Britain’s music industry, the EU, the UK – and an early entry for Frost’s inbox

2 Mar

Some post-Brexit barriers to business between the UK and the EU are a consequence of both parties failing to clinch an agreement that one or the other or both already have with third parties – in which the loser is the industry concerned, on both sides of the channel.

Others are a product of our own bureaucracy: of government being ponderous when it might be nimble in offering advice and support.

And others still are simply a product of Brexit as we agreed it, which brings with it friction in trade with the EU, which in turn can be minimised but not eliminated.

The continuing row over the access of British musicians to the EU and EU musicians to Britain offers examples of all three.

In the first category, we have visas.  Some EU states will allow our musicians to visit without a visa for up to 90 days and other won’t.  That isn’t a problem for other third party states, such as St Lucia, Tonga or those which make up the United Arab Emirates, because they have a bileteral deal with the EU that waives the requirement.

In the second, there is VAT. UK exporters of physically recorded music and merchandise must go from paying no VAT to negotiating 27 different EU VAT systems to dealing with a single EU VAT system during this current year.  This is a classic instance of the businesses concerned needing more advice from the government as it seeks to navigate two systems within twelve months.

Finally, there will be more bureaucracy, admin and paperwork – even if the UK and the EU can sort that visa issue, and others that could reasonably be settled (such as carnets, for which there may already be an exemption for portable musical instruments taken into the EU for professional purposes).

That last category is integral to leaving the Single Market and Customs Union – which is outweighed, to some Brexiteers, by the regaining of national independence and, to others, by the gains that come from being outside the EU system and willing to act on it.  Our vaccine success alone could be worth “more than the most pessimistic assumptions about the economic damage of Brexit,” according to Jethro Elsden of the Centre for Policy Studies.

(Northern Ireland, of course, remains in the Single Market for goods and, in key respects, in the Customs Union too for practical purposes.)

Why the difficulty over negotiating a deal on visa waivers or work permits?  Because musicians are caught up in a wider issue of which their story is part: freedom of movement.

To cut a long story short, the EU made a public offer on the issue, which had wider implications for free movement, and the UK made a private one, that did not.

The former would have applied not only to musicians but to other workers and travellers, as Free Movement confirms.  But, for many people who backed Brexit, ending it was integral to the exercise.

Our proprietor’s EU referendum day poll of over 12,000 people found that a third of those who voted Leave said the main reason was that leaving “offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders.”

Meanwhile, Oliver Dowden says that “the reason why we rejected the offer from the European Union was that it wasn’t binding, it didn’t cover touring, it didn’t cover technical support staff, and crucially, it didn’t cover work permits.”

This continuing impasse is an early bidder for entry near the top of David Frost’s inbox as he begins only his second day as a member of the Cabinet – though if the free movement obstacle remains immovable, there will be little he can wring out of the EU.

However, Frost knows the ropes, having led the negotiation on the trade deal himself, and is so is well-placed to knock on the doors of individual member states, into whose hands most of these matters fall in the absence of an EU-wide agreement.

UK Music argues that “fishing is of course an important British industry, contributing £446 million to the UK economy in 2019 and employing 12,000 fishers”.

“But it pales in comparison with the UK music industry, which in the same year contributed £5.8 billion to the economy and supported 200,000 jobs.”

It is strange to think that there is more money in Peter Grimes, figuratively speaking, than there is in real fishing – even if because there is less than there might be because of the dispute.

There will be a £23 million fund for fisheries, and Music UK proposes, by way of parallel, a music exports office to help the sector cope with the increased bureaucracy.

Perhaps Rishi Sunak will make an offer tomorrow – after all, today’s papers are full of pre-briefing, as is way with modern Budgets, of £400 million more for theatres, museums, galleries and live music venues.

Andrew Rosindell: How close we came to waking up in the backstop

8 Jan

Andrew Rosindell is the MP for Romford.

How close we came to waking up on January 1 trapped in the backstop. That misery would have been quickly overtaken by the new national lockdown announced on Monday night. But this would in no way have diminished in the longer-term the ramifications of being trapped in a customs union with no way out.

To the true Brexiteers, the sensible outcome to the Brexit process was always a Canada-style free trade agreement which took back control of our laws, money, borders and waters, while still allowing both the UK and the EU to trade together as equal partners on mutually-beneficial terms.

Unfortunately the EU spent the next few years in a desperate and arrogant attempt to punish our nation for the Brexit vote. It tried to trap our nation in a customs union, demanded tens of billions in exit fees, demanded a continuing role for its courts in UK affairs and made blood-curdling threats of economic punishment.

In a way it showed self-awareness. Because it is only with threats and traps – much in the fashion of the Chinese Communist regime (with whom the EU is now engaging in a nauseating romance) – does EU membership become preferable to the freedom of being a sovereign, independent nation.

All told, the EU generally appeared aghast at the affirmations by the British people of their democratic right to decide their future. To me this demonstrated that the only way out was a completely clean break: to walk away, for good if necessary.

It is why I and my Spartan colleagues voted on three separate occasions against Theresa May’s Brexit deal. If we hadn’t held out against the pleas of our colleagues, from both the Remain and Brexit wings of the party, then we would have woken up on New Year’s Day trapped in the backstop. What should have been a moment of restored sovereignty would simply be a new future paralysed by the EU’s protectionist trading bloc.

The Prime Minister voted for that deal, at the third attempt. I believe he feared for Brexit if the deal wasn’t passed. Fortunately for him, the Spartans gave Brexit a chance. And once Boris was at the reigns he was always ready to walk away. He realised no deal really is better than a bad deal.

With this strategy he was able to bring before the House of Commons an agreement which facilitates free trade with zero quotas and tariffs, without the UK being part of the Single Market or Customs Union and with no control over us by the European Court of Justice.

It will give us the freedom to chart our own course. It will mean the establishment of freeports and new enterprise zones to turbocharge the regions. It means we can change our VAT policy, for example on home insulation products as my friend and colleague John Redwood has noted.

It means we can revitalise nationally important industries with targeted support, such as shipbuilding. It means we can sign free trade deals with our closest friends and allies in the Commonwealth, and improve economic ties with some of the fastest growing economies.

Liz Truss, the Secretary of State for International Trade, has already negotiated trade deals with 61 countries, including one deal, the UK-Japan FTA which goes beyond the existing EU-Japan agreement, particularly on data and digital matters. The backstop would have precluded much of this.

The new agreement with the EU is not perfect. There are flaws in the deal. The transition period for fisheries is too long, the Northern Ireland protocol threatens to divide our country and I am nervous of the separate deal on Gibraltar, given Spain’s record.

Finally, I was disappointed that our British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies did not seem to be fully included. I also share David Davis’s comments on this website, where he highlights how far ahead of the EU we are in many areas of regulation, particularly animal welfare, but also on energy and labour law. Any arbitration panel which rules on deviations from the “level playing field” must recognise that there is no “level playing field” at present. It is the EU undercutting the UK in many ways.

There are problems, then. However, I and my colleagues have come to the conclusion that this is still a good agreement: it restores our sovereignty, avoids temporary disruption of ‘no deal’ and avoids the acrimony which would define UK-EU relations going forward if no agreement had been reached.

There is nothing in the agreement which compromises our sovereignty in the manner of the backstop. Yet where there are flaws, there are fights still to be had. I have demonstrated that I am ready for these battles, as have my fellow Spartans.

For now, let’s celebrate the restoration of sovereignty to these islands and move onto the next challenge: getting the country vaccinated, lifting these Covid-19 restrictions, and revving up the UK economy for a new, better, more prosperous and, I hope, a more united decade.

Craig Mackinlay & Andrea Jenkyns: This is the first step in a new, improved relationship with our continental neighbours – and with the wider world

30 Dec

Craig Mackinlay is an executive committee member of the European Research Group, and is MP for South Thanet. Andrea Jenkyns is Deputy Chairman of the ERG, and is MP for Morley & Outwood.

Oh well, it’s only been 1,652 days since referendum – longer than the entire duration of World War One. Whether that inordinate amount of time is properly due to the complications of unwinding a 46-year relationship with an ever-changing entity that moved from trading club to a fully-fledged supra-national state in being, or has been a reflection of the failure of statecraft and of obstructive behaviour by those who couldn’t accept a democratic result, we’ll leave to readers to decide.

The Prime Minister gave the powerful rallying cry to the electorate of the UK a little over a year ago to ‘Get Brexit Done’. That was endorsed by the voters, providing him with a historic 80 seat majority and we duly left the EU, as promised, on 31st January of this year. No prevarication, no extensions, no missed promises.

Since March, UK and EU negotiators had been locked in discussions over the terms of the new trading relationship that will apply after the end of the transitional period on 31st December, this coming Friday.  Protracted deadlock ensued – caused by the EU’s refusal to discuss anything other than their own “red lines”, which amounted to keeping the UK within its permanent regulatory orbit.

This was finally broken when the Prime Minister announced his intention to withdraw from the talks, and remove any possibility of further timetable delay or transition extension. That clearly concentrated minds in Brussels; negotiations accelerated, and the outcome was the Christmas Eve Deal before us.

The instructions given to David Frost and the rest of the British negotiating team were clear: any agreement should ensure that the sovereignty of the United Kingdom was not compromised in any respect. No other outcome could be compatible with the result of the 2016 referendum.

The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, to give the deal its full title, does indeed respect the United Kingdom’s hard-won sovereignty. That is a thread that runs throughout the agreement, but is most particularly evident in two respects.

First, the Agreement declares that neither party shall be subject to the courts of the other, thereby excluding the jurisdiction in the UK of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the entity in which EU sovereignty resides. Not to be bound by the rulings of a foreign court has to be the singularly most powerful statement of sovereignty and independence.

Second, it provides that either party may terminate the agreement on one year’s notice. There is therefore not the assumptive permanency in the arrangement – unlike the position under EU membership, despite Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Agreement, therefore, is a broad and comprehensive free trade agreement, and little more. It is, indeed, the most comprehensive trade deal ever done by the European Union. It provides for zero-tariff, zero-quota trade in goods, effectively giving the UK what many commentators said was impossible: access to the EU Single Market but also let us not forget, access by EU countries to ours but without EU membership, annual fee or supremacy of EU law.

In the short term, this provides reassurance to UK businesses that they can continue to sell into the EU market and they to ours without financial barriers and gives us the domestic freedom to move away from the ratcheting Acquis Communautaire as the EU moves on to whatever it wants to be.

It is in the longer term, however, that the most exciting opportunities will present themselves. Outside the constraints of the Customs Union, the UK can seek out new and lucrative markets. Already, free trade deals have been done with over 60 countries around the world, with more undoubtedly to come. For the first time in 46 years, the UK can become a new champion of international free trade with our seat resumed at the WTO.

The Agreement, in short, is a remarkable achievement. It is not without its flaws – full control over our fishing resources are delayed and there remain unanswered questions as to how the new arrangements will apply in practical terms to Northern Ireland under the unaltered Withdrawal Agreement. A strong and resolute government willing to exercise the country’s new freedoms will be able to resolve these issues.

This international treaty may be the final act in the UK’s tortuous departure from the European Union but is also the first step in a new, improved relationship with our continental neighbours, and with the wider world.

John Redwood: Why we would be better off with No Deal

14 Dec

Sir John Redwood is MP for Wokingham, and is a former Secretary of State for Wales.

No Deal would be a good outcome for the UK. It would mean that we take back control of our borders, our money, our laws and our fish, as promised by the Leave campaign. The deals on offer from the EU fall well short of improving on No Deal.

It wants to continue overfishing our seas with its huge industrial trawlers. It wants to control our law making in all areas related in any way to business and trade. It wants its court to adjudicate disputes between us – in a clear violation of usual international practice, in which an impartial arbitrator is used, or the two sides need to argue matters through to agreement. Its every word and action signals that it does not wish to accept the fact that we have voted to be an independent country, and intend to be one.

When Theresa May with senior civil servants foolishly sought to recreate many of the features of our EU membership under the cover of a so-called comprehensive partnership, the EU made it impossible for her. If we just wanted a free trade agreement like Canada or Japan, that seemed to be on offer.

Once a new UK government offered to do just, that the EU decided to impede and prevent it, and to pretend the UK still really wanted special access to the Single Market which in turn required subservience to its laws.

There was little good faith in trying to implement the Political Agreement by the EU, given that it said that a free trade agreement would lie at the heart of a new relationship between the EU and the UK. The EU has always behaved with discipline and severity in its negotiating stance, assuming that it can have its cake and eat it. It has repeated its mantra that you cannot have access to the Single Market without accepting many limitations on your freedoms.

This of course is simply not true for the rest of the world, which trades with the EU without having to obey its laws. In every other case, the EU accepts mutual respect for World Trade Organisation rules. The EU as a member of the WTO accepts its disputes resolution. The EU has a history of some violations of WTO rules with penalties – as with subsidies to Airbus.

I was asked to give many speeches during the EU referendum campaign to business audiences. I always said No Deal was the only outcome we could guarantee. It was an outcome which would give a good answer for the UK, achieving all our aims to be independent. On the past economic evidence, I expected a No Deal Brexit to offer us a small boost to GDP if we used the new freedoms well.

I used to go on to say it would be very easy – if there was political will – to add a free trade agreement on top of No deal, which would be beneficial to both sides. In most free trade deals, there are delays and problems with each side wishing to defend a tariff here and a non-tariff barrier there.

In the case of the UK and EU, we start from a position where there are no tariffs and no untowards barriers to goods trade, so it would just be a question of rolling over what we have.  I also sometimes added that some thought the EU would not behave well or want to do that.

In that event, surely it shows how right we are to leave if our EU neighbours, friends and allies behave in such a silly way towards us, to the point of hurting their own access to our own lucrative market. To the EU, the UK has indeed been Treasure Island. It has taken large payments from us in the form of our net contributions to the EU, and has ru a huge surplus on goods and food trade through tariff-free entry.

The Prime Minister has been clear and right in saying we will leave the Single Market and Customs Union. We want our own international trade policy, and will be a more powerful and consistent voice for freer trade than the EU. To do this, we need to have full control of all matters relating to trade and business.

The Single Market has been damaging to the UK overall. In our first decade in the Common Market, as it was then erroneously called, we lost half our motor manufacturing capacity as tariffs were removed. Over the years, we have seen the loss of most of our steel industry and aluminium output, serial damage to textile and ceramic manufacture, the mass closure of foundries and the break up and contraction of our chemical industry.  Our market share in temperate food production has fallen sharply, and we have gone from being a net exporter of fish to a shrunken industry, with consumers reliant on imports for much of our demand.

EU grants and subsidies have bid some business investment away from the UK. EU rules have often been based around the needs and methods of large-scale continental producers at the expense of our firms. The EU has failed to negotiate trade deals at all with two of our largest trading partners, the USA and China, and has not bothered about proper service sector access in other deals, despite the UK’s strong position in many service areas.

Our average growth rate was faster before entry into the Common Market post-war than during the years of Common market membership, which in turn was faster than our average growth rate in the years which followed 1992 and the so-called completion of the Single Market.

The UK establishment has never been willing to analyse the data and understand what was truly happening. It visited upon us the disaster of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, whose predictable impact caused a major recession at the very point there was meant to be a boost from completing the Single Market.

So how can now use our freedoms as we leave with No Deal, assuming there is no last-minute wish to be sensible by the EU and agree a free trade deal?   We should be up and running with tax cuts – at last, we can take VAT off all those green products from insulation to boiler controls the EU insists on.

We can lift tariffs from South African oranges and other tropical fruit and food that we cannot grow for ourselves. We should pursue our offer to the USA of removing EU retaliatory tariffs on its goods if it will drop their tariff on Scotch whisky, which was an unwelcome hit from an EU trade spat.

We should set up freeports and enterprise zones to marshal new investment and make more in the UK. We should reorient farm subsidies to slash the food miles, and grow more of our own salads, fruits,and vegetables. We should land more of our fish at home, and add fish processing to create meals and products that we want to eat or which we can export.

We should put in more electricity capacity, and end our growing dependence on imported EU power. As the Government encourages the planting of many more trees, we should ensure more sustainable forestry to cut the massive timber imports.

These are all good economic reasons to press for the No Deal Brexit. The best reason of all is to be free, living in an independent country. I want to help pass on a country that is self-governing – a beacon for democracy.  Brexit means taking back control of our laws, our borders and our money. That way we will be better governed. If any given government lets us down we can sack it, and get the answer we want from another. That is something we can never do as members of the  EU. They give us the laws and we do not control the government.

David Gauke: If Johnson goes for a Brexit trade deal, as he should, he should also go for a further implementation period.

7 Nov

David Gauke is a former Justice Secretary, and was an independent candidate in South-West Hertfordshire at the recent general election.

It is time to talk about Brexit again.

Understandably, the country’s attention has been focused upon the second wave of Covid-19 and the Government’s response to it. And in the past few days, many of us have welcomed the chance to change the subject and follow every twist and turn of the US Presidential election. But it is all too easy to miss the fact that the next week will be one of the most important in the protracted saga of the UK’s departure from the European Union. Just this afternoon, the Prime Minister is speaking to the President of the EU Commission.

We are so used to deadlines whooshing past with little or no practical consequence, there is a temptation to be complacent about the EU’s position that, for a free trade agreement between the UK and the EU to be ratified in time to take effect by the end of the transitional period, such agreement would need to be concluded by 15 November. After all, the Prime Minister has previously said that talks would need to conclude by 15 October in order to reach a deal and – save for a brief and rather unconvincing walk-out – the parties carried on talking.

This time, however, the difficulty is that we are not dealing with a deadline imposed for political reasons in order to focus the minds. We are now at the stage of running out of time to go through all the practical hurdles to ratify any agreement amongst member states and the European Parliament.

The stand-off remains as it has been for months. The two sides remain some way apart of the level playing field provisions, particularly on state aid, and how any agreement is enforced. In addition, the economically irrelevant issue of fish continues to be contentious.

Progress has been made on many of the technical issues, but on these fundamental points the talks have stalled. Both sides have given some ground, but will have to move further. And the side that is going to have to move the furthest will have to be the UK. If Boris Johnson wants a deal, at the very least he will have to accept something which recent leaders of the Conservative Party would consider to be desirable regardless of the EU implications – a robust and independent state aid regime.

I do not know whether the Prime Minister will decide to go for a deal. As far as I can see, it is not clear that he knows himself. Making decisions is not always a strong point for Johnson, and he made one big difficult decision a few days ago by re-imposing a lockdown. Now he has to make another.

At one level, the decision should be straightforward. The right to waste public money by subsidising loss-making businesses has never been a demand of most Eurosceptics, save for a few Bennites, and was a non-issue in the 2016 referendum campaign. (Johnson has praised the EU on this point.) He went to the country in 2019 promising he had a deal: failing to conclude an FTA looks like a failure of competence and a breach of trust. An already fragile economy will suffer a further blow.

However, it has been reported that the Prime Minister is ‘emotionally drawn’ towards a WTO Brexit. Why might that be? It is possible that he believes that any constraint on decision is an unacceptable suppression of sovereignty, but that suggests a purity of view that would make a free trade agreement with anyone impossible.

The politics and the Prime Minister’s perceptions of his own self-interest may tempt him to turn down a deal. Nigel Farage is relaunching himself (again) and is ready to cry betrayal (again) which will panic plenty of Conservative MPs (again). Johnson will also be aware that he has taken on many of his Parliamentary colleagues over the Government’s response to Covid-19 – he might not want to take on many of the same people on a second issue. And – a point I made back in February  – even a deal will cause economic disruption. If the Prime Minister agrees to a deal in the next few days, he will have to proclaim a triumph, but also explain to businesses that time is running out to prepare for it being much more difficult to trade with the EU.

The evidence that – even with the thin deal we may get – the end of the transition period will damage the economy is growing. On Thursday, the Bank of England pointed out that the UK’s trade and GDP will be adversely affected in the first half of 2021, even with a deal. On Friday, the National Audit Office published a report expressing concerns that UK business will face widespread disruption in 2021 because of failures to prepare for post-Brexit borders. A deal will help because it might provide an opportunity to ease rules in particular circumstances but the fundamental problems remain the same.

The approach of the Government has been to blame businesses for not being prepared. Some businesses may have been complacent about the consequences of the end of the transition period, but they can hardly be blamed when the Government, until relatively recently, has not been able to provide details of our future relationship and presented this moment as an opportunity. It simply is not. At a practical level, leaving the Single Market and the Customs Union only makes it harder to trade with the EU.

The Prime Minister might be tempted to try to escape responsibility for the predicament that he, more than anyone, has got us in. He could collapse the talks, and blame the EU for the consequences that the country will face in January. We saw how Brexiteers rather enjoyed the prospect of the talks collapsing in mid-October. A bitter dispute with the EU which could last for years would be truly thrilling to some. And quite a lot of the public would swallow mendacious claims for the reasons of the negotiations breaking down. In terms of the next few weeks, walking away from the talks might be the easier path to tread.

It would also be grossly irresponsible. In the medium term, it would not be possible for Boris Johnson to escape responsibility for a decision that will have a major impact on many people’s lives and livelihoods. The timing could not be worse with the economy already shrinking and businesses restricted in what they can do because of Covid restrictions for at least four of last nine weeks until the transition period ends.

If the Prime Minister wants a soft landing for Brexit, he will need to make concessions, but he needs to do more. Time has run out to prepare properly for 31 December. Even at this late stage, he should ensure that his deal has a further implementation period of another 12 months. A combination of Covid and the Government’s failure to prepare the nation for the realities of Brexit means that ending the transition period at the end of the year will cause even greater problems than necessary. A responsible Prime Minister should seek to prevent that from happening. He should get a deal that gives everyone time to implement it.

Roderick Crawford: The EU must drop its maximalist approach to the Northern Ireland Protocol

29 Jun

Roderick Crawford works on conflict resolution in countries such as Yemen, South Sudan and Iraq, and on Brexit-related matters. He is a former editor of Parliamentary Brief.

Any final agreement on the future relationship is dependent on the successful implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement; not surprisingly, it is the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol where British and EU positions are furthest apart.

The UK and EU have always viewed the protocol through different lenses. In part this difference is because the EU doesn’t fully understand the Belfast Agreement and was incredibly slow to recognise that it undermined rather than supported many of its positions.

Having framed the protocol as a defender of the Belfast Agreement, the EU struggled to accept that the agreement upheld east-west relations as well as north-south ones in ways the protocol undermined. In the context of the political constraints and crisis of last autumn, the concession on consent did bring the protocol sufficiently in line with the Belfast Agreement for the UK to accept it, however unsatisfactory the protocol remained constitutionally, politically and as practical policy.

Now at the implementation stage, both parties are again looking at the protocol through their different lenses. Last month the Government published its approach to implementation; the Commission’s response showed no sign of welcoming a light-touch regime favoured by the UK, stating: “the UK will have to meet all the requirements of the Protocol, rigorously and effectively. That includes putting in place all the necessary checks and controls for goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain. That includes applying EU rules on customs and sanitary and phytosanitary protection”.

The strict requirements of the protocol secure the EU’s primary interests, but not those of the UK, so the EU has little incentive to problem solve with the UK to try and realise aims it signed up to but does not really share, or to agree trade offs between these other aims and its core interests. However, there is one factor that alters these dynamics – potentially significantly.

Before the end of 2024 the UK government will provide the opportunity for consent to the continued application of the main economic aspects of the protocol (articles 5-10). Consent will require a simple majority of votes in the assembly. It is assumed that a vote on the continuation of the relevant articles of the protocol will be for no change; this is based on expected party representation after the next assembly election, though this expectation may overstate likely future decline in unionist seats.

The assumption that there will be no vote to change the working of the protocol assumes the question is seen in largely or wholly political and communal terms: a vote against the protocol on principle. However, removing consent to a system because it is damaging economically would not be a matter of political principle and communal allegiance but of mutual and thus cross-communal interest.

A rejection of the relevant economic articles of the protocol would result in an improvement to the working of the protocol, one that would likely command a majority in the assembly; it would not threaten north-south co-operation (excluded from the issues that would be voted on) and could not require a hard border, for which there would be no majority anyway. Addressing the faults of a cumbersome and expensive protocol would benefit Northern Ireland: it would, however, be a loss for the Commission.

The point of the consent principle in the protocol is not only that one day the voice of the people of Northern Ireland will be heard; it is that because this is the case, their voice and interests will be taken into account from the very beginning – from the design stage itself: i.e. now. In the light of this, the EU’s incentive to make a deal that works for everyone and balances the full aims of the protocol is far greater. The EU is no longer the final judge on the acceptability of the protocol.

The question that faces the Commission therefore, is how it can ensure that the operation of the protocol is not overly detrimental to the economic interests of the people of Northern Ireland, thus risking its rejection by democratic vote in just over four years. That is likely to be the cost of a heavy-handed approach to implementing the protocol.

The EU needs to change its thinking from a maximalist approach focused on its limited interests to a more balanced approach that allows trade offs between rigorous application of the Union Customs Code and the economic interests of Northern Ireland. A maximalist approach is not needed to secure core EU interests and a more flexible and innovative approach is needed to manage the trade offs – and these do need managing.

There is plenty of scope to apply exemptions to the strict application of checks and customs duties. For instance, Article 5 of the protocol, on movement of goods, provides that goods that are not at risk of entering the single market will not pay customs duties; there are no practical grounds for strict application of the Union Customs Code to apply to such goods.

Retail shipments bound for the high streets and shopping centres of Northern Ireland would fall within this “not at risk” category, thus preventing hikes in the cost of weekly shopping that would affect people across Northern Ireland. A decision on this is required before the end of the transition period, December 31: it should be made now.

Goods subject to commercial processing cannot be designated “not at risk” of single market entry. Getting the necessary checks and controls undertaken as lightly and swiftly as possible for these goods is a problem that still needs to be solved and agreed but the incentive to do so has not really been there for the EU. Long-established supply chains could have special status and arrangements based on such trusted trading could allow the minimal paperwork.

Consent was not a sop to allow the UK to swallow the protocol whole: it introduced democracy into the working of the protocol and so made it accountable to the people, not just the EU. This change should affect the approach the Commission takes to getting the protocol implemented; like the UK, it now needs a protocol that works with the least hindrance to east-west trade. Failure to get this right risks rejection of the protocol in four years and its replacement with a lighter-touch regime. The EU should work to achieve that regime now.

One of the conditions the EU has set for an agreement on a UK-EU future relationship is respect for democracy. We will see how serious the Commission is about that in the weeks ahead. Michel Barnier warned that there were costs to Brexit for Northern Ireland; there are also costs of democracy for the Commission.