Adrian Lee: Nord Stream 2. How Russia could turn off half Germany’s gas supply – and so threaten our collective security.

21 Jun

Adrian Lee is a Solicitor-Advocate in London, specialising in criminal defence, and was twice a Conservative Parliamentary Candidate.

Some political issues – such as Climate Change, female circumcision and African debt relief – become truly internationalised over the passage of time. Gatherings of world leaders see these subjects set high on the agenda for discussion and the press released closing statements at such events are dominated by worthy platitudes calling for greater global action.

By contrast, other matters with the potential to change the world order draw far less attention. One issue that has largely failed to focus the comment of the media pack is the imminent opening of the Nord Steam 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany.

On the Friday 11th June – ironically, the very day that the G7 leaders arrived in Cornwall – commissioning works to fill the pipeline with gas began. Whilst many have vaguely heard of the controversy, few realise the possible impact of Nord Stream 2 upon the defence of the United Kingdom.

Nord Steam 2 starts at Vyborg in Russia, threads its way through the Baltic Sea, passing Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and terminates in Griefswald, Germany.

Few would dispute that the project represents a triumph of modern engineering. Like its already operational predecessor, Nord Stream 1, this underwater marvel has the capacity to pump approximately 55 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year from Russia directly into Germany.

Even before the fuel starts pumping down the new line, Germany has already attained the status of the world’s largest user of natural gas, 94 per cent of which has to be imported, and 40 per cent of that total is supplied by Putin’s Russia.

Dependency upon this particular source is likely to increase significantly in the near future, as the so-called “Energiewende” policy announced in 2010 has already terminated most of Germany’s nuclear power, with the remaining six reactors scheduled to be phased out by 2022. When this plan was first trumpeted, the German government was confident that “renewables” would make up for the loss of nuclear power, but alas this has yet to transpire and consequently the wheels of German industry are more dependent on natural gas than ever before. No wonder then that Germany has some of the highest energy prices in the world and that the average German consumer has to pay double the cost of the equally average American.

Nord Stream 2 AG is owned by Gazprom, a Russian state-owned company, and its CEO is one Matthias Warnig, a former intelligence officer in the East German Stasi. The main source of the natural gas for the pipeline can be found in the Yuzhno-Russhoye field, located in Krasnoselkupsky, Tyumen Oblast. When one realises that oil and gas are responsible for more than 60 per cent of Russia’s exports and provide over 30% of the country’s GDP, you can understand why the Kremlin is so enthusiastic about this project. Russia certainly intends to make a lot of money out of wealthy Germany and is therefore not planning to suspend supplies, but should she feel the need to do so in the future, she faces no legal obstacle, as Russia is not a signatory to the 1991 Energy Charter Treaty, that provided safeguards to supply.

Why should Britain be concerned about this Russo-German oil deal? Well, mainly because of the military dimension. Sweden and Poland have voiced grave concerns about the Russian Navy using Nord Stream 2’s presence as a pretence for increased military intelligence gathering and intensified patrolling in the Baltic Sea. However, there is a much greater reason for worry.

NATO has been the cornerstone of the West’s defence for seven decades and, until the end of 1991, the main strategic opponent of NATO was the USSR. Following the collapse of Soviet Communism, the organisation changed its emphasis to the broad founding principle of collective security. In other words, an attack on one member is an attack on all – hence the participation of European NATO members in the Afghanistan theatre after 9/11.

The Russian war with Georgia in 2008, the protracted conflict over the Ukraine since 2014 and the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war refocused NATO’s attention on the increasing threat from the east. The 2016 NATO Summit, held in Warsaw, set the conditions for the establishment of an enhanced “Forward Presence” in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to strengthen the line against Russian forces.

There are currently 900 British military personnel in these states, along with allies from France and Denmark. There can be no doubt that Putin’s Russia is today the main threat to NATO on the European continent.

Since the inception of NATO, the involvement of Germany (originally West Germany) has been pivotal. Prior to 1989, Germany formed the frontline and prospective battlefield in any conflict, contributed an effective military force and provided a permanent base for US and British forces.

During recent decades ,it is arguable that Germany’s attention has turned towards the costly projects of re-building the old GDR territories and pushing for a federal Europe but, geographically, the country provides a vital link with the eastern NATO members in terms of supply. An effective NATO without wholehearted German participation remains unthinkable.

Unfortunately, Germany’s armed forces are currently in a pretty parlous state. Despite the pressure from the Trump Administration, Germany is yet to come close to contributing the two per cent of GDP agreed by all NATO countries in 2006. She only spent 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2019.

No surprise, then, that Germany’s arsenal is so decrepit. The main battle tank, the Leopard 2, entered service in 1979 and, of the 183 that the German state possesses, only 101 are estimated to be operational.

In 2014, it was reported that a significant number of German military aircraft were “unserviceable”. In terms of assault aircraft, Germany possesses 60 aging Tornados and 141 Eurofighters. However, it has been claimed that only half of these are airworthy, and one estimate states that just 12 of the Tornados are currently operational. Recently, Germany has ordered another 38 Eurofighters, but they are hardly likely to make the Russians quake in their flying boots.

By contrast, since 2012, Russian ground forces have received more than 15,500 pieces of weapons systems and equipment, twelve missile regiments have been rearmed with Yars ICBM’s and 10 missile brigades with Iskander tactical ballistic missile systems.

Overall, Russian has a million active-duty personnel in its armed forces, 2,300 modern battle tanks, 1,200 new helicopters and assault planes, 50 state of the art surface ships, 28 submarines and a 100 shiny new satellites for communication, command and control. Vladimir Putin spends 4.3 per cent of GDP on the Russian armed forces – in part thanks to the healthy financial contribution made by his trading partner Germany.

Under the circumstances, we are surely entitled to ask whether Germany’s commitment to NATO is likely to remain as wholehearted in the era of Nord Stream 2. Is Germany really going to go out on a limb for, say, the Baltic States and Poland when, at the turn of a tap Russia could cut off over half of her energy supply? Or is Germany gradually going to slide down the road to a slightly more neutralist position in the years ahead – to paraphrase William Hague “In NATO, but not run by NATO.”

One thing is for certain: in the absence of an effective backup plan for energy supply to Germany in the event of conflict with Russia, Angela Merkel’s government has handed Putin the ability to paralyse her country, and potentially the whole of western defence.

Snap guide to this session’s Government legislation 4) The Armed Forces Bill

20 Jun

The Bills announced in each session’s Queen’s Speech are the fulcrum of the Parliamentary year.  But they are easily lost sight of, separately and wholly, as the political cycle moves – and a mass of other news and events crowd them out.

So during the coming months, ConservativeHome will run a brief guide, most Sunday mornings, to each Bill from this year’s Speech: what it is, whether it’s new, its main strengths and weaknesses – and whether it’s expected sooner or later.

2) The Armed Forces Bill

What it is

In a nutshell, this Bill ensures that the United Kingdom has armed forces.  Why is legislation required for that purpose?  Because of Parliament’s ancient fear of the Crown having a standing army. (So it is that we have a Royal Navy and Air Force but the British Army.)

As James Sunderland explained recently on this site, “the Armed Forces Bill is a procedural anomaly harking back to the 1689 Bill of Rights. Every five years, the Bill must pass through Parliament, thereby renewing the Armed Forces Act in statute and enabling the maintenance of standing forces in peacetime”.

Responsible department

The Ministry of Defence.  Second Reading debate took place in the Commons on February 8.   Secretaries of State usually take the Second Reading of Bills, but Johnny Mercer, then Minister for Defence People and Veterans, took this one.

He has since resigned (over the treatment of Northern Ireland veterans, which is unconnected to this Bill) so his replacement, Leo Doherty, is likely to step into the breach when amendments are considered.

Carried over or a new Bill?

A new Bill – but it has had pre-legislative scrutiny through a unique form of joint committtee, chaired by Sunderland.  Read its report.

Expected back when?

The committee stage of the Bill is timetabled for this coming Wednesday, June 23.

Arguments for

The case for the Bill is a slam dunk – assuming that you believe that the United Kingdom needs armed forces.  It also updates elements of the armed forces disciplinary system.

Furthermore, it “enshrines the Armed Forces Covenant in law and help prevent service personnel and veterans being disadvantaged when accessing services like healthcare, education and housing and improve the Service Justice System for our personnel wherever they are operating”.

Arguments against

No-one has emerged in the Commons to argue that we don’t need armed forces, but there are lots of questions about the detail of the Bill – especially the application of the Covenant.

For example, as the Joint Committee report puts it, “concerns were…raised that the Bill applies to local government and some public bodies, but not to central nor devolved governments, and that there is a lack of alternative routes of redress for veterans”.  The committee also has concerns about the proposed workings of the Service Justice System.

Politics

Labour’s unsurprising position has been to support the Bill in principle, arguing that it emerges from its own Armed Forces Act of 2006 – while backing the Joint Committee’s concerns and adding some of its own.  For example, Kevan Jones, the former Defence Minister, claimed during Second Reading that Labour suggested protections for a 2009 forerunner of the Covenant that are not contained in the Bill.

While the Joint Committee necessarily maintained some differences with the Government, Sunderland rowed in behind Ministers over Labour’s criticisms, arguing that “my view therefore is that, far from being overly prescriptive in primary legislation, it may be better to be less prescriptive”.

Controversy rating: 2/10

As John Healey, Labour’s Shadow Defence Secretary, said at Second Reading, the Bill is bipartisan – and it is difficult to get controversy going about a measure necessary for the continuance of our Armed Forces.  But honouring the Covenant will be a challenge, given the range and complexity of issues affecting veterans, that may require further legislative changes before the Bill next comes up for renewal.

Garvan Walshe: Lukashenko’s air piracy. By way of western response, sanctions are only a start. Here’s what we need to do next.

27 May

Garvan Walshe is a former national and international security policy adviser to the Conservative Party

Alexander Lukashenko has stopped pretending he’s anything better than a gangster. Roman Protasevich was paraded on TV after his kidnapping with visible bruises. The message is clear: we grabbed him, we tortured him – and we don’t care what you think. He might as well have taken out that AK–47 he’s fond of carrying ,and screamed: “what are you going to do about it, punk?”

But what, indeed, are we going to do about it? International opinion is coalescing around a set of economic sanctions, and the US, EU, UK and other diplomats are working out the details. It could usefully be accompanied by a coordinated expulsion of Belarussian diplomats by all NATO members, just as Russian diplomats were expelled following the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. This is the minimum that can be expected, and will provide a modest deterrent against other small regimes contemplating something similar.

It is nowhere near enough.

While twentieth century dictatorships consolidated power by cutting themselves off from the democratic world, in the twenty first they exploit globalisation to corrupt democracies. They think we’re too greedy, fond of a quiet life, or exhausted after 20 years fighting Islamist terrorism to impose costs on dictators.

Mention of the latter pre-9/11 suggests a parallel today. Just as in the case of Al-Qaeda, which had bombed a US barracks in Saudi Arabia, attacked the USS Cole destroyer, and whose precursor made the first attempt to level the World Trade Center in 1996, we have ignored warnings about a significantly greater threat to peace and security, because facing the truth was inconvenient.

We made the mistake of hoping that tit-for-tat reprisals against Islamist attacks would be sufficient, when we needed to work out how to marginalise and sideline the full spectrum of Islamist activity. After 20 years of trial, and (considerable) error, we’ve settled on a combination of measures, from military strikes through humanitarian aid, counter-extremism prevention, and education progammes at the soft end. We came to understand that we had to neutralise the Islamists’ strategic aim to build theocratic dictatorships, and not merely blunt their tactics.

Lukashenko, Putin and Xi Jinping want to destabilise and weaken the West by undermining the system of international norms we’ve built up since 1945. They take advantage of our naivety. We made the mistake of letting countries without democratic politics and rule of law into the system by pretending to ourselves that the economic integration would be to make them liberal. This exposed our societies to infiltration by emboldened autocracies instead.

They have put a former German Chancellor and a Scottish First Minister on their payroll, have gained access to critical nuclear and telecommunications infrastructure, and broadcast their propaganda and disinformation on our airwaves. They use the openness of our free market system against us, by operating through front organisations (The gory details of the Russian element to this can be found in Catherine Belton’s excellent Putin’s People). The well-known abuse of social media platforms with fake accounts are just an extension of this technique. Lukashenko’s abuse of counter-terrorism protocols to dupe the Ryanair flight into landing, and then seizing Protasevich, is from the same playbook.

Our mistake was to extend the deeper elements Western of international cooperation, which relied on a sense of shared interest in keeping the system together, to countries that want not merely to free-ride on that system, but actually pull it apart.

This now needs to be reconfigured to deal separately with trusted and untrusted states. Trusted states can be kept within the system, but untrusted states need to be let in only on more sceptical terms. The automatic snap-back sanctions in the JCPOA Iran Deal are an example of mechanisms that could be used. The China Research Group proposed taking a similar stance in its Defending Democracy in a new world report (in which I was involved). Flows of foreign investment, support for think tanks, universities, and other forms of influence need to be brought under heavier scrutiny. Real “beneficial owners” need to be identified, and intelligence capability be built so this goes beyond a box-ticking compliance exercise. Media backed, directly or indirectly, by regimes that restrict media freedom should be denied broadcast licenses.

We need to consider whether we have adequate intelligence capability to keep tabs on influence by twenty-first century autocracies, and to protect our citizens and residents from their extraterritorial operations. One wonders whether Greek security services, for example, had any idea of the Belarussian KGB’s plot to kidnap Protasevich. Protecting democratic opponents of these regimes ought now become a priority for Western security agencies.

Belarus’s air piracy should be a wake-up call for the Western alliance. Just like twenty-first century terrorism, twenty-first century authoritarianism doesn’t stay within its own borders. Keeping it out of ours and those of our allies has become a matter of highest importance.

Profile: Penny Mordaunt. Ambitious, socially liberal, sacked, then rehabilitated, restive, military-flavoured – and on manoeuvres.

25 May

Last Tuesday, Penny Mordaunt triumphed at the Dispatch Box. In a speech lasting three minutes and 46 seconds she demolished Angela Rayner.

According to Henry Deedes, sketching the contest for The Daily Mail,

“You’d struggle to find a more elegant piece of skewering among Marseille’s finest kebabists.”

Rayner claimed that ministers “act like the rules are for other people”, and have repeatedly broken those rules. Mordaunt replied with icy self-possession:

“The right hon. Lady has made particular accusations today about colleagues, and I want to make a final point, Mr Speaker. If you were to take every single MP she has made an allegation about this afternoon, if you were to look at all the political donations they have received since the pandemic started, since January 2020, and if you were to add them all up and then double them—no, quadruple them—you would just about match what the right hon. Lady herself has received in the same time period. She should thank her lucky stars that we do not play the same games that she does.”

This sounded just the kind of point Michael Gove might have made had he been defending the Government, and some good judges even saw “Michael’s hand” in these words.

Rayner, who now rejoices in the title of shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, had supposed she would be taking on Gove, who is in many ways the most formidable debater on the Government benches.

It was instead Mordaunt, as Paymaster General, outside the Cabinet but a Cabinet Office minister, who was given the chance to remind Conservatives that she too is a considerable Commons performer, and can be relied on to carry the fight to the Opposition.

As ConHome noted in an earlier profile of her, published in March 2016 and predicated on the possibility that she might be a future leader:

“Mordaunt has a go-for-it mentality, which emerges at quite frequent intervals in her career, and is accompanied by a gift for publicity.”

She followed up her Commons performance with a piece in last week’s Daily Telegraph in which she mounted a bold defence of the Government’s record during the pandemic:

“I am proud to be part of this Government and to serve under such a determined, resilient, and popular leader…

“We…prioritised community assets over individual freedoms. The Government’s decision to protect the NHS and save lives was reminiscent of Churchill’s response to the U boat threat. He instinctively recognised that it was the one thing that could really hurt us.

“This is where the Prime Minister deserves personal praise. As someone who is an instinctive libertarian, he made the most difficult decision of his career.”

Her comparison with the Second World War was marred by a horrible blunder, when she described the Battle of El Alamein in 1942 as “the first and last victory of the war that was fought chiefly with British leadership”.

It fell to the present Viscount Slim to remind her that in Burma “the largest British-led campaign of the Second World War” began in 1942, and involved at its height a mainly Commonwealth army of 1.25 million personnel, which nicknamed itself the Forgotten Army, and which, unfortunately, was forgotten by Mordaunt, a former Defence Secretary.

What do Boris Johnson, Bill Gates, Elton John, Tony Blair, Ruth Davidson, Richard Curtis, Richard Branson, Kim Leadbeater, Michael Dobbs, Malcolm Rifkind, Peter Hennessy and Anthony Seldon have in common?

All of them have provided puffs for Mordaunt’s new book, Greater: Britain After The Storm, written with Chris Lewis and published last Thursday.

Blair described it as “uplifting and highly readable”, Branson said it is “utterly uplifting and inspiring”, Curtis settled for “really readable and funny”, while Johnson’s verdict is “loving, invigorating and delivered with characteristic wit”.

One may doubt whether these critics found either the time or the inclination to read the whole book, for like almost all such manifestos, it is sprinkled with ludicrous assertions.

On an early page, the American Ambassador to London, Woody Johnson, is said to have given a speech which is “shorter than the Gettysburg Address and just as powerful”.

In a later chapter, Parliament is dismissed as “about as out of touch with a modern democracy as it’s possible to be”, and some shoot-from-the-hip proposals are made for reform of the Lords and Commons, which earned the book a short write-up in The Sunday Times.

But the point of such a book is not to show literary merit. It is generally written to demonstrate the fitness of the author to be leader, a role reckoned to require energy, vision and grim determination, all of which are needed to get a book finished.

Anyone who would like to see Mordaunt display those qualities in shorter form is referred to her piece in September 2018 for ConHome entitled The twelve new rules of politics, and also to her piece in May 2019 entitled It’s time for servant leadership that will listen to the people.

Mordaunt supported Leave in the EU Referendum of 2016, but saw the need afterwards to bring the two sides together.

Theresa May made her Minister of State for Disabilities from 2016-17, put her in the Cabinet as International Development Secretary from 2017-19, and promoted her to the role of Defence Secretary from May to July 2019.

This was a highly suitable post for her, given her service background, outlined in the earlier ConHome profile. Even as Defence Secretary she continued as a Royal Navy reservist, a combination of roles which the Navy found, in the words of one of her colleagues, “mildly uncomfortable”, for she was both extremely senior and rather junior.

By this stage, May’s prime ministership was tottering to its close, and having established that despite her ConHome pieces, she did not have enough support to run for the leadership herself, Mordaunt decided to back Jeremy Hunt, and became a member of his campaign team.

Had Hunt won, she could have expected a senior Cabinet post. But although he got to the final two, he lost heavily to Johnson, who proceeded to sack Mordaunt.

She might have gone off to chair a select committee, the role taken by Hunt himself.  But instead she set to work on her book, and in the reshuffle of February 2020 accepted the post of Paymaster General, well below her previous level.

“I’m sure that Boris has told her if she’s helpful she can come back [into the Cabinet],” a former minister told ConHome. “But Boris tells everyone that.”

“I’m a big fan,” another former minister said. “I would have thought she would be an absolutely prime candidate for promotion to the Cabinet. There’s an awful lot of talent in the party, but I’d put her top of my list.”

“She’s very determined, very ambitious and generally very competitive,” a third ex-minister said, contemplating her chances of one day becoming leader. “But I don’t know how far she has been able to ingratiate herself with the 2019 intake.”

Because of the pandemic, nobody has been able to woo that intake much.

Mordaunt has a headstrong quality, and has on a considerable number of issues defied the Government line. Last summer she said there were many “inconsistencies” in Dominic Cummings’ account of his visit to Barnard Castle, and accused him of undermining the Government’s key public health messages.

She is a resolute social liberal, and in March told the Commons that ‘transmen are men and transwomen are women’, a position far in advance of Government policy.

At about the same time, she defied the Government line by meeting the Muslim Council of Britain.

So she could already have been fired for insubordination. Perhaps this accounts for the more loyal tone she has recently struck, though that could also proceed from the realisation that Johnson is on course to emerge strengthened from the pandemic, which means the best she can hope for is to get back into the Cabinet, which in turn will only happen if she convinces the Prime Minister that she is loyal.

Meanwhile, in the Ukraine…

18 Apr

There is only so much news that the cycle can really stay across at once. So with pandemic and the constitutional clashes in Scotland and Northern Ireland – not to mention the nation saying farewell to the Duke of Edinburgh – it perhaps isn’t surprising that foreign affairs are flying under the radar.

But events in Eastern Europe are a reminder that the Prime Minister could end up facing yet another crisis.

Ukraine is pressing its allies in Western Europe to honour their earlier commitments to admit it to NATO – and potentially threatening to re-acquire nuclear weapons, which it surrendered in exchange for Western security guarantees, if it doesn’t. Meanwhile Russia is mobilising troops on its border with the country in an effort to deter any such outcome.

The balance of opinion at present seems to be that Vladimir Putin is not planning a full-blown invasion. But then few thought he would be so bold as to annex the Crimea either. And even if he doesn’t, the pro-Russian separatists entrenched in Donetsk and Luhansk aren’t going anywhere.

But even if the crisis doesn’t devolve into a hot war, it still puts a spotlight on the Government’s strategic priorities, especially in light of the defence review and the planned ‘pivot to Asia’.

Realistically, any British involvement in an Asian theatre is likely to consist of sending a bit of support to an effort spearheaded by the United States and their regional partners, such as Australia and Japan. It may be welcome, but it seems unlikely to be decisive.

Meanwhile the UK has to service more obvious defence commitments closer to home. Even if Ukraine is not admitted to NATO, we are committed to the defence of existing allies such as the Baltic states. Yet our on-the-ground commitment in Estonia is so pitiable it has been nicknamed ‘Operation Tethered Goat’. Nor, as Garvan Walshe noted this week, are other European countries doing anything to pick up the slack.

Boris Johnson’s vision of a small, high-tech Armed Forces seems to suggest that they are not intended to operate independently, but as part of a broader, inevitably American-led coalition. Given that logic, one wonders if Washington wouldn’t prefer a British defence posture geared towards the European theatre, where capable allies are in shorter supply.

Neil O’Brien: I can laugh off China sanctioning me, but we can’t shrug off the threat it poses

5 Apr

Neil O’Brien is co-Chairman of the Conservative Party’s Policy Board, and is MP for Harborough.

Typical, isn’t it?  You’re trying to get the kids off to school and nursery, running late as you hunt around for your son’s snuggly giraffe. You have a busy day planned, meeting the local paper and a café owner threatened with eviction.

The next thing you know, a communist superpower declares war on you personally.

I’m one of nine people sanctioned by China. It’s tempting to laugh it off. After all, seizing my assets in China will leave the Communists no richer. And after they kidnapped two prominent Canadians, I wasn’t planning to go there anyway.

The next morning, the Chinese embassy still sent me their regular propaganda email to MPs, which began: “Dear friends…”  It seems joined-up government is impossible – even under dictatorship.

But it’s no laughing matter. The goal isn’t really to intimidate me or the other MPs, but business people, academics, and others. To create uncertainty, fear and self-censorship – memorably described as the “Anaconda in the chandelier” strategy.

More and more businesses are having to grapple with it: Beijing’s currently threatening to destroy Nike and H&M in China for raising concerns about slave labour.

It’s now coming up on a year since we launched the China Research Group.  Over the last 12 months, things have changed in lots of ways.

First, there’s growing global awareness of China’s human rights abuses: particularly against the Uighur people, but also in Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and across China as a whole. Human Rights Watch says it’s the worst period for human rights since Tiananmen.

The brutal crackdown in Hong Kong and Beijing’s decision to tear up the Sino-British declaration and end “one country, two systems” showed how much Beijing will sacrifice to keep absolute control. All leading pro-democracy activists there are now in exile, in jail or on trial.

At least the world has started to notice and act.  Indeed, we were targeted by Beijing in response to coordinated sanctions on human rights abusers in Xinjiang, recently put in place by 30 democratic countries.

MPs around Europe and MEPs from all the European Parliament’s main political groups were sanctioned along with us, with various US politicians already sanctioned last year.

So we’re all in it together, and it was great to get strong support from the Prime Minister – and through him the US President – and also from friends around Europe.

The sanctions aren’t like-for-like of course. MPs like me are being sanctioned simply for writing articles like this. By contrast, the democracies are sanctioning Xinjiang officials for presiding over a regime forcing sterilisation of Uighur women on an industrial scale; using rape as a weapon to break dissenters in its vast network of detention camps; rolling out an AI-powered surveillance state that to identify and control minority groups; and physically erasing the Uighur culture and religion from the face of the earth.

Our sanctions are to protest against human rights abuses. Theirs to silence such protests.

What Beijing’s doing is at least as bad as Apartheid South Africa.  But by comparison, the international response has been more muted so far. Partly because China makes it hard for reporters to get access. But also because China is more powerful than South Africa was.

International pressure on South Africa grew over decades and became a huge cultural movement. It loomed large in the pop music of my 80s childhood: “Free Nelson Mandela”, “Something Inside So Strong”, “Silver and Gold”, “Gimme hope Jo’anna” were all hits.

These days Hollywood studios make sure that their films have the thumbs up from Beijing: they think it’s too big a market to risk losing.

I’ve written about China’s growing global censorship. Nonetheless, the truth is seeping out, and the global criticism getting louder.

That points to a second positive change over the year: new opportunities for democracies to coordinate in the Biden era.

Coodination is essential: China’s economic and political strategy relies on divide and rule.  Each free country fears losing out if it alone stands up to Beijing.

The communist regime singles out countries who challenge it like Australia, Sweden and Canada. Like all bullies, they are really trying to teach others to keep their heads down.

But while Trump had scratchy relations with other leaders, Biden’s election makes cooperation much easier.

It’s not just that we need to get the band back together again, and make the G7 work (though that’s important), but bringing together a wider group of democracies including India, South Korea, Australia and South Africa. The Prime Minister is right to push the “D11” concept.

The third big change is changing western attitudes on economic policy regarding China.

The single best thing about the recent Integrated Review was the clear-eyed understanding of the competition for technological advantage now underway between nations.

In the sunny utopianism of the 1990s, the world was going to be flat, borderless, and competition was between companies not countries. Technology was cool, but not a national issue: the UK could just specialise in professional services. Awesome new global supply chains meant you didn’t need to worry about where your supplies were coming from, whether it was vaccines; ventilators, PPE, silicon chips or telecoms equipment.

Beijing has a very different vision, and its rise means we must change our thinking  It promotes “Civil-military fusion”, and its imports have slowed dramatically as its import substitution policies develop.

Xi Jinping says he is “building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” He explains that China must “enhance our superiority across the entire production chain… and we must tighten international production chains’ dependence on China.”

The US has woken up to this, and in Washington as well as Beijing there’s a shared understanding that the two superpowers are fighting to dominate the technologies of the future. Joe Biden talks about “winning the future”.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have long seen tech competition as a shared national endeavour, and have policies to match.  No wonder: meeting politicians from these countries through the China Research Group, I’ve come to understand the level of constant threat they have to live under.

We too must adapt to this more national world.

First, we need to build a powerful innovation system. During the 1960s and 1970s the US and UK invested similar amounts in R&D.  But Reagan grew federal support while we let it wither, and we have been operating on different levels since.  I’ve banged on before about how to make government funding do more for our economy.

Second, we need to protect ourselves from the Beijing’s hoovering up of technology.  More help for business to resist cyberattack from the National Cyber Force.  Somewhere to get advice on not losing your intellectual property if you do business in China.

And as well as the very welcome National Security and Investment Bill we need to make sure that the new Investment Security Unit has the same resourcing and input from the security services that CFIUS enjoys in the US – and we need to be prepared to use the new powers.

Likewise, Jo Johnson’s recent report highlights the risks to our universities from poorly-thought-through partnerships with China. Investigations by Civitas and the Daily Telegraph revealed that UK universities are actually helping Beijing with new weapons technologies. We must get a firm grip of all such partnerships and where universities’ money is coming from.

Over the last year we’ve learned a lot.  The UK and governments across the west have started to act.  But we’re still just starting to figure out how to respond to a more aggressive China.

Jeremy Quin: The Government’s defence investment ensures a modern, persistent and effective approach to future threats

31 Mar

Jeremy Quin is the MP for Horsham and Minister for Defence Procurement.

It has been an important two weeks for the UK’s foreign, defence and security policy. The Prime Minister set out through the Integrated Review the most significant reappraisal of UK foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, including a commitment to sustaining our strategic advantage through science and technology.

Last week’s Defence in a Competitive Age backs this up, signalling the biggest shift in defence policy in a generation. The Government’s vital investment in defence, amounting to an extra £24 billion over four years from today’s levels, ensures we will equip our Armed Forces to be modern, persistent and effective in deterring the threats of the future.

The following day through DSIS (the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy) we announced further reforms to ensure that this investment supports not just the Armed Forces, to which we owe so much, but invests in those who support them. The £85 billion we are investing in defence equipment and support over the next four years will drive not only the success of our Armed Forces but opportunity, capability and prosperity throughout the UK. 

Our defence sector is already world-renowned. Directly and indirectly it employs more than 200,000 across the UK. It is the world’s second largest global exporter of defence goods and services, helping support our allies and partners overseas. It generates valuable skills and technology, and is one of the many binding forces of our successful Union. Frigates are made in Scotland, satellites in Belfast, our next generation Ajax armoured vehicles in Wales and fighter aircraft in the north of England.

But we must do more to unlock the vast potential of this sector and drive the research, the skills and investment that will enhance prosperity, keep us secure and help us thrive as a science superpower.

To do so we have ended the policy of “global competition by default’ to better deliver our strategic goals. Of course competition has an important role to play, as will international collaboration. There will also be occasions when, to meet critical needs, purchases will be made from our friends and allies.

However we will be adopting a nuanced and sophisticated approach to procurement with a focus on on-shore capabilities and asking key questions. What more can we secure from this investment? How will this contribute to our science superpower status, level up the whole UK and deliver on skills, capability and export success? We will continue to welcome companies based overseas who are prepared to invest in maintaining the industrial capability we need onshore.

In the future you can expect greater integration between government, industry and academia. Our approach to combat air shows what this can achieve. A £2 billion investment, leveraging further industrial contributions, driving world-leading research and capabilities – and creating 2,500 apprenticeships – will deliver the future of combat air

We are investing £6.6 billion into R&D to support next-generation capabilities, from space satellites and automation to artificial intelligence and novel weapons. A clear signal to our industrial partners.

We will be more focussed on exports. For the first time in a generation we are working with our close friends in Australia and Canada on highly sophisticated UK warships. Our multipurpose Type 31 frigate has been designed with export in mind. We are determined to spark a renaissance in British shipbuilding, underpinned by UK orders but focussed on the huge export potential in maritime. Similar export opportunities across the waterfront of defence.

Lastly, DSIS will make procurement more agile, pulling through technology fast to the frontline. By driving improvements inside MOD and reforming our approach to suppliers, we will shift the dial. We are introducing “social value” to our procurements and will be doing more to help our imaginative SMEs – the lifeblood of defence – to continue their record of securing more of our defence spend.

So DSIS will make a huge difference to our country. It will ensure our people continue to have the right kit. It will contribute to the advanced skills and capabilities our nation requires as a science superpower. And it will fire up the engines of prosperity in every corner of our United Kingdom.

The Armed Forces always deliver for our country. DSIS will ensure that our investment not only secures our peace and security; its benefits will also be felt in our industrial heartlands, building greater prosperity in every part of the Union.

Nicolas Clark: The Government’s defence plans are based on a stark choice – ‘go large’ or ‘go smart’

26 Mar

Nicolas Clark works in the defence sector and is the co-founder of Conservative Friends of the Armed Forces. 

As many start to decipher the Defence Command Paper (‘Defence in a Competitive Age’) it will likely leave them conflicted: with our proud military history do we not need numbers to be considered serious, and to support our allies? Are our elite forces really enough to achieve what we need?

At the heart of the matter is this question: why does our military exist?

For the modern day the primary answer must be to keep both our society and interests, as well as those of our allies, safe Safe from whom? Those who would do us harm of course.

But who are ‘they’, what are they looking to do to us, and how can we best prepare ourselves to address their threats?

Firstly, we have to accept a reality, unpopular for many; Britannia does not rule the waves. Yes, we are good at what we do, better than most, and we are an important ally, but gone are the days where we are likely to take on a peer enemy head to head, alone. It is not impossible that we could do this, but it is more probable that we would enter a conflict alongside any number of our allies.

Secondly, the nature of conflict has changed. A decade ago, talk of cyber hackers, hyper-sonic missiles, directed energy weapons, micro-drones and loyal wingmen (unmanned fighters linked to a manned fighter) were things of science fiction. To put this in context, about a decade ago the army still wore that green camouflage (DPM), Osama bin-Laden and Muammar Gaddafi had been killed, and David Cameron had become Prime Minister in the Coalition Government.

Today the science fiction is becoming science reality and the focus is on hybrid threats (propaganda, deception and sabotage) and actions being carried out within the ‘grey zone’ that exists between war and peace.

Finally, we have to accept the financial situation. We don’t’ have the financial means to maintain a large force, or the collective will to prioritise the military over education, welfare or healthcare. Continuing to spend two per cent of GDP on defence in line with NATO requirements is just about acceptable to many, but does not carry a public majority. As the British Empire grew, its finances could support a large military, and soldiers whether from home or abroad were cheap. I need not elaborate on how this has changed but we must recognise that it is now in Asia that the growth in military stature is taking place.

Faced with this, should we really be going down to an army smaller in size than that of the 1700s? Well size does matter, but it matters if you want to hold large areas of ground. If you accept that we do not want to do this in the future by conventional means, or alone, then you should also be able to recognise that if you cannot ‘go large’, you should ‘go smart’. I would argue that ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’ is a smart solution.

The threat of terrorism still exists of course, particularly where it is sponsored by foreign states; think not just Iran but also Russian activities in Salisbury and North Korean assassinations. Whilst we and our allies became embroiled in Iraq and Afghanistan our adversaries were watching. They noted our mistakes, our conventional military solutions, and they planned.

Not necessarily in new ways – often they went back to basics; Russia to techniques of disinformation and propaganda associated with the World and Cold Wars, and China to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, and the Peoples’ Liberation Army’s 1999 text ‘Unrestricted Warfare’. To see these strategies in practice one only need look at Russian activity in Eastern Ukraine and Chinese influence in Australia. It is not a coincidence that the Nordic and Baltic countries remained focused, throughout the ‘War on Terror’ years, on the threat that sits on their doorstep, Russia.

Consequently, the technologies and approaches of Sweden and Norway are particularly designed to counter Russian aggression and why they are now particularly strategic allies for the UK. We do need to learn from these examples, and fast.

Without descending into War Studies; Sun Tzu talked about choosing the right strategy for the right conditions but not fighting unless you had to, and, if you had to, fighting smart. Indeed, he said that the superior way of winning a war was by not fighting, i.e. defeating your opponent before it came to battle. Finally, of relevance, is how you should fight the fight that fits the weapons you have, and consequently make the weapons that fit the fight you intend to have.

So, a smaller, highly-trained and capable force, that can deliver a surgical physical strike, that is integrated with cyber, space and electronic warfare capabilities, is a logical direction to take. When married with a maritime force, long-range accurate strike capabilities, and advanced aviation and space asset, the expeditionary effect of your force becomes incredibly potent, arguably multiplied to be much greater than the sum of its parts.

What does this all mean? Well in scenarios where you quickly wanted to support your Norwegian or Australian allies you could get there quickly from air or sea and deploy your air (Paras), land (Rangers) or sea (Commandos), with a variety of physical and invisible technologies, that would deliver the swift Bruce Lee ‘chop’ that helps to stop an aggressor in its tracks. The slow, but powerful, Mike Tyson alternative (the British Army of old) might well turn up to the fight too late and have found its gloves stolen on route.

Upsetting the apple cart at this juncture is probably the right thing to be doing. Cap badges and traditions have formed part of a proud military heritage but we need to rethink the core purpose of our military for the future. It is right to play to our historic strengths but not to be weighed down by them, and to look instead to how we can repurpose for our future challenges.

Investing in technology is key, and has a symbiotic benefit between economy and capability. Supporting allies overseas through engagement projects influence, and working with our partners builds stronger allegiances that we know others seek to weaken.

Of course, we can’t enter a cold war with those that threaten our way of life, but with whom we also trade, on a whim. However, we can prepare to deal with them effectively if it is required of us, and we can insulate ourselves from their malign intentions. What remains to be seen is whether the Ministry of Defence, in the implementation of this paper, can overcome the hurdle of the historic “general ineptitude” with which it was branded by the Defence Select Committee and see this laudable ambition through to fruition.

Stephen Booth: The Integrated Review – a further step towards the wider world and away from the European Union

25 Mar

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

A “Global Britain” needs to ensure it is relevant in and to all three of the world’s major economic and geopolitical hubs – Europe, North America, and the Indo-Pacific. Brexit or no Brexit, it is clear that the economic and political weight of Europe is in relative decline and that global power is shifting, predominantly due to demographics and the rise of economies in Asia. 

Brexit has only emphasised the need for the UK to diversify its international relationships and that it must be prepared to do so across a wide spectrum of areas. It was significant, therefore, that last week’s Integrated Review (IR) emphasised such coherence across government, mirroring a world where the boundaries between prosperity and security, trade and development, and domestic and foreign policy are increasingly intertwined. 

The IR reflects several concepts and recommendations that have featured prominently in the think tank I work for, Policy Exchange’s, research. Arguably, the most significant is the “Indo-Pacific tilt”. Trade policy was not highlighted alongside security, defence, development and foreign policy in the official title of last week’s IR, but did feature in its conceptual development and it is a key strand of the document. It has emerged as a key component of the UK’s new strategic approach and is central to the “tilt”.

The UK intends to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and become a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. The UK has already secured a deal with Japan. Bilateral trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand would be expected to bear fruit this year, while talks with the United States could take longer. 

India is an increasingly important part of the UK’s Indo-Pacific economic strategy and the IR confirmed that a potential comprehensive trade deal is a long-term ambition. We may expect to hear more about the roadmap to a deeper UK-India economic relationship during the Prime Minister’s planned visit to the country next month.

Individual free trade agreements will provide important economic benefits, particularly for certain sectors of the economy, but their aggregate impact on UK GDP is likely to be limited in the short-term. Trade deals are best viewed as important elements of a long-term strategy of diversification away from – rather than immediate replacements for – the EU market and increasing the UK’s links to the economic and political developments of the world’s faster-growing markets. 

The key to taking advantage of these opportunities will be to marry the twin aims of outwardly projecting “Global Britain” and “Levelling Up” those regions of the UK that have most struggled to adapt to globalisation. The IR recognises that for Global Britain to be a success, more of the UK must become integrated and competitive in the global economy.

For example, the government is launching new UK Trade and Investment Hubs in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the North of England. This is a complex and long-term challenge. British businesses, smaller ones in particular, will need to be supported and encouraged to make the most of new opportunities which will take time.

It is welcome, then, that the IR acknowledges that the UK’s new trade policy is not simply a commercial endeavour. It is, rightly, viewed as an important part of a geopolitical toolkit that should be deployed to reinforce the wider economic, political and security relationships, upon which a successful Global Britain will rely. 

It is noteworthy that the IR underlines the UK’s ambition to “move from defending the status quo within the post-Cold War international system to dynamically shaping the post-Covid order.” An important aspect of this means using “regulatory diplomacy” and working with like-minded partners to influence global rules.

This is particularly relevant in emerging technologies, as systemic competition intensifies, in particular with China. This is an often-underappreciated benefit of concluding trade agreements, particularly with platforms such as the CPTPP. It helps to embed and promote high-quality rules. 

The IR’s emphasis on the UK “as a global services, digital and data hub” highlights that the UK’s natural economic strengths often sat uneasily within the wider EU’s order of priorities, where the UK’s approach in these sectors has often differed from the other big players, France and Germany.

In my previous column, I noted that the UK is now able to put forward a distinct voice and approach that plays to its competitive advantage and confronts head-on the political reality that global power is shifting away from Europe, particularly in these innovative fields. France, Germany and the Netherlands have all adopted their own national strategies for the Indo-Pacific, prompting the EU to signal that it will set out a common vision in the “coming months”. The challenge for Brussels will be to produce something pragmatic that rises above the lowest common denominator.

Several commentators have remarked that the IR says relatively little about how the UK views its long-term relationship with the EU developing, both in terms of future cooperation and competition. This is perhaps unsurprising given the proximity of the publication of the IR to what has been a turbulent Brexit process.

In recent days, we have seen examples of both forces at work. The UK and the EU, along with the US and Canada, have co-ordinated new sanctions against China over its treatment of Uighur Muslims. However, the threat of an EU vaccine export ban, chiefly targeted at the UK, illustrates that any UK strategy for national resilience must now consider the prospect of an uncooperative EU.

The EU acting as a bloc can have the advantage of economic scale and collective weight but, due to internal tensions, it can lack coherence and focus, often particularly evident in its efforts to implement a collective foreign policy.

There follows a strong argument that the advantages of the EU were better suited to the relatively benign international order of the late twentieth century – an order underpinned by the US security guarantee – and its drawbacks less so to a world increasingly characterised by great power rivalry and systemic economic competition. Many within the EU have historically been reluctant to acknowledge that the transatlantic relationship, based as it is on NATO, is fundamentally asymmetric.

It is also worth recalling that during the Brexit negotiations, it was the EU that held out hope of a formal agreement with the UK on foreign and security policy. The UK ultimately decided it would not pursue such an agreement. The UK has made it clear in the IR that its commitment to European security is “unequivocal”, that it “will continue to be the leading European Ally within NATO”, and will “actively support” EU-NATO exercises.

However, in terms of direct engagement with Brussels, the IR highlights the opportunity for a “distinctive approach to foreign policy” outside the EU and the advantages of flexibility and coherence from acting independently. The UK has also committed to finding “new ways of working with” the EU on “shared challenges” and “where our interests coincide”.

There remains no sign that the UK is interested in any formal agreement with Brussels in this area. The implication is that the merits of cooperation will continue to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and therefore cannot be taken for granted, particularly if the economic relationship were to be further soured.