland can achieve going forward. Instead of endless re-running of votes and arguments, all of which she sadly lost, the leader of Scotland’s government needs to embrace the reality of the new world we are in.

“A No Deal Brexit would be a catastrophic outcome for Scotland” – she proclaimed, before ordering her MPs to vote for one in the closing days of 2020. To her, Brexit has always been an emotive weapon used to stir up division and further her grievance with the UK government. But also one of absolute hypocrisy and paradoxical ironies.

She would happily drive our fishermen and their fish straight back into the murky seas of the Common Fisheries Policy, and she would herd our farmers back behind the fences of the Common Agricultural Policy, if it meant achieving her lifelong political mission of Scottish separation, at the expense of everyone and everything else. Her swansong perhaps, at any cost.

Just last weekend, her own deputy labelled a second independence referendum “an essential priority” without a hint of irony, apparently unaware of the global pandemic and the mounting Coronavirus death toll in Scotland.

The truth is that she must be spitting nails at the UK’s orderly managed exit, because the SNP calculated it had more to gain by pushing for a chaotic departure rather than acting in the national interest. The truth is that the SNP was desperate for the final week of 2020 to be marked with disruption and for 2021 to begin with the very No Deal exit from EU transition that it had spent years condemning with the might of a pulpit preacher.

They talked of the cliff edge ad-infinitum, only to then vote for one when it came to the actual crunch: do as I say, not as I do.

Now that Brexit has finally happened, and we have actually left the EU, how on earth can Scotland be reassured that their First Minister will embrace the New Year and the opportunities that awaits us with the zeitgeist it merits? The problem for Scotland is that she won’t.

If only her separatist government put such effort into its domestic policy as it does its interest in repealing referenda, perhaps we wouldn’t have seen the demise of our world-class education, our judicial system or the seemingly perpetual decline of our economy under the reigns of the nationalist government in St. Andrew’s House in Edinburgh.

When you think about it, the only people who should be afraid of the new freedoms we have outside the EU, is the SNP. With more powers devolved to these islands, they might simply now have to deliver for Scotland rather than just pointing the finger at Westminster when things go wrong.

The bogeyman is neither Europe nor London. The power and responsibility lie firmly in Edinburgh. Be it agricultural policy, or fishing infrastructure. Be it environmental ambition or investment in infrastructure – the Scottish Government has much to account for and much to deliver.

The stark reality facing all governments is to make sure that Brexit actually works for everybody in Scotland, not just those who voted for it. Instead of listening to what Scotland can’t do without Brussels, I want our government to start talking about the opportunities on our doorstep. Our global ambition, if you like.

What about a study abroad scheme with Australia? A financial services agreement with the US, so firms in Edinburgh can have unfettered access to the multi trillion-dollar market in New York? Scotland will always be a close partner and ally of Europe, but our ambitions must stretch beyond the continent of the political union we have just taken leave of if we are to succeed.

Nobody is saying that things will be easy, but ambition is core to success.

We begin 2021 with a new deal, a new relationship, and a new future, which does require some patience I admit. But waiting is not a quality that Sturgeon can rely on, because the political life expectancy of SNP leaders who lose referendums is very limited, and she has been on the losing side of every referendum she has ever campaigned on.

Unlike the First Minister, I believe that Scotland can truly thrive outside of the constraints of Brussels. I want those powers of the Brexit bounty repatriated to these shores, so that every corner of the UK can take advantage of a global UK. The deal thrashed out with the EU, and accepted by both sides, means Scotland will succeed by not only having tariff-free access the European Single Market, but by allowing us to benefit from new free trading arrangements with economic giants such as the US, India, Japan, and Canada. Our whisky, our salmon, our smokies: a global market for a truly global Scotland.

It now just needs a First Minister with the resolution, a new found one if you will, to work with and not against the grain and make a success of our renewed place in the world.

Stephen Booth: This trade deal delivers both the UK and the EU’s main objectives. It gives us freedom – which comes at a price.

29 Dec

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

Much of the analysis of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement will flow from underlying prejudices. “The UK shouldn’t have left”, “we don’t need a trade deal with the EU”, “the UK should have or could have asked for X or Y”. It is, however, more instructive to assess the deal against the Government’s stated aims and, for that matter, what the EU said it wanted.

Brexit will have economic and geopolitical consequences. But, ultimately, it is a constitutional question for both Brexiteers and Brussels. In the foreword to the UK explainer, the Prime Minister cites “restoring national sovereignty” as the “central purpose of leaving the EU”.

Meanwhile, the EU’s brochure is quick to stress that, even under the new agreement, the UK will lose the benefits of membership. “This will recreate barriers to trade in goods and services and to cross-border mobility and exchanges that have not existed for decades,” it says. In other words, freedom comes at a price.

The past year of negotiations has not simply been an exercise in haggling over the price of UK legal independence from the EU system. At times, it seemed Brussels was simply unwilling to recognise this principle as part of a negotiated settlement. The EU had initially demanded dynamic alignment with EU law, enforced via the European Court of Justice (ECJ). And it demanded a continuation of existing EU fishing rights in UK waters, despite the UK’s departure from the Common Fisheries Policy.

A Brexit government with a significant majority could not have accepted such a deal. Nonetheless, convincing the EU to conclude a deal that does recognise the UK as a “sovereign equal” is a significant achievement for the negotiating team led by David Frost. The agreement is based on international law, there is no role for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and no requirement for the UK to continue following EU law. Under the terms of the Northern Ireland Protocol, ECJ jurisprudence will continue over some issues in the province. Despite this, there has been a calming of Northern Irish tensions over the issue.

As has been noted before, this negotiation was unique, since it was driven by the desire for separation rather than integration. Therefore, any agreement essentially had to do two things. First, establish the new baseline for the UK-EU economic relationship (or the degree of dislocation) and, second, address how further divergence (or convergence) in the future should be managed.

The deal’s main feature is ensuring there are no tariffs or quotas on goods traded between the UK and the EU, where they meet the relevant rules of origin. This is significant because it is the first time that the EU has agreed a zero-tariff, zero-quota deal with any other trading partner (for example, the EU retains a small number of tariffs on Canadian agricultural exports). Certainly, businesses would have liked more time to adjust to the new relationship, but the deal provides important stability for the sectors most vulnerable to a no deal Brexit, such as agriculture, automotive, aerospace and chemicals.

The UK has secured some simplifications for customs formalities and important provisions for haulage, but there will be new frictions on UK-EU trade. For example, the EU refused to reduce the frequency of checks on food imports and has insisted that some products be certified by EU rather than UK testing bodies. The provisions on services are limited. The cost of doing business with the EU will be increased as a result.

There are several issues that could evolve in future. UK professional qualifications will not be recognised at the outset, but there is a mechanism to do so in the future. Arrangements for personal data and financial services remain dependent on unilateral EU decisions, due to be taken next year, which might provide a basis for further cooperation.

On fishing, a delicate balance has been struck. 25 per cent of EU boats’ fishing quota in UK waters by value will be transferred to the UK fleet, over a period of five-and-a-half years. The Government says this will bring the share of the total catch taken in UK waters by UK vessels to around two thirds. After this period, there will be annual talks on the amount EU boats can catch in UK waters (and vice versa). The UK would then have the right to completely withdraw EU access to UK waters. However, in response, the EU could impose tariffs on fish or other goods exports from the UK. These measures would need to be proportionate to the impact of the loss of access and are subject to arbitration. This means that the annual negotiations from 2026 could yet become a difficult political battleground.

The UK probably gave a little more than it would have liked to. However, the amount of fish caught in UK waters by UK vessels will increase, the UK has maintained tariff- and quota-free access to the EU market where much of the UK catch is sold, and the agreement establishes the principle of the UK’s status as an independent coastal state. It is undoubtedly an improvement on the status quo and, at this point, it is not clear the UK has the capacity to catch all the fish available.

The other major contentious issue throughout the negotiations has been the level-playing field. The agreement is a reasonable solution to satisfy the UK’s demand for regulatory independence and address the EU’s concern that future divergence may result in distortions to trade or investment.

The UK has agreed not to lower its existing standards on employment and the environment or use subsidies to unfairly distort trade. Both sides would also have the right to take countermeasures, such as imposing tariffs, if they believe they are being damaged by future changes to subsidy policy, labour and social policy, or climate and environment policy. As such, any dispute would only concern the effects of any changes to UK legislation, rather than whether UK rules are exactly the same as the EU’s.

This “rebalancing mechanism” has the potential to get messy if it is used frequently. However, crucially, any countermeasures are subject to independent arbitration, which means there would need to be solid justification for any EU tariffs in response to UK divergence. Tariffs cannot be used arbitrarily by the EU for leverage over the UK in the future. Ultimately, a race to the bottom on standards was always likely to be a bigger EU concern in theory than in practice. The reality is that the UK is likely to be equally as ambitious as the EU in many of these areas, such as climate change or animal welfare commitments, and perhaps more so.

In summary, this agreement is a considerable political achievement, because it manages to combine independence from the EU’s regulatory system with a high degree of market access (relative to comparable trade agreements, rather than EU membership). At times, this appeared impossible and, therefore, the UK’s strategy has been vindicated.

The deal recognises that the UK-EU relationship will continue to evolve. There could be future disputes but the deal is likely to provide stability for the next five to ten years when the world will no doubt be different again.

It is equally important that the country can move on and devote its energies to the future, both with regards to domestic policy and international relationships beyond Europe.

This is the first of a new series of pieces by Policy Exchange for Conservative Home looking at the various issues that arise from the Brexit trade deal.

Simon Richards: Almost 15 years ago, I helped to set up Better Off Out. This deal isn’t perfect – but it delivers what we campaigned for.

28 Dec

Simon Richards was CEO of The Freedom Association until June 2020, and a co-founder of the Better Off Out campaign in 2006. He is now working on plans to help promote the record and reputation of Margaret Thatcher.

Three o’clock in the afternoon still has a resonance for the millions who follow football more than I do – not least on a Boxing Day Bank Holiday. For me, it is a sacred time on just two days of the year: Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.

So I was incandescent when, following a ridiculously lengthy delay even by his own standards, Boris Johnson’s press conference clashed with that immovable highlight of Christmas Eve, the Festival of Nine Lessons and Carols from King’s College, Cambridge.

It could have been even worse: had he held it at the same time the following day, he might have found himself even lower down the Queen’s Christmas card list than Tony Blair. To add insult to injury, the Prime Minister apologised, not for clashing with the world’s best-loved carol service, but for ‘disturbing Cars Three’, an American computer-animated film which, it transpired, he had not actually interrupted at all.

A far more substantial objection to Johnson’s deal is that its timing allows Parliament just a single day to debate it. How convenient for the Government! So the truth is that, whatever you or I might think of it, this deal is, if you will pardon my French, a fait accompli – an accomplished fact; a done deal.

Call it what you will, nothing is going to stop it now. Even were there adequate time to discuss this massive document, Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition, true to form, would provide no opposition at all. That, as usual, is left to those Conservative Party backbenchers who, from the fight over the Maastricht Treaty onwards, have served as an awkward squad, carrying out, without official recognition or pay, the work that the Labour Party has long neglected even to attempt to do.

Are important aspects of this deal unsatisfactory for the United Kingdom? Of course they are! There is no doubt that the UK made considerable concessions on fishing, but the key issue, of sovereignty over British waters, was upheld. Given the immense damage that the EU and its Common Fisheries Policy have done to the British fishing industry, it will be years before our fishermen are in a position to take full advantage of regaining control over our waters, so it was a sensible move by Lord Frost and the Government to give ground (or should that be water?) in that area.

After all, in any negotiation there have to be areas where concessions must be made. The important question is “will our fishing industry be in a better position than before?” and the answer to that can only be “yes” – granted that it would be difficult to worsen its current state.

If the Labour Party’s ‘thin deal’ criticisms of the deal are feeble, then the SNP’s attack on the fishing deal elevates political dishonesty to a new level even by its own standards. It has never stood up for Scotland’s fishing industry and its policy of independence, accompanied by an application to join the EU, could only be achieved by sacrificing that industry once again.

The truth is that the Prime Minister’s deal has shot Sturgeon’s fox, or, as one ought perhaps to say around Boxing Day, clubbed it to death. Nothing that Johnson came back with from Brussels was ever going to meet with the approval of Ian Blackford, Scotland’s very own Mr Potato Head himself. His cry of, ‘the potato-seed industry, the potato-seed industry, my kingdom for the potato-seed industry’ is hardly likely to match William Wallace as a call to battle.

There isn’t room here to go into all the arrangements covered in this vast set of agreements. Others such as Bill Cash, Martin Howe and Lee Rotherham are better able to do that than I am – and I trust their judgement. Not only can no deal be perfect, but we should not seek such perfection. For a deal of this nature to be successful – and to stick – it needs broadly to satisfy both sides. If it only satisfies one, it will be unacceptable to the other.

Bismarck was wise enough to realise that he had been wrong to agree to Prussia grabbing Alsace and Lorraine from France in the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871. It ensured that France was consumed by a desire for revenge, which led inexorably to two world wars. A deafening cacophony of claims from the EU side that it had got the better of the Brits was only to be expected, but, save for the inevitable French Government minister or two with an eye to bolstering Emmanuel Macron’s popularity, such claims have been conspicuous by their absence.

Similarly, on this side of the Channel, screams of betrayal from Brexiteers have been more like squeaks. Back in 2006, along with Mark Wallace of this parish and others, I helped set up the Better Off Out campaign, to promote the case that the UK would indeed be Better Off Out of the EU.

Had you asked me then whether I would have regarded the terms of this Christmas Eve Agreement as acceptable, I would have replied, in the style of the last British Prime Minister successfully to defend British interests in Europe, ‘Yes! Yes! Yes!’ It was good to hear the Prime Minister cite Margaret Thatcher’s famous Bruges speech as an inspiration and a turning point. She set out an updated version of De Gaulle’s ‘Europe of Nations’. The EU would have been well advised to have taken heed of her advice, but chose to plough on regardless with its project of a United States of Europe.

Later, forcing through the Maastricht Treaty, John Major, who has been uncharacteristically quiet in recent days, took to the mantra that Britain was ‘at the heart of Europe’. Only somebody ignorant of both geography and history could have insisted on such an obvious falsehood.

The agreement that Johnson has obtained rights the wrongs inflicted by Major and a succession of Europhile Prime Ministers. It restores to the United Kingdom the freedom and independence that made it great, retaining its close and friendly links with its friends and neighbours on the continent whilst re-establishing its worldwide vision. I started by mentioning football.

To conclude, were this a football match it would have been 3-0 to the EU at half-time, with three own goals scored by Theresa May and her hapless team. David Frost has been Britain’s champion, achieving a great result for his country against all the odds, with a good deal of British pluck. Now it only remains for one injustice to be put to right: Boris, please give Nigel Farage the knighthood that he deserves.

John Redwood: Why we would be better off with No Deal

14 Dec

Sir John Redwood is MP for Wokingham, and is a former Secretary of State for Wales.

No Deal would be a good outcome for the UK. It would mean that we take back control of our borders, our money, our laws and our fish, as promised by the Leave campaign. The deals on offer from the EU fall well short of improving on No Deal.

It wants to continue overfishing our seas with its huge industrial trawlers. It wants to control our law making in all areas related in any way to business and trade. It wants its court to adjudicate disputes between us – in a clear violation of usual international practice, in which an impartial arbitrator is used, or the two sides need to argue matters through to agreement. Its every word and action signals that it does not wish to accept the fact that we have voted to be an independent country, and intend to be one.

When Theresa May with senior civil servants foolishly sought to recreate many of the features of our EU membership under the cover of a so-called comprehensive partnership, the EU made it impossible for her. If we just wanted a free trade agreement like Canada or Japan, that seemed to be on offer.

Once a new UK government offered to do just, that the EU decided to impede and prevent it, and to pretend the UK still really wanted special access to the Single Market which in turn required subservience to its laws.

There was little good faith in trying to implement the Political Agreement by the EU, given that it said that a free trade agreement would lie at the heart of a new relationship between the EU and the UK. The EU has always behaved with discipline and severity in its negotiating stance, assuming that it can have its cake and eat it. It has repeated its mantra that you cannot have access to the Single Market without accepting many limitations on your freedoms.

This of course is simply not true for the rest of the world, which trades with the EU without having to obey its laws. In every other case, the EU accepts mutual respect for World Trade Organisation rules. The EU as a member of the WTO accepts its disputes resolution. The EU has a history of some violations of WTO rules with penalties – as with subsidies to Airbus.

I was asked to give many speeches during the EU referendum campaign to business audiences. I always said No Deal was the only outcome we could guarantee. It was an outcome which would give a good answer for the UK, achieving all our aims to be independent. On the past economic evidence, I expected a No Deal Brexit to offer us a small boost to GDP if we used the new freedoms well.

I used to go on to say it would be very easy – if there was political will – to add a free trade agreement on top of No deal, which would be beneficial to both sides. In most free trade deals, there are delays and problems with each side wishing to defend a tariff here and a non-tariff barrier there.

In the case of the UK and EU, we start from a position where there are no tariffs and no untowards barriers to goods trade, so it would just be a question of rolling over what we have.  I also sometimes added that some thought the EU would not behave well or want to do that.

In that event, surely it shows how right we are to leave if our EU neighbours, friends and allies behave in such a silly way towards us, to the point of hurting their own access to our own lucrative market. To the EU, the UK has indeed been Treasure Island. It has taken large payments from us in the form of our net contributions to the EU, and has ru a huge surplus on goods and food trade through tariff-free entry.

The Prime Minister has been clear and right in saying we will leave the Single Market and Customs Union. We want our own international trade policy, and will be a more powerful and consistent voice for freer trade than the EU. To do this, we need to have full control of all matters relating to trade and business.

The Single Market has been damaging to the UK overall. In our first decade in the Common Market, as it was then erroneously called, we lost half our motor manufacturing capacity as tariffs were removed. Over the years, we have seen the loss of most of our steel industry and aluminium output, serial damage to textile and ceramic manufacture, the mass closure of foundries and the break up and contraction of our chemical industry.  Our market share in temperate food production has fallen sharply, and we have gone from being a net exporter of fish to a shrunken industry, with consumers reliant on imports for much of our demand.

EU grants and subsidies have bid some business investment away from the UK. EU rules have often been based around the needs and methods of large-scale continental producers at the expense of our firms. The EU has failed to negotiate trade deals at all with two of our largest trading partners, the USA and China, and has not bothered about proper service sector access in other deals, despite the UK’s strong position in many service areas.

Our average growth rate was faster before entry into the Common Market post-war than during the years of Common market membership, which in turn was faster than our average growth rate in the years which followed 1992 and the so-called completion of the Single Market.

The UK establishment has never been willing to analyse the data and understand what was truly happening. It visited upon us the disaster of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, whose predictable impact caused a major recession at the very point there was meant to be a boost from completing the Single Market.

So how can now use our freedoms as we leave with No Deal, assuming there is no last-minute wish to be sensible by the EU and agree a free trade deal?   We should be up and running with tax cuts – at last, we can take VAT off all those green products from insulation to boiler controls the EU insists on.

We can lift tariffs from South African oranges and other tropical fruit and food that we cannot grow for ourselves. We should pursue our offer to the USA of removing EU retaliatory tariffs on its goods if it will drop their tariff on Scotch whisky, which was an unwelcome hit from an EU trade spat.

We should set up freeports and enterprise zones to marshal new investment and make more in the UK. We should reorient farm subsidies to slash the food miles, and grow more of our own salads, fruits,and vegetables. We should land more of our fish at home, and add fish processing to create meals and products that we want to eat or which we can export.

We should put in more electricity capacity, and end our growing dependence on imported EU power. As the Government encourages the planting of many more trees, we should ensure more sustainable forestry to cut the massive timber imports.

These are all good economic reasons to press for the No Deal Brexit. The best reason of all is to be free, living in an independent country. I want to help pass on a country that is self-governing – a beacon for democracy.  Brexit means taking back control of our laws, our borders and our money. That way we will be better governed. If any given government lets us down we can sack it, and get the answer we want from another. That is something we can never do as members of the  EU. They give us the laws and we do not control the government.

Britain’s relationship with the EU: no love affair, followed by a bad marriage and a stormy divorce

12 Dec

Reluctant European: Britain and the European Union from 1945 to Brexit by Stephen Wall

This book could also be called “Life as a Continuous Negotiation”. It shows with great clarity that when Britain entered the European Economic Community, as it was then known, the advocates of joining indulged in wishful thinking, as more recently did the advocates of Brexit.

There was no love affair before this marriage, no honeymoon after it, and the divorce is proving pretty painful too.

In 1979 Helmut Schmidt, an anglophile German Chancellor, asked Oliver Wright, the British Ambassador in Bonn, why the British had spent the six years since we joined haggling like Italians about sums of money which ought to have been beneath our notice.

There had been years of haggling before we joined, and there was a lot more haggling to come, for Margaret Thatcher was only just beginning her campaign for the British rebate.

Stephen Wall, who joined the Diplomatic Service in 1968, saw much of this haggling at first hand, for he was an adviser to five Foreign Secretaries and three Prime Ministers, and also served for five years as the UK’s Permanent Representative to the EU.

How did he stand it? This book is intended mainly as a dispassionate account of Britain’s European policy over the last 75 years: an aim it more than meets.

But it also offers hints on how to survive official life. One method is to enjoy the comic side of things. Here is one of the best anecdotes with which Wall enlivens his text:

“My father-in-law [Norman Reddaway], a young diplomat in the post-war British Embassy in Rome, had accompanied his Ambassador in 1950 when the latter, on instructions from London, called on the Italian Foreign Minister to persuade him of the ill-advised nature of the proposed Coal and Steel Community. The Minister, Count Sforza, listened politely. At the end of the Ambassador’s reasoned case, Sforza smiled tolerantly. ‘My dear Ambassador,’ he said. ‘There are times at the opera when you should enjoy the music and not worry about the words.'”

There is much to be said for the Sforza approach. Enjoy the music and don’t bother to translate the lyrics.

It was not, however, an approach which Wall and his colleagues felt able to adopt:

“We British worried intensely about ‘the words’. With no overarching written constitution, the words of Parliamentary Acts were all we (and the courts which interpreted them) had to rely on.”

One detects the note of suppressed hysteria which runs through the story of Britain’s relationship with Europe. It mattered desperately to get it right: here is the principal, and entirely honourable, motive which drove so many members of the Diplomatic Service to devote their careers and very considerable minds to the problem.

And yet, as Wall’s account brings out, brains were not enough to arrive at a solution. He starts in the Frick gallery in New York, staring at the Holbein portraits of Thomas More and Thomas Cromwell.

Here are “the two sides of the schism that was the Reformation”: Cromwell “the piggy-eyed, clever thug”, versus a representative of European civilisation:

“More was a Renaissance scholar… He was the friend of the Dutch philosopher and scholar Erasmus. They both saw themselves as part of an international, and especially European, cultural and spiritual order: that of Christendom. For More, the son of a lawyer, and himself the most senior guardian and dispenser of the law in the England of his day, the Church and State were umbilically linked and the laws of God and the laws of Man had to be in harmony. When Henry VIII sundered that harmony by declaring himself Head of the Church and breaking from the authority of Rome he was not, in More’s eyes, simply rebelling from a pontiff who was more of a temporal ruler than a spiritual one. Henry’s action was, as More saw it, an assault on the very foundations on which the English state was built.”

Wall is descended rather wonderfully from Norman foot soldiers who settled in Derbyshire, where their name “gradually morphed from Du Val to Wall” and they became yeomen farmers.

His mother was a Catholic, he was brought up as a Catholic, and he points out that the EEC was “largely conceived by Catholic Christian Democrats”, who signed the Treaty of Rome on 25th March 1957, the Feast of the Annunciation:

“For Britain, on the other hand, the idea of a supranational authority – beyond the control of national parliaments – was, and remained, conceptually alien and politically nigh on impossible to contemplate. We live with that political reality to that day.”

Wall is too intelligent and fair-minded to suggest that all virtue lies on the European side of the divide. He describes how the six founding members of the EEC created, “in an act of pre-emptive and ruthless self-interest”, the Common Fisheries Policy, before the British, the Danes, the Norwegians and the Irish, all of whom had large stocks of fish, were allowed to join.

The budget was likewise rigged against the British, who found themselves paying for a system of agricultural support for French farmers, an injustice which took many years of haggling to put right.

In 1987, Julian Bullard, the British Ambassador in Bonn, wrote a dispatch to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which included the words:

“I would plead that at least more thought should be given to the style of British policy in Europe. The plain speaking of the House of Commons does not translate well into Continental languages, especially in countries that live by coalition and compromise.”

Over 30 years later, what Bullard said remains true. Abrasive language of the kind often heard in Westminster just doesn’t register in Germany: is politely discounted as simply not serious.

Yet if one adapts one’s tone to take account of German susceptibilities, one is liable to make no impact, and to lose one’s British audience.

Wall admits that Margaret Thatcher made a remarkable impact not only in Europe, especially in that part of the Continent still held by the Soviet Union, but in the United States:

“A visit to Washington by Prime Minister Jim Callaghan rated a few lines in The New York Times. The first visit of Thatcher as Prime Minister, for which I was the gofer late in 1979, dominated the headlines and the TV news. Her address to both Houses of Congress electrified the audience. I spent the first ten years of my Foreign Office career doing my bit to represent a country in visible decline: widely seen as the sick man of Europe. All that changed with Thatcher.”

Tony Blair emerges less well from this account than one might expect. He contributes a single, mendacious paragraph to his memoirs on the subject of joining the euro, is heard by Wall agreeing to misrepresent Jacques Chirac’s views about Saddam Hussein, fatefully promises a referendum on a new European treaty, and pretends that he shares the vision of the EU’s founders.

The moral of this admirable book is that forms of words, however carefully chosen, are not enough to bridge the divide that runs through Britain, and has done since the Reformation.

So although Wall says almost nothing about Boris Johnson, for whom he never worked, he does draw the impassable chasm into which any Prime Minister is in danger of tumbling: one to which the present occupant of Number Ten sometimes seems, with his carefree insistence that politics should be enjoyable, to be applying the wisdom of Count Sforza.

How the EU must wish it had accepted May’s Chequers offer

9 Dec

Daniel Hannan is a writer and columnist. He was a Conservative MEP from 1999 to 2020, and is now President of the Initiative for Free Trade.

Liam Fox was right. The former trade secretary has been much mocked for his remark that a trade deal with the EU would be “one of the easiest in human history”. Two and a half years later, that deal has still not been done and, as I write, there is a real prospect that the talks will break down. Yet Fox’s reasoning was sound. The most difficult aspects of trade negotiations, in general, are the opening of markets and the recognition of each other’s standards. In this instance, neither issue arises. Britain and the EU already have access to each other’s markets and reciprocal standards. Every barrier would be a costly move away from the status quo. For once, the inertia bias pulls towards free trade.

So what is the problem? Why wasn’t a deal struck long ago? Well – and this is where Foxie was correct – it wasn’t because of differences over trade. The purely commercial aspects of the deal seem to have been agreed easily enough. The hold-up, as everyone knows, is over other matters, notably fisheries and what Brussels negotiators (and most British media) misleadingly call the “level playing field”.

Neither of these disputes is primarily economic. We keep being told that the fishing industry accounts for a tiny proportion of Britain’s GDP, but the same is true for the EU. More to the point, the only way in which EU trawlers would be wholly excluded from British waters is if there were no deal. A deal would mean a phased reduction in access for Continental vessels, but not a reduction to zero. Whatever the EU’s reasons for holding out on fisheries, concern for French skippers is plainly not one of them.

Similarly, when it comes to the level playing field, Brussels doesn’t truly fear that Britain will abolish the minimum wage, scrap its environmental rules or subsidise its industries with a view to hostile dumping. British social and employment standards are higher than the EU’s requirements, its green targets more ambitious and its levels of state aid lower.

No, in both cases, the issue is emotional rather than economic. Eurocrats are still affronted by the 2016 referendum result. A few explicitly want Britain to suffer, even if that means that the 27 suffer, too. Even those who, rationally, accept that the best way to maximise their own prosperity is to have a free and open trading relationship with their biggest market sometimes struggle, psychologically, to follow that logic all the way through. Hence all their snide remarks and passive-aggressive tweets.

Britain’s other trade talks – first with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, then with the United States, then with India, Mercosur and the Gulf states – have been premised on the idea that both sides want to maximise their prosperity. We recently agreed a deal with Switzerland which covers pretty much the same ground as the EU talks. Foxite in its simplicity, it largely involved the two sides agreeing to leave things as they were. Indeed, the main complicating factor was EU pressure on Switzerland not to agree to too much.

Why, then, do Brussels negotiators talk of “granting” tariff-free access as if trade were an act of kindness? Because, in truth, they have not come to terms with Brexit. The EU thinks of itself as a modern empire (see speeches by José Manuel Barroso, Guy Verhofstadt et al) and its attitude to Britain is that of a metropolitan power toward a renegade province. They find it hard to let go. They want some remaining emblems of suzerainty.

We British should understand. We have, from time to time, found ourselves in the EU’s shoes. When the bulk of Ireland broke away, for example, London struggled to reconcile itself to the notion that it there was now a truly independent country next door. It imposed all sorts of conditions on the new state, including an oath of allegiance to the Crown, the continuing use of three Irish ports and a guarantee that the Anglo-Irish Treaty would have legal precedence over measures adopted by the Irish parliament.

In truth, these measures were more decorative than functional. Ireland after 1921 was, in its essentials, an independent country; but another generation passed before it formally assumed the final attributes of sovereignty without British opposition.

Fisheries and the level playing field are, so to speak, the EU’s treaty ports and oath of allegiance – symbols that Britain is a semi-protectorate rather than with an equal sovereign power. While Eurocrats would no doubt phrase that sentence differently, the truth is that they see Britain as a rule-taking dependent, like Macedonia or Ukraine, rather than as a wholly independent nation.

The funny thing is that, when Theresa May offered them such a relationship at the 2018 Salzburg summit, they threw it back in her face. Perhaps, as reports suggested at the time, they were simply put off by her manner. Perhaps they were not prepared, on principle, to agree to anything proposed by the renegade province. Either way, they must now wish they had grabbed that deal.