Philip Mitchell and Chris Goddard: We need game-changing strategies to meet the challenge of China

15 Apr

By Chris Goddard and Philip Mitchell are both members of the Lewes Conservative Political Forum.

The West has been full of righteous indignation about supposed excesses in the Peoples’ Republic of China, from the treatment of the Uighurs and the ending of democracy in Hong Kong, to the threat to Taiwan and the spat between China and Australia.

The Biden Administration has had its eyes and ears opened wide recently by the Chinese tirade at the Alaskan conference with the US National Security Adviser. But these are faraway actions so far as the UK is concerned, prompting no more than the usual ritual warnings from Dominic Raab about “unacceptable behaviour”.

The game has changed. Not only has the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its fatwa against certain Westminster MPs for speaking out about alleged human rights abuses, but the country’s chief cyber regulator has now announced that it will sanction any online criticism of the Communist regime and encourage internet users worldwide to snitch on others who “deny the excellence of advanced socialist culture”.

That is perfectly capable of extending to words uttered in the UK. So there we have it: Big Brother, in the form of a dragon, has finally arrived.

Much ink has been spilt on the question of what the West’s, and indeed the UK’s, response to China should be: a boycott of goods;  a refusal to import communications or nuclear technology; a blocking of outward intellectual property transfers; the offer of refuge to displaced citizens of Hong Kong?

All these are knee jerk reactions and all miss the essential truth: that the Peoples’ Republic has become the second world power and intends to pursue its agenda of international domination by whatever means are available. Our sitting like King Canute on the edge of the waves, commanding that the tide rise no further, has a distinctly outmoded ring to it.

Since with two exceptions the rest of the world are minnows swimming in these dangerous waters, how can the West and in particular, Britain, respond in any meaningful way? Joe Biden has just proposed one of them, and we can be a champion for the other: out-compete and form alliances.

The US’s idea, a far cry from Trump’s tariffs and protectionism, is that financial muscle in the West can out-perform Chinese technology and manufacture and make enhanced strategic investment in countries where China currently “colonises” by means of loans and infrastructure projects. The second strand, international alliances, must necessarily draw in developing countries sympathetic to democratic values whose chief assets are their burgeoning industry, scarce raw materials, and populations. The greatest of these is India, whose population even now matches China and by 2050 will exceed it by a predicted 237 million, according to Worldometer.

Of a telephone conversation to Boris Johnson on 27th March , President Biden recounted: “we talked about China and the competition they’re engaging in in the Belt and Road initiative. And I suggested we should have, essentially, a similar initiative coming from the democratic states, helping those communities around the world.”

By “those communities” it is assumed he meant those African and South American states where soft power intervention is achieved by aid programmes rather than military presence. American policy in a number of key areas presently rests on vague pronouncements to spend trillions of extra dollars in pursuance of democratic ideals of the “public good”. Whether these will materialise remains to be seen, but America alone has the reach and resources to stretch out in this way.

Other countries, including the UK, debt-ridden by Covid-19 for the foreseeable future, cannot compete in this league. What, then, can Britain do?

Many have argued that the reduction in spending on overseas aid is a hammer-blow to soft power overseas. It need not be so. The mass of trade deals skilfully negotiated by Liz Truss will enable many poorer countries to offer their natural products to Britain. on favourable terms. We can also afford to be generous with the roll out of the AstraZeneca vaccine, which Europe now despises, bearing in mind that the Chinese vaccine has been officially announced to be of “low efficacy” at around 50 per cent (although one wonders whether the hapless official who made that announcement will ever be seen in public again).

China is donating millions of jabs to its client states and there is no reason why the UK should not do the same. We can also import more goods from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea and less from China. Although our £30 billion worth of yearly exports to the Peoples’ Republic must not be thrown away, our most precious export is our democratic way of life, the rule of law, and the cry of freedom.

Yet it is the area of diplomacy that Britain could take a leading role in equalising relations between states and moderating China’s world dominance, and preferably putting it on a less aggressive footing. This centres round the idea that you do not want to fight on too many fronts. While China may feel able to bully its smaller neighbours, particularly Australia, over commodity supplies and purchase of territory, a counter-alliance which includes the US, Japan, Brazil, Nigeria, and above all India, all highly populous countries in the Western sphere, orchestrated from London, would be a force to contend with.

Container ships, not cutlasses, would be the weapon of choice. There could be a standing council comprised of senior representatives of participating states, taking joint action against belligerence wherever it occurs.

The aim must surely be to recognise China for the superpower it is, with its long history of culture and achievement, but to seek to persuade its leadership that the path to greatness lies in co-operation in key areas in which all humankind has a profound interest: better standards of living, addressing climate change, the conservation of scarce resources, medical advances for everybody, and the empowerment of women to slow population growth. These are not contentious goals, and they do not need to be fought over.

There is one area where Britain alone is in a position to prevent disaster: the displaced people of Hong Kong, who are seeing their democratic future under the 1997 Two Systems treaty dismantled before their eyes. Last year the Foreign Secretary rightly made an open-ended commitment to dual passport holders to allow residence over here, a decision is self-evidently justified on moral and economic grounds. There are, however no discernible practical steps to assimilate the numbers who are estimated to want to come: half a million at the least, three million at the most.

Where are these people to go in our crowded island and shouldn’t we be taking steps now to facilitate their welcome arrival? What a beautiful solution to a raging problem – let the Chinese become British.

Aamer Sarfraz: Other countries have started work on digital currencies. It’s time the UK got going too.

13 Apr

Lord Sarfraz is a Conservative member of the House of Lords and a Member of the Science and Technology Committee.

Today in the House of Lords, I will be speaking about a digital pound. Specifically, on this occasion, I will be asking the Government what assessment it has made of a UK Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).

There is already much thinking that has already gone into this. The Bank of England’s CBDC discussion paper, published last year, started the ball rolling for a digital pound.

A digital pound, backed by the Bank of England, could be a major win for individuals and businesses. With a digital pound, held in an electronic wallet, many bank fees could be eliminated, and foreign currency exchange risks substantially reduced. Importantly, such a currency could compete with Bitcoin’s market share, which currently stands at approximately US$1 trillion. It is estimated by the FCA that 1.9 million adults in the UK already own cryptocurrencies, and this number is growing.

A successful digital pound will need to be built with the right technology. The Bank of England has several options, including using a decentralised distributed ledger, like other cryptocurrencies. However, the very principle of “decentralisation” will not come naturally to any “central” bank. Most importantly, central banks will need to work with each to ensure their various CBDC’s operate on the same technology standards. Otherwise, we will have the same problem we have with fiat – a pound note doesn’t fit in a US vending machine.

Other countries are already forging ahead with plans for a digital currency. Japan’s Central Bank has launched a one-year digital currency trial this year. Furthermore, this week the Chinese government has officially started to issue digital yuan to 750,000 recipients. Other central banks around the world are also experimenting with digital currencies of their own. There are already several GBP-pegged stablecoins in the market. We now need to pick up the pace on a Bank of England issued digital currency.

Alongside issues of supply, there is clear demand for stable digital currencies. Tether, a stablecoin pegged to the US dollar, already has a US$45 billion market cap. However, CBDC’s will not mark the end of Bitcoin, nor should that be our objective. Bitcoin will still be the “people’s digital currency”, uninfluenced by central banks or governments. Without the success of Bitcoin, we would never have been thinking about a digital pound in the first place.

The rationale for the emergence of a digital pound is that the current banking system has several drawbacks. Over the past few decades, commercial banks have diversified their revenue sources.  As a result, “non-interest income”, mostly in the form of bank fees, have become an important source of income. Bank fees are charged on all sorts of things – account maintenance, overdrafts, cashier checks, reference letters, returned cheques, and wire transfers to name a few. There are entire online comparison sites helping consumers navigate bank fees.

Individuals making or receiving overseas payments, and those travelling overseas for both business and pleasure, get hit especially hard. They are faced with foreign currency losses (often twice during a trip – on departure and return), foreign ATM fees, traveller’s cheques issuance fees, fees for sending or receiving money, and fees for overseas transactions. Similarly, businesses that are buying and selling overseas, have to manage foreign currency risks and pay substantial transaction fees.

While some challenger banks are doing a good job reducing transaction fees, many still earn considerable non-interest income. They would say, quite rightly, that regulatory and compliance costs have skyrocketed, which result in the need to find additional sources of revenue.

A digital pound could be even more powerful when combined with smart contracts. Take the example of trade finance. In today’s archaic system, international trade is entirely dependent on banks, without whom costly letters of credit – the principal instrument in import and export – cannot be opened. Letters of credit were used by the Medici Bank in the 14th century, and are still in use today.  A smart contract, programmed into a digital wallet, could mean importers and exporters could use their digital pounds to conduct trade without banks.

Any solution afforded by the emergency of a digital currency would be part of the UK’s burgeoning fintech sector. The UK has already established a strong fintech sector and it could become even stronger. It has built on the UK’s historic strengths in financial services, which contributes an estimated £132 billion to the UK economy, corresponding to 6.9 per cent of the economy. The UK’s fintech market generates over £11 billion in annual revenues, and claims 10 per cent of market share globally. It is no surprise that 71 per cent of all British people interact with at least one fintech, which is higher than the global average of 64 per cent.

The Kalifa review reported in late February proposed five key recommendations. One of those was focused on creating a new regulatory framework for emerging technology, and this would include virtual currencies. The report’s author explained: “Fintech is not a niche within financial services. Nor is it a sub-sector. It is a permanent, technological revolution, that is changing the way we do finance.”

Fintech has already brought benefits for people in everyday life, and the UK has become a particularly strong hub for its development. Looking ahead, a digital pound could bring benefits for both consumers and businesses and the UK must move faster in exploring the mechanics and regulatory system of such an innovation.

Neil O’Brien: I can laugh off China sanctioning me, but we can’t shrug off the threat it poses

5 Apr

Neil O’Brien is co-Chairman of the Conservative Party’s Policy Board, and is MP for Harborough.

Typical, isn’t it?  You’re trying to get the kids off to school and nursery, running late as you hunt around for your son’s snuggly giraffe. You have a busy day planned, meeting the local paper and a café owner threatened with eviction.

The next thing you know, a communist superpower declares war on you personally.

I’m one of nine people sanctioned by China. It’s tempting to laugh it off. After all, seizing my assets in China will leave the Communists no richer. And after they kidnapped two prominent Canadians, I wasn’t planning to go there anyway.

The next morning, the Chinese embassy still sent me their regular propaganda email to MPs, which began: “Dear friends…”  It seems joined-up government is impossible – even under dictatorship.

But it’s no laughing matter. The goal isn’t really to intimidate me or the other MPs, but business people, academics, and others. To create uncertainty, fear and self-censorship – memorably described as the “Anaconda in the chandelier” strategy.

More and more businesses are having to grapple with it: Beijing’s currently threatening to destroy Nike and H&M in China for raising concerns about slave labour.

It’s now coming up on a year since we launched the China Research Group.  Over the last 12 months, things have changed in lots of ways.

First, there’s growing global awareness of China’s human rights abuses: particularly against the Uighur people, but also in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and across China as a whole. Human Rights Watch says it’s the worst period for human rights since Tiananmen.

The brutal crackdown in Hong Kong and Beijing’s decision to tear up the Sino-British declaration and end “one country, two systems” showed how much Beijing will sacrifice to keep absolute control. All leading pro-democracy activists there are now in exile, in jail or on trial.

At least the world has started to notice and act.  Indeed, we were targeted by Beijing in response to coordinated sanctions on human rights abusers in Xinjiang, recently put in place by 30 democratic countries.

MPs around Europe and MEPs from all the European Parliament’s main political groups were sanctioned along with us, with various US politicians already sanctioned last year.

So we’re all in it together, and it was great to get strong support from the Prime Minister – and through him the US President – and also from friends around Europe.

The sanctions aren’t like-for-like of course. MPs like me are being sanctioned simply for writing articles like this. By contrast, the democracies are sanctioning Xinjiang officials for presiding over a regime forcing sterilisation of Uighur women on an industrial scale; using rape as a weapon to break dissenters in its vast network of detention camps; rolling out an AI-powered surveillance state that to identify and control minority groups; and physically erasing the Uighur culture and religion from the face of the earth.

Our sanctions are to protest against human rights abuses. Theirs to silence such protests.

What Beijing’s doing is at least as bad as Apartheid South Africa.  But by comparison, the international response has been more muted so far. Partly because China makes it hard for reporters to get access. But also because China is more powerful than South Africa was.

International pressure on South Africa grew over decades and became a huge cultural movement. It loomed large in the pop music of my 80s childhood: “Free Nelson Mandela”, “Something Inside So Strong”, “Silver and Gold”, “Gimme hope Jo’anna” were all hits.

These days Hollywood studios make sure that their films have the thumbs up from Beijing: they think it’s too big a market to risk losing.

I’ve written about China’s growing global censorship. Nonetheless, the truth is seeping out, and the global criticism getting louder.

That points to a second positive change over the year: new opportunities for democracies to coordinate in the Biden era.

Coodination is essential: China’s economic and political strategy relies on divide and rule.  Each free country fears losing out if it alone stands up to Beijing.

The communist regime singles out countries who challenge it like Australia, Sweden and Canada. Like all bullies, they are really trying to teach others to keep their heads down.

But while Trump had scratchy relations with other leaders, Biden’s election makes cooperation much easier.

It’s not just that we need to get the band back together again, and make the G7 work (though that’s important), but bringing together a wider group of democracies including India, South Korea, Australia and South Africa. The Prime Minister is right to push the “D11” concept.

The third big change is changing western attitudes on economic policy regarding China.

The single best thing about the recent Integrated Review was the clear-eyed understanding of the competition for technological advantage now underway between nations.

In the sunny utopianism of the 1990s, the world was going to be flat, borderless, and competition was between companies not countries. Technology was cool, but not a national issue: the UK could just specialise in professional services. Awesome new global supply chains meant you didn’t need to worry about where your supplies were coming from, whether it was vaccines; ventilators, PPE, silicon chips or telecoms equipment.

Beijing has a very different vision, and its rise means we must change our thinking  It promotes “Civil-military fusion”, and its imports have slowed dramatically as its import substitution policies develop.

Xi Jinping says he is “building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” He explains that China must “enhance our superiority across the entire production chain… and we must tighten international production chains’ dependence on China.”

The US has woken up to this, and in Washington as well as Beijing there’s a shared understanding that the two superpowers are fighting to dominate the technologies of the future. Joe Biden talks about “winning the future”.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have long seen tech competition as a shared national endeavour, and have policies to match.  No wonder: meeting politicians from these countries through the China Research Group, I’ve come to understand the level of constant threat they have to live under.

We too must adapt to this more national world.

First, we need to build a powerful innovation system. During the 1960s and 1970s the US and UK invested similar amounts in R&D.  But Reagan grew federal support while we let it wither, and we have been operating on different levels since.  I’ve banged on before about how to make government funding do more for our economy.

Second, we need to protect ourselves from the Beijing’s hoovering up of technology.  More help for business to resist cyberattack from the National Cyber Force.  Somewhere to get advice on not losing your intellectual property if you do business in China.

And as well as the very welcome National Security and Investment Bill we need to make sure that the new Investment Security Unit has the same resourcing and input from the security services that CFIUS enjoys in the US – and we need to be prepared to use the new powers.

Likewise, Jo Johnson’s recent report highlights the risks to our universities from poorly-thought-through partnerships with China. Investigations by Civitas and the Daily Telegraph revealed that UK universities are actually helping Beijing with new weapons technologies. We must get a firm grip of all such partnerships and where universities’ money is coming from.

Over the last year we’ve learned a lot.  The UK and governments across the west have started to act.  But we’re still just starting to figure out how to respond to a more aggressive China.

David Alton: The horror of this day, Good Friday, is a horror for our times

2 Apr

Lord Alton of Liverpool is a Crossbench Peer.

Without the certainties of Easter, there would be little cause to describe this day, this Friday, as “Good.” The origins and etymology of the word have been lost in the mists of time, but scholars suggest that its meaning is rooted in the use of good as a representation of holy or pious. In old English it was called “Long Friday” and in the East is sometimes known more graphically as Black Friday.

Whether you believe, or not, the story of this Friday was the story of a bad day for justice: an unjust trial, the violent use of torture, the degrading of human dignity. Mel Gibson left no doubt about the full horror of crucifixion in “The Passion of the Christ”. The harrowing detail is disturbing but undoubtedly accurate. The Romans perfected the art of the slow death and inflicted excruciating pain – intensified by scourging designed to lacerate and expose a man’s wounds.

The crucifixion of an innocent man is an old story, yes, but one that still stirs vast numbers of people. It’s a story with contemporary resonance.

More than two billion people world-wide today identify as Christian and, even in the UK, almost two thirds of the country (33.2 million people) describe themselves as Christian. With 84 per cent of the global population identifying with a religious group – and as the demographics of belief are  weighted in favour of the young  – the world has been getting more religious, not less.

For the non-believer, the religious beliefs of their acquaintances can seem incomprehensible and  threatening. But it cuts both ways.

How we accommodate one another, how we negotiate each other’s beliefs – or lack of them – and how we learn to live alongside each other, with genuine respect for difference, is a defining question for our times. It’s also one our forebears had to address..

In 1948, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, and the abject failure to counter a murderous ideology rooted in the hatred of difference, world leaders promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Crime of Genocide. As international institutions have fallen into disrepair, the declarations and treaties – and the duties and obligations which flow from them – need urgent renewal and recalibration.

The UDHR was the civilised world’s response to the infamies of the twentieth century—from the Armenian genocide to the depredations of Stalin’s gulags and Hitler’s concentration camps; it emerged from warped ideologies that elevated nation and race. The Declaration’s stated objective was to realise, “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.

The four great murderers of the 20th century—Mao, Stalin, Hitler, and Pol Pot—were united by their hatred of religious faith. It was the bloodiest century in human history with the loss of 100 million lives. And now, in the twenty-first century, often in the name of a religion, millions more have died or been forced to flee their homelands.

Article 18 of the UDHR asserts the right to believe, not to believe,  or to change your belief. It’s a good place to start on a day like this. A defence of the article ought to unite believers and non-believers alike  – and might provide a common platform from which to call out those who violate so many of the other 30 Articles in the UDHR.

In 2019, having read The Times leader writer’s description of our muted response to such anti-Christian persecution as the actions of “spectators at the carnage”, Jeremy Hunt took the well-judged step of commissioning an independent review of the evidence.

The Truro Report concluded that “the level and the nature” of  the persecution of hundreds of millions of Christians was in some regions “arguably coming close to meeting the international definition of genocide.”

Turn a blind eye, pretend you didn’t know, and the persecution leads to atrocity crimes; turn a blind eye, and it becomes open season on believers of all faiths; turn a blind eye, and every one of the other 30 Articles in the UDHR will be breached too.

That we still avert our gaze and have much more to do can be seen in these snapshots from the past few days.

Last weekend, on Palm Sunday, radicals acting, not for the first time, in the name of religion, laid bombs in a church – this time in Makassar in eastern Indonesia, injuring twenty people.

This week, the most important in the Christian calendar, is a favourite target of jihadists. Recall the Easter Day bombings in Sri Lanka in 2019, and the Easter murders of church goers in Lahore’s Gulsha-i-Iqbal Park, picnicking after their Service.

But for many the agonies of Good Friday are a daily occurrence.

Think of Northern Nigeria where Leah Sharibu, a young schoolgirl, remains in the hands of Boko Haram, having been abducted, raped, forcibly converted, and married. Since last Easter, more than 3,000 Christians have been killed in Nigeria – a country which last year received an average of £800,000 in UK aid every single day.

In Pakistan, another Commonwealth country, Maria Shahbaz is just one of around 1,000 Christian and Hindu girls, aged between 12 and 25, who are abducted annually – with impunity. Ten years ago, Shahbaz Bhatti, the Christian Minister for Minorities, was assassinated. No one has been brought to justice. During the same period, Pakistan has been in receipt of £3 billion of UK aid, little of which reaches beleaguered minorities.

In Burma, the illegal military junta is stoking the fires of religious nationalism, targeting ethno-religious minorities such as Christian Kachin and Karen, and Muslim Rohingyas.  The appointment of my friend, Dr Sasa, an ethnic Chin, and a Christian, as the international envoy of Burma’s elected Parliamentarians.

Think, too, of the personal Calvaries of China’s religious minorities: the genocide against Uyghur Muslims; the incarceration of Christians in Hong Kong;  Tibet’s suffering Buddhists;  murdered Falun Gong practitioners ; bulldozed churches and arrested pastors – such as Pastor Wang Yi of Early Rain Church, now serving nine years in prison.

In neighbouring North Korea, another atheistic regime has created  what a UN report describes as “a State without parallel” .  A North Korean escapee from one of the concentration camps was a witness at a hearing I chaired in Westminster. She told us: “They tortured the Christians the most”.

These stories can be replicated in many other jurisdictions, from Sudan to Iran, Eritrea to Iraq – where genocide was the fate of Christians, Yazidis and other minorities.

The man who coined the word “genocide” was the Jewish Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, and his work led to the Genocide Convention. He  argued that “international co-operation” was needed, “to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge”.

As a Treaty signatory we are committed to prevent, protect, and punish. But as Parliament has made clear in recent weeks these promises have been honoured mainly in their breach. William Hague was right to say there is a significant “gap between the commitments States have made and the reality of their actions.”

Both the Genocide Convention and Article 18 of the UDHR  are secular documents.  They could still offer the best hope to the religious and non religious alike. Along with better focused and prioritised practical help, through UK aid programmes, we really could turn the tables.

On a day when we remember an unjust trial, the violent use of torture, the degrading of human dignity, and judicial murder, we  might ask whether we march to such a very different tune, too often acquiescing in the shedding of innocent blood?

Good Friday was a bad day for humanity – but even the most monstrous crimes don’t have to be the final word. Beyond the Cross is an empty tomb, giving reassurance, meaning and perspective to our seemingly endless ability to inflict wounds and suffering on one another.

Garvan Walshe: Merkeldammerung. Germany’s polls put the Greens within striking distance of government.

1 Apr

Garvan Walshe is a former national and international security policy adviser to the Conservative Party

No leader gives up the job entirely on their own terms, but Angela Merkel, who will step down as Chancellor after what will be at least fifteen years in power, came closer than most.

She had the skill to keep the coalition of voters behind her Christian Democratic Union (which governs with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union) sufficiently broad to dominate German politics for a decade and a half. She’ll leave office as one of the great centre-right Chancellors of modern Germany, along with Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl.

Known for waiting for what seems to everyone too long before making darting radical jumps, Merkel overcame the financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and even dealt effectively with the first wave of the Covid pandemic.

She saw off rivals internal (Wolfgang Schäuble) external (the AfD) and a man best described as standing just inside the tent, peeing in (Friedrich Merz).

Yet she was unable to find a successor. Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg imploded in a plagiarism scandal, Ursula von der Leyen’s mediocre efforts at the defence ministry would be repeated at the European Commission, Annegret Kramp Karrenbauer proved the dampest of squibs, while Armin Laschet was left holding the Coronavirus pandemic as the vaccination programme foundered.

Like every other centre-right party in proportional electoral systems, the CDU/CSU is struggling in a fragmenting political landscape. Party activists worry that she’s losing votes to her right, to the AfD (or, in a more liberal direction, the FDP), while larger numbers of voters defect to the Greens, who have governed impressively in Baden Württemburg (in coalition with the CDU), and who also increased their seats at the CDU’s expense in Rhineland-Palatinate.

The “Union” has a backup plan in the form of Markus Soder, the leader of the Bavarian CSU, who could replace Laschet as the centre-right’s Chancellor candidate in September’s elections, but he is now also suffering from the terrible vaccination campaign and PPE procurement corruption scandals. The Union is now polling in the mid twenties, ten points down on the beginning of the year. This doesn’t look like an election where “more of the same” is a winning formula.

The latest opinion polls have narrowed the gap between the CDU/CSU and the Greens to less than five points, and if the trend continues the Greens could even top the poll in September.

This opens up two new possibilites for post-election Germany. Until this month, it had seemed likely that a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the Greens, headed by a Union Chancellor, would have been the only way to avoid letting either the AfD or the post-communist Linke into national government.

But the green surge increases the options. A “traffic light” coalition, between the Greens, SPD (the social democrats, whose colour is red) and the liberal FDP (yellow), or a Jamaica coalition (after the Jamaican flag, because the CDU’s colour is black) involving Greens, Union and FDP would also add up to a majority. In these scenarios it is the Greens, not either of Germany’s two traditional parties, who could choose who to form a government with.

Germany’s Greens started as a conventional green party emphasising environmental politics, but have evolved into a centre-left formation without the industrial baggage of the SPD, which allows them to take clearer stances against polluting industry or in favour of immigration and accommodating refugees.

If their representation in the Berlin city government is radical (favouring rent control, for example) their adminsitration in prosperous Baden Würtemberg, home to much of Germany’s car industry, has been decidedly more pragmatic. Their independence from German industrial politics has also led them to take stronger stances against Putin’s Russia (remember that Gerhard Schröder, Germany’s former Chancellor, serves as chairman of Rosneft), and Orban’s Hungary.

A green-led government would, perhaps astonishingly, tilt German geopolitics closer to that of the United States. Transatlantic friction over Russia’s Nordstream pipeline to Germany, which both the Greens and Washington are against, would disappear. Leading the govenrment would, however, pose problems for the party in relation to nuclear weapons, with which much of its membership is deeply uncomfortable.

Nevertheless, the German Greens, which hse co-leaders, Robert Habek and Annalena Baerbock, would pursue international policy in step with the UK’s focus on addressing climate change, and upholding international human rights norms against Moscow and Beijing.  Nonetheless, they are strongly pro-European, and a Green-led German government would put renewed energy behind deeper European integration.

In September, the test for the Greens will be whether they can provide the right combination of reasssurance and change for an electorate that prized the stability and integrity Merkel provided them, but is now ready to give the system a bit of a jolt.

Daniel Hannan: I hate everything about the lockdown. But most of all, how much we like being bossed around.

31 Mar

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere is a Conservative peer, writer and columnist. He was a Conservative MEP from 1999 to 2020, and is now President of the Initiative for Free Trade.

I hate everything about the lockdown. I hate the confiscation of liberty, and the ease with which it is surrendered. I hate the damage to children’s education. I hate the prying and the prissiness and the pettiness. I hate the way university students have missed out on what should be the best time of their lives. I hate the tone in which police officers address people going about their lawful business.

I hate the way the goalposts keep moving: flatten the curve; no – wait for a vaccine; no – keep the pressure off the NHS; no – stop new variants. I hate the cataclysmic impact on small businesses, and the indifference of large parts of the public. I hate the debt we are racking up. I hate the protectionism and the authoritarianism. I hate hearing words like “hoarder” and “profiteer” – words we used to associate with extremist ideologies. I hate the loneliness that I see weighing on my elderly neighbours. I hate the profusion of pettifogging laws.

But d’you know what I hate the most? I hate what it has revealed about us. It turns out that we quite like being bossed around – at least, a lot of us do. Given the excuse of a collective threat, we revel in crackdowns and prohibitions.

I am not talking about the contingent acceptance of some restrictions. Almost everyone can see that an infectious disease requires proportionate limitations on normal activity. Infecting other people is what economists call an “externality”, a cost borne by someone else.

No, I am talking about the equanimity, even the enthusiasm, with which some have taken to house arrest. “I loved lockdown”, declared a secret card returned to an enterprising London printer who is inviting people to send her their most intimate lockdown confidences on anonymous postcards. I reckon most of us have heard that sentiment, whispered furtively. Many of the printer’s postcards tell the same story: “a lot of people not wanting to unlock,” as she puts it.

King’s College London and Ipsos Mori found last week that 54 per cent of us will miss some aspects of the lockdown. Think about that for a moment. We’re not talking about things that we are free to do at any time. Obviously lots of us find staying at home more pleasant than commuting. Lots of us have enjoyed walks more than usual. Lots of us like seeing more of our children. But the essence of the lockdown is not that it allows us to rebalance our lives; it is that it mobilises the full force of the law to compel us.

We could always choose to forego a foreign holiday in return for working shorter hours. The idea that we need to be coerced into doing so – and have all our neighbours similarly coerced – is a terrifyingly illiberal one. So is the idea that we should be paid to stay at home – with money that someone or other is presumably supposed to find down the line.

I always knew that libertarianism was a minority creed. For most people, safety trumps freedom every time. Even so, it is distressing to see the near-universal demand for the smack of firm government. Take, to pluck an almost random example, the prohibition on leaving the country. Governments have every right to impose whatever conditions they want on people seeking to enter their territory, including quarantine. But leaving? Isn’t that for the receiving country to decide?

Yet that ban, like all the others, was cheered through with barely any debate. Politicians can see which way the wind is blowing: 93 per cent of people backed the first lockdown, 85 per cent the current one, and every easing of restrictions has been unpopular in the polls. There are honourable exceptions, but few MPs or commentators want to take what they know would be an utterly pointless stand. Even the PM, whose dislike of nannying has until now been his ruling principle, seems to have decided that there is no purpose in placing himself in the path of an authoritarian electorate.

This is not a column about the efficacy of lockdown measures. I happen to think that they are disproportionate. It has for some reason become fashionable to mock Sweden, but that country has suffered fewer excess deaths than most of Europe. Then again, there are good and sincere people who take a different view. The question of how much suffering we should inflict in exchange for a given number of lives is never going to have a simple answer.

No, this is a column about what ConservativeHome has called “the freedom gap” – the way in which a country that used to define itself as individualist, eccentric and undeferential now leads the world in its unhesitating acceptance of controls. An alien visitor, judging only from the texture of daily life, would assume that Britain in early 2021 was a far more repressive state than Russia or China.

The editor of this site recently speculated that the elevation of security over liberty might reflect the feminisation of politics. Jonathan Haidt would put it down to the vogue for “safetyism” – the idea that people should be at all costs be protected from unpleasant experiences rather than learning from (and being hardened through) them.

Let me proffer a gloomier explanation. Safetyism is a natural instinct. Throughout almost all human civilisation, people have accepted various forms of hierarchy and tyranny in the name of security. The liberal interlude through which we have lived is exceptional. We may be witnessing its end.

Tim Loughton: So – no Wuhan holiday home for me. Yes, I’ve been sanctioned by China. But it won’t stop me speaking out.

28 Mar

Tim Loughton is MP for East Worthing and Shoreham, and is a former Education Minister.

What adjective do you use for a group of nine democrats calling out human rights abuses by the world’s largest totalitarian state? We have the Famous Five and the Magnificent Seven and After Eights even, but nine seems to be a particularly under-appreciated digit. Nine pins doesn’t really cut it.

Thus it was that I woke up on Friday morning – or, rather, was woken up by my Twitter feed going berserk in the early hours to find that I have been included on the list of nine Britons sanctioned by the Chinese Government for spreading ‘lies and disinformation’ about the epitome of benevolent paternalism that is the Chinese Government.

I am in good company with four other Conservative MPs, two members of the Lords, an eminent lawyer and an academic together with some random mostly Tory-minded research groups.

As apparently no other Britons have been personally sanctioned before, it is not clear exactly what it entails. I have received no formal letter from Comrade Xi. Should I be awaiting a DHL speedy delivery bearing an official ‘certificate of debarment’? From what I read on social media, it would appear that I and my family will be barred from entering mainland China, Macau and Hong Kong, all my assets and business interests in China will be seized and Chinese officials will be prevented from engaging with me.

Fortunately, I have no plans for a holiday home in Wuhan and resisted the lure of investing in Uighur forced labour sweatshops in Xinjian, so I am not going to lose too much sleep. But if the Chinese Government thinks it can apply to British Parliamentarians the same level of censorship and suppression of free speech that pervades their own citizens, most recently extended to Hong Kong, they have badly miscalculated.

Indeed, given the tsunami of supportive emails and comments from around the world and everyone from Joe Biden to Boris Johnson, the move appears to have backfired badly for the Chinese Government. Instead, its actions are acting as a recruiting sergeant for those coming forward to call out China’s ‘industrial scale’ human rights’ abuses, as our Foreign Secretary rightly described it.

This week, Government ministers, acting in unison with EU states and our American and Canadian allies, applied Magnitsky sanctions to certain Chinese officials, complicit in human rights abuses. The seven Parliamentarians now sanctioned warmly and vociferously welcomed this move, and have urged the British Government to go further. Bizarrely, it is we ‘Nonentity Nine’ who are now the target of Chinese reprisals, not members of the Government itself nor Government officials.

The action lays bare the Chinese Government’s complete lack of understanding of how democracies work. The ‘crime’ of British Parliamentarians is to call out what many see as constituting genocide against the Uighur people by the Chinese Government, on top of 62 years of suppressing the people of Tibet resulting in deaths of more than a million Tibetans.

But that is what democratically elected MPs should do, without fear or favour, yet in return we are now sanctioned by China. We call out genocide; they actually carry it out. These moves are a breach of Parliamentary privilege, and so a challenge to the people who elect our Parliamentarians.

Frankly, I have surely been on borrowed time for a while now. For several decades, I have championed the cause of the Tibetan people. It was the first ever political march I went on as a spotty teenager, to the Chinese Embassy bearing Tibetan flags.

I Chair the All-Party Parliamentary Group For Tibet, and have had the privilege of welcoming the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Sikyong (President) to Parliament several times, despite the now notorious attempts of David Cameron to kow-tow to the Chinese Government, and ban ministers from meeting them.

At times, standing up for the Tibetan people, the most peace-loving and put-upon people in all the world, has been a rather lonely vigil. But the international focus on the extraordinary atrocities inflicted on the Uighur minority in Xinjian province from satellite images of corralled prisoners in detention camps to accounts of forcibly sterilised Uighur women, has put Chinese human rights’ abuses firmly on the international radar. We are no longer voices in the wilderness.

This latest inept measure by the Chinese regime will be hugely counter-productive. For too many years, they have got away with it because condemnations by Governments of all colours amounted to strong words, with little follow through. But this act is a wake-up call to all democratic nations and freedom loving people everywhere. We sanctioned MPs are more determined than ever to make sure the Chinese regime faces serious consequences for its atrocities, and our voices will now be louder and heard further afield.

In the last few weeks, the Government has been emboldened to bring forward significant practical measures. Key officials have been sanctioned, but not nearly enough. British businesses are prevented from dealing with Chinese companies complicit in Uighur forced labour factories, though not yet widely enough.

Whilst we did not persuade the Government to go all the way in making genocide a key consideration of the Trade Bill, it moved a long way, and genocide and the Chinese regime are words now regularly occurring in the same sentence in regular parlance. This is a good start – but only a start.

The international allegiances that are being formed between foreign ministers and the cross-border scope of Parliamentarians striking common cause through the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) are making a difference, and clearly China is getting riled. If they want to be treated as twenty-first century major power there are basic global standards they need to adopt, and not trying to crush the culture of inconvenient minorities is pretty basic.

Hand in hand with abuse of its people goes China’s abuse of the planet too. As the world’s biggest polluters, where their contribution to global warming is melting the glaciers in the Tibetan Plateau which water over a quarter of the world’s population, the Chinese need to be held to account environmentally too, and we must make sure that happens at COP26.

So, as Iain Duncan Smith said, I will wear my inclusion on the sanctions list as a ‘badge of honour.’ If it means more people more focused on standing up to the world’s biggest human rights’ abuser, even if I personally will be denied access to the delights of a Wuhan wet market, I will happily take one for the team.

Stephen Booth: The Integrated Review – a further step towards the wider world and away from the European Union

25 Mar

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

A “Global Britain” needs to ensure it is relevant in and to all three of the world’s major economic and geopolitical hubs – Europe, North America, and the Indo-Pacific. Brexit or no Brexit, it is clear that the economic and political weight of Europe is in relative decline and that global power is shifting, predominantly due to demographics and the rise of economies in Asia. 

Brexit has only emphasised the need for the UK to diversify its international relationships and that it must be prepared to do so across a wide spectrum of areas. It was significant, therefore, that last week’s Integrated Review (IR) emphasised such coherence across government, mirroring a world where the boundaries between prosperity and security, trade and development, and domestic and foreign policy are increasingly intertwined. 

The IR reflects several concepts and recommendations that have featured prominently in the think tank I work for, Policy Exchange’s, research. Arguably, the most significant is the “Indo-Pacific tilt”. Trade policy was not highlighted alongside security, defence, development and foreign policy in the official title of last week’s IR, but did feature in its conceptual development and it is a key strand of the document. It has emerged as a key component of the UK’s new strategic approach and is central to the “tilt”.

The UK intends to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and become a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. The UK has already secured a deal with Japan. Bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand would be expected to bear fruit this year, while talks with the United States could take longer. 

India is an increasingly important part of the UK’s Indo-Pacific economic strategy and the IR confirmed that a potential comprehensive trade deal is a long-term ambition. We may expect to hear more about the roadmap to a deeper UK-India economic relationship during the Prime Minister’s planned visit to the country next month.

Individual free trade agreements will provide important economic benefits, particularly for certain sectors of the economy, but their aggregate impact on UK GDP is likely to be limited in the short-term. Trade deals are best viewed as important elements of a long-term strategy of diversification away from – rather than immediate replacements for – the EU market and increasing the UK’s links to the economic and political developments of the world’s faster-growing markets. 

The key to taking advantage of these opportunities will be to marry the twin aims of outwardly projecting “Global Britain” and “Levelling Up” those regions of the UK that have most struggled to adapt to globalisation. The IR recognises that for Global Britain to be a success, more of the UK must become integrated and competitive in the global economy.

For example, the government is launching new UK Trade and Investment Hubs in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the North of England. This is a complex and long-term challenge. British businesses, smaller ones in particular, will need to be supported and encouraged to make the most of new opportunities which will take time.

It is welcome, then, that the IR acknowledges that the UK’s new trade policy is not simply a commercial endeavour. It is, rightly, viewed as an important part of a geopolitical toolkit that should be deployed to reinforce the wider economic, political and security relationships, upon which a successful Global Britain will rely. 

It is noteworthy that the IR underlines the UK’s ambition to “move from defending the status quo within the post-Cold War international system to dynamically shaping the post-Covid order.” An important aspect of this means using “regulatory diplomacy” and working with like-minded partners to influence global rules.

This is particularly relevant in emerging technologies, as systemic competition intensifies, in particular with China. This is an often-underappreciated benefit of concluding trade agreements, particularly with platforms such as the CPTPP. It helps to embed and promote high-quality rules. 

The IR’s emphasis on the UK “as a global services, digital and data hub” highlights that the UK’s natural economic strengths often sat uneasily within the wider EU’s order of priorities, where the UK’s approach in these sectors has often differed from the other big players, France and Germany.

In my previous column, I noted that the UK is now able to put forward a distinct voice and approach that plays to its competitive advantage and confronts head-on the political reality that global power is shifting away from Europe, particularly in these innovative fields. France, Germany and the Netherlands have all adopted their own national strategies for the Indo-Pacific, prompting the EU to signal that it will set out a common vision in the “coming months”. The challenge for Brussels will be to produce something pragmatic that rises above the lowest common denominator.

Several commentators have remarked that the IR says relatively little about how the UK views its long-term relationship with the EU developing, both in terms of future cooperation and competition. This is perhaps unsurprising given the proximity of the publication of the IR to what has been a turbulent Brexit process.

In recent days, we have seen examples of both forces at work. The UK and the EU, along with the US and Canada, have co-ordinated new sanctions against China over its treatment of Uighur Muslims. However, the threat of an EU vaccine export ban, chiefly targeted at the UK, illustrates that any UK strategy for national resilience must now consider the prospect of an uncooperative EU.

The EU acting as a bloc can have the advantage of economic scale and collective weight but, due to internal tensions, it can lack coherence and focus, often particularly evident in its efforts to implement a collective foreign policy.

There follows a strong argument that the advantages of the EU were better suited to the relatively benign international order of the late twentieth century – an order underpinned by the US security guarantee – and its drawbacks less so to a world increasingly characterised by great power rivalry and systemic economic competition. Many within the EU have historically been reluctant to acknowledge that the transatlantic relationship, based as it is on NATO, is fundamentally asymmetric.

It is also worth recalling that during the Brexit negotiations, it was the EU that held out hope of a formal agreement with the UK on foreign and security policy. The UK ultimately decided it would not pursue such an agreement. The UK has made it clear in the IR that its commitment to European security is “unequivocal”, that it “will continue to be the leading European Ally within NATO”, and will “actively support” EU-NATO exercises.

However, in terms of direct engagement with Brussels, the IR highlights the opportunity for a “distinctive approach to foreign policy” outside the EU and the advantages of flexibility and coherence from acting independently. The UK has also committed to finding “new ways of working with” the EU on “shared challenges” and “where our interests coincide”.

There remains no sign that the UK is interested in any formal agreement with Brussels in this area. The implication is that the merits of cooperation will continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and therefore cannot be taken for granted, particularly if the economic relationship were to be further soured.