Bernard Jenkin: The Government should not allow China a role in our nuclear industry without new safeguards

14 Jul

Bernard Jenkin MP is Chair of the Liaison Committee. He is MP for Harwich and North Essex.

There is no such thing as a truly independent Chinese company. Any involvement with Chinese companies comes with strings attached that lead all the way back to the Communist leadership in Beijing. We tried to ignore this with Huawei and the construction of our 5G network. But Chinese regime influence is an inevitable fact of any relationship with Chinese companies. And the Government still don’t seem to have learnt this lesson.

Near my constituency, a next generation nuclear power station is out to consultation at Bradwell on the Essex coast. Bradwell B is intended as a vital part of the UK’s future carbon-free base electricity supply. The British pretty well invented nuclear power, but we allowed BNFL to sell the n-power builder Westinghouse to Toshiba in 2005, so the UK has no indigenous n-power construction capability.

Dependent on foreign designs, the government agreed with China that CGN (China General Nuclear) should construct two Chinese designed reactors at Bradwell. CGN is entirely state-owned.

So the Government has agreed that the Chinese government should build a key part of our own critical national infrastructure (CNI). If this is to go ahead, the very least we should insist upon is a set of safeguards to protect our national security and CNI from malign foreign influence from a hostile government.

The Chinese government has demonstrated an established pattern of IP theft, nuclear espionage, political interference with private enterprise and cyber attacks on Western interests. Chinese companies are not the same as private companies based in Europe or the United States, or even state owned ones like the French EDF, which is building Hinkley Point.

Only three years ago, China passed a law granting itself the power to compel any Chinese citizen to cooperate with the government of China for national security purposes. CGN has itself been indicted by the US government, after US-based employees attempted to recruit American nuclear experts for projects in China.

Last year,  Dr Christopher Ashley-Ford, the US Assistant Secretary of State, said: “the Chinese nuclear industry is not a purely civilian industry, instead operating in close partnership with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)…To cooperate with the Chinese nuclear business, in other words, is thus to some extent inescapably to cooperate with the PLA.”

If we don’t want the UK taxpayer to contribute to the strength of the Chinese military, or UK based technology to mysteriously end up in Beijing, we need to act swiftly and decisively, whilst also recognising that, at least for now, we still need Chinese financing and technical expertise in order to expand the UK’s civil nuclear infrastructure.

The only safeguards currently proposed for Bradwell B are the same as for any nuclear power station. They are wholly inadequate. At present, China will finance, build, own and operate Bradwell B. The Office of Nuclear Regulation states that parent companies may not “usurp [the company’s] authority”, but what does this mean would happen if it happened? How can China “usurp” the authority of a company it owns anyway? This is either more wishful thinking about China, or more wilful strategic blindness.

The Government is proposing a new National Security and Investment law, of course, but this focuses on ‘trigger events’ – granting ministers the power to prevent, for example, a foreign takeover. The Bradwell deal signs us up to the takeover in the first place.

Nuclear espionage is already illegal, but this hasn’t stopped China so far. If we are to prevent espionage creating new crimes is insufficient. We must place obstacles in the way of those wishing to carry out criminal activities against us in the first place.

So the Government must use the new law to introduce a special regime for all foreign-owned CNI: a UK plc with a government-owned ‘golden share’, giving the Government special powers, and placing obligations on directors to inform the government of non-UK threats to UK CNI or to national security. This arrangement is based on the ‘golden shares’ introduced by the Thatcher government in 1980s for newly privatised industries, such as the defence research company, Qinetiq.

Under this arrangement, the Government would get the power to prevent takeovers and to appoint board members Senior company executives would have special responsibilities to notify the Government if they believed certain events were about to take place, including the preparation of intellectual property for transfer or sale and the employees involved. After all, any conspiracy to steal nuclear secrets that doesn’t involve senior executives would at least be more difficult to carry off successfully, even if it can’t eliminate the risk entirely.

The Government must manage the risks of foreign investment in UK CNI if we are to both build an infrastructure to secure our future as well as to regain China’s respect for our system and our values. Its huge economy and our own are interlinked in so many ways, and we should have positive and reciprocal engagement, but we must end the decades of blindness to China’s long-term aim of creating Western dependency on it.

Bernard Jenkin: The Government should not allow China a role in our nuclear industry without new safeguards

14 Jul

Bernard Jenkin MP is Chair of the Liaison Committee. He is MP for Harwich and North Essex.

There is no such thing as a truly independent Chinese company. Any involvement with Chinese companies comes with strings attached that lead all the way back to the Communist leadership in Beijing. We tried to ignore this with Huawei and the construction of our 5G network. But Chinese regime influence is an inevitable fact of any relationship with Chinese companies. And the Government still don’t seem to have learnt this lesson.

Near my constituency, a next generation nuclear power station is out to consultation at Bradwell on the Essex coast. Bradwell B is intended as a vital part of the UK’s future carbon-free base electricity supply. The British pretty well invented nuclear power, but we allowed BNFL to sell the n-power builder Westinghouse to Toshiba in 2005, so the UK has no indigenous n-power construction capability.

Dependent on foreign designs, the government agreed with China that CGN (China General Nuclear) should construct two Chinese designed reactors at Bradwell. CGN is entirely state-owned.

So the Government has agreed that the Chinese government should build a key part of our own critical national infrastructure (CNI). If this is to go ahead, the very least we should insist upon is a set of safeguards to protect our national security and CNI from malign foreign influence from a hostile government.

The Chinese government has demonstrated an established pattern of IP theft, nuclear espionage, political interference with private enterprise and cyber attacks on Western interests. Chinese companies are not the same as private companies based in Europe or the United States, or even state owned ones like the French EDF, which is building Hinkley Point.

Only three years ago, China passed a law granting itself the power to compel any Chinese citizen to cooperate with the government of China for national security purposes. CGN has itself been indicted by the US government, after US-based employees attempted to recruit American nuclear experts for projects in China.

Last year,  Dr Christopher Ashley-Ford, the US Assistant Secretary of State, said: “the Chinese nuclear industry is not a purely civilian industry, instead operating in close partnership with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)…To cooperate with the Chinese nuclear business, in other words, is thus to some extent inescapably to cooperate with the PLA.”

If we don’t want the UK taxpayer to contribute to the strength of the Chinese military, or UK based technology to mysteriously end up in Beijing, we need to act swiftly and decisively, whilst also recognising that, at least for now, we still need Chinese financing and technical expertise in order to expand the UK’s civil nuclear infrastructure.

The only safeguards currently proposed for Bradwell B are the same as for any nuclear power station. They are wholly inadequate. At present, China will finance, build, own and operate Bradwell B. The Office of Nuclear Regulation states that parent companies may not “usurp [the company’s] authority”, but what does this mean would happen if it happened? How can China “usurp” the authority of a company it owns anyway? This is either more wishful thinking about China, or more wilful strategic blindness.

The Government is proposing a new National Security and Investment law, of course, but this focuses on ‘trigger events’ – granting ministers the power to prevent, for example, a foreign takeover. The Bradwell deal signs us up to the takeover in the first place.

Nuclear espionage is already illegal, but this hasn’t stopped China so far. If we are to prevent espionage creating new crimes is insufficient. We must place obstacles in the way of those wishing to carry out criminal activities against us in the first place.

So the Government must use the new law to introduce a special regime for all foreign-owned CNI: a UK plc with a government-owned ‘golden share’, giving the Government special powers, and placing obligations on directors to inform the government of non-UK threats to UK CNI or to national security. This arrangement is based on the ‘golden shares’ introduced by the Thatcher government in 1980s for newly privatised industries, such as the defence research company, Qinetiq.

Under this arrangement, the Government would get the power to prevent takeovers and to appoint board members Senior company executives would have special responsibilities to notify the Government if they believed certain events were about to take place, including the preparation of intellectual property for transfer or sale and the employees involved. After all, any conspiracy to steal nuclear secrets that doesn’t involve senior executives would at least be more difficult to carry off successfully, even if it can’t eliminate the risk entirely.

The Government must manage the risks of foreign investment in UK CNI if we are to both build an infrastructure to secure our future as well as to regain China’s respect for our system and our values. Its huge economy and our own are interlinked in so many ways, and we should have positive and reciprocal engagement, but we must end the decades of blindness to China’s long-term aim of creating Western dependency on it.

James Wild: A security, defence and foreign policy review is underway. Here’s how we can become a truly Global Britain:

14 Jul

James Wild MP for North West Norfolk was Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence 2014-17

“Smallest Army since Napoleonic war. Save the Marines. Protect our surface fleet. Focus on cyber, not boots on the ground.”

Recent press reports underline that a security, defence and foreign policy review is underway, and special interests are making their case.

In 2015, I advised the Defence Secretary on the Strategic Defence and Security Review. This took place against the backdrop an increasingly aggressive Russia and the appalling shooting down of MH17; Daesh having been close to the gates of Baghdad before the UK as part of the Global Coalition acted against them, and increasing state-backed cyber attacks.

After the 2010 review where painful cuts were required, the 2015 review was an opportunity to reinvest. However, there was something of a bidding war between No 10 and No 11 – with regular incoming missives.

No 10’s priority was doubling our drone fleet and Special Forces equipment and the carriers. The Treasury wanted more F35 jets earlier than planned and the deployment of the Queen Elizabeth accelerated. For the MOD, our priorities were restoring the Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability to respond to increased Russian submarine activity; a step change in offensive cyber capability, and investing in innovation and space.

The ambition was right and everyone pretty much got what they wanted. But to fund these enhancements, the MOD was required to agree to ever greater efficiency targets. These were stretching – and in some cases little more than a wedge against a budget line – but performance to deliver them has been disappointing. That has only added to pressure on the budget today.

The current review presents an opportunity to address the challenges in defence and to provide a coherent Global Britain strategy.

It will consider our multilateral partnerships including the proposed new D-10 group of 10 leading democracies (the G-7, plus India, South Korea, and Australia) and how to reinvigorate NATO. Such alliances will be increasingly important in the face of China’s breaking of international norms and hostile actions.

The work will define how to use the new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to promote British interests and values. It can better align military training to take place where it supports our strategic objectives, has a deterrent effect, and is more cost effective.

Given my previous role, it is no surprise that I believe this is not a time to consider cutting the defence budget. The global pandemic we are experiencing could well lead to further instability and increased security and defence risks.

However, we need to be better at making choices. The usual bleeding stumps leaks have begun. These are in my experience partial, misleading, self-serving and will only stop if those responsible are held accountable.

Having said that, it is well documented that the defence budget is stretched. The National Audit Office has repeatedly warned that the MOD equipment and support budget – £180 billion over the next 10 years – is unaffordable. The Mr Micawber approach of hoping that something will turn up, reliance on efficiencies, or the infamous budget “fade” undermines the credibility of the budget.

In the past, decisions have been ducked by delays or deferrals that simply add pressure. Much as we may want to, the UK cannot do everything – the Permanent Secretary has rightly talked about the need to scrap some sacred cows.

It is encouraging that this review will involve a new, younger generation of chiefs. They bring fresh thinking on where the UK can add value, on the size and shape of our forces, and a greater focus on automation, robotics and Artificial Intelligence.

There needs to be a review of the delegated model and the levers to hold front-line commands properly to account for their budgets. In the private sector, constantly over-spending your allocated budget would not be dealt with by a bailout from the finance department but by being shown the door.

The review needs to usher in a new approach to procurement. The MOD has been trying to get procurement right since Samuel Pepys’ time as clerk to the Navy Board.

In March, the National Audit Office found that only five of 32 major projects were probable or highly likely to be delivered on schedule. After joining the MOD, I was constantly told about endless contracts where the taxpayer carried the risk for overruns.

The reforms put in place during that time helped improve results with a move to sharing cost savings or overruns. But we need an agile model where MOD is close to companies that are innovating and designing systems that it can procure at the right time. The old approach of ordering a capability that takes 13 years from business case to full operating capability – such as the Watchkeeper surveillance system – should become a thing of the past.

One element of the budget this review must address head on is the nuclear enterprise. The Public Accounts Committee, which I am a member of, concluded the current funding regime does not work due to uniquely long project timescales and given the impact on the overall defence budget.

Annual budgeting rounds with the Treasury drive additional cost in a long-term programme and the need for in year savings even saw a contractor receiving increased fees when deferred work led to increase costs. There is a strong case for ring-fencing the budget.

An objective of this review must be to create a joint force with a multi-domain model that brings services and agencies together. This will enable what was called “full spectrum effects” and deployed highly effectively in defeating Daesh, and was subsequently rebranded as an apparently new “fusion” doctrine.

It should tackle duplication including: support services such as HR, legal, and admin; the multiple types of helicopters, overlapping ISR capabilities, and other equipment driven by a siloed service approach.

These defence reforms are required to better support the people who serve to keep us safe – everyone in our Armed Forces.

Inevitably speculation is focusing on the size of the regular army. This is the wrong approach – the question for the review is what should the shape and balance be for the challenges we are likely to face?

How can we work better with partners making the most of our respective capabilities? How can we increase the diversity of our Armed Forces with more female and ethnic minority recruits?

Ultimately you can cut your coat to your cloth, or have more cloth. The danger is to avoid making choices and go for an emperor’s new clothes approach.

James Wild: A security, defence and foreign policy review is underway. Here’s how we can become a truly Global Britain:

14 Jul

James Wild MP for North West Norfolk was Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence 2014-17

“Smallest Army since Napoleonic war. Save the Marines. Protect our surface fleet. Focus on cyber, not boots on the ground.”

Recent press reports underline that a security, defence and foreign policy review is underway, and special interests are making their case.

In 2015, I advised the Defence Secretary on the Strategic Defence and Security Review. This took place against the backdrop an increasingly aggressive Russia and the appalling shooting down of MH17; Daesh having been close to the gates of Baghdad before the UK as part of the Global Coalition acted against them, and increasing state-backed cyber attacks.

After the 2010 review where painful cuts were required, the 2015 review was an opportunity to reinvest. However, there was something of a bidding war between No 10 and No 11 – with regular incoming missives.

No 10’s priority was doubling our drone fleet and Special Forces equipment and the carriers. The Treasury wanted more F35 jets earlier than planned and the deployment of the Queen Elizabeth accelerated. For the MOD, our priorities were restoring the Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability to respond to increased Russian submarine activity; a step change in offensive cyber capability, and investing in innovation and space.

The ambition was right and everyone pretty much got what they wanted. But to fund these enhancements, the MOD was required to agree to ever greater efficiency targets. These were stretching – and in some cases little more than a wedge against a budget line – but performance to deliver them has been disappointing. That has only added to pressure on the budget today.

The current review presents an opportunity to address the challenges in defence and to provide a coherent Global Britain strategy.

It will consider our multilateral partnerships including the proposed new D-10 group of 10 leading democracies (the G-7, plus India, South Korea, and Australia) and how to reinvigorate NATO. Such alliances will be increasingly important in the face of China’s breaking of international norms and hostile actions.

The work will define how to use the new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office to promote British interests and values. It can better align military training to take place where it supports our strategic objectives, has a deterrent effect, and is more cost effective.

Given my previous role, it is no surprise that I believe this is not a time to consider cutting the defence budget. The global pandemic we are experiencing could well lead to further instability and increased security and defence risks.

However, we need to be better at making choices. The usual bleeding stumps leaks have begun. These are in my experience partial, misleading, self-serving and will only stop if those responsible are held accountable.

Having said that, it is well documented that the defence budget is stretched. The National Audit Office has repeatedly warned that the MOD equipment and support budget – £180 billion over the next 10 years – is unaffordable. The Mr Micawber approach of hoping that something will turn up, reliance on efficiencies, or the infamous budget “fade” undermines the credibility of the budget.

In the past, decisions have been ducked by delays or deferrals that simply add pressure. Much as we may want to, the UK cannot do everything – the Permanent Secretary has rightly talked about the need to scrap some sacred cows.

It is encouraging that this review will involve a new, younger generation of chiefs. They bring fresh thinking on where the UK can add value, on the size and shape of our forces, and a greater focus on automation, robotics and Artificial Intelligence.

There needs to be a review of the delegated model and the levers to hold front-line commands properly to account for their budgets. In the private sector, constantly over-spending your allocated budget would not be dealt with by a bailout from the finance department but by being shown the door.

The review needs to usher in a new approach to procurement. The MOD has been trying to get procurement right since Samuel Pepys’ time as clerk to the Navy Board.

In March, the National Audit Office found that only five of 32 major projects were probable or highly likely to be delivered on schedule. After joining the MOD, I was constantly told about endless contracts where the taxpayer carried the risk for overruns.

The reforms put in place during that time helped improve results with a move to sharing cost savings or overruns. But we need an agile model where MOD is close to companies that are innovating and designing systems that it can procure at the right time. The old approach of ordering a capability that takes 13 years from business case to full operating capability – such as the Watchkeeper surveillance system – should become a thing of the past.

One element of the budget this review must address head on is the nuclear enterprise. The Public Accounts Committee, which I am a member of, concluded the current funding regime does not work due to uniquely long project timescales and given the impact on the overall defence budget.

Annual budgeting rounds with the Treasury drive additional cost in a long-term programme and the need for in year savings even saw a contractor receiving increased fees when deferred work led to increase costs. There is a strong case for ring-fencing the budget.

An objective of this review must be to create a joint force with a multi-domain model that brings services and agencies together. This will enable what was called “full spectrum effects” and deployed highly effectively in defeating Daesh, and was subsequently rebranded as an apparently new “fusion” doctrine.

It should tackle duplication including: support services such as HR, legal, and admin; the multiple types of helicopters, overlapping ISR capabilities, and other equipment driven by a siloed service approach.

These defence reforms are required to better support the people who serve to keep us safe – everyone in our Armed Forces.

Inevitably speculation is focusing on the size of the regular army. This is the wrong approach – the question for the review is what should the shape and balance be for the challenges we are likely to face?

How can we work better with partners making the most of our respective capabilities? How can we increase the diversity of our Armed Forces with more female and ethnic minority recruits?

Ultimately you can cut your coat to your cloth, or have more cloth. The danger is to avoid making choices and go for an emperor’s new clothes approach.

James Rogers: We’re in the G7 and are members of NATO. But we need a new alliance of democracies – the D10.

8 Jul

James Rogers is Director of the Global Britain Programme at the Henry Jackson Society.

Covid-19 is like a flash of lightning that uncovers a darkened landscape at night. It is, of course, first and foremost a public health emergency; but more deeply, it is a reflection of deep geopolitical change.

It has reconfirmed the Indo-Pacific zone’s growing centrality. It has revealed the authoritarian nature and untrustworthy character of China’s government. It has shown why we cannot afford to be so dependent on China – or any other country – for critical goods. And it has demonstrated why we need to work more with like-minded countries to uphold our principles and secure our objectives and interests.

Although it has been clear for some while that the so-called rules-based international system is increasingly dysfunctional, Covid-19 has confirmed the extent to which authoritarian powers have gained influence in such bodies last the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Human Rights Commission – stuffed as it often is with autocracies and systematic human rights abusers.

The reason for this is that the authoritarian revisionists – such as Russia and China – have grown in power over the past two decades. They want to make the world safe for autocracy; as they gain further in power, and unless they are resisted, they will continue to dismantle or hijack the international order that Britain and its allies have done so much to put in place and undergird.

This is why it makes sense, as Boris Johnson’s government restarts the Integrated Strategic Review, to thoroughly reappraise Britain’s membership of existing alliances and international organisations.

The problem is that most of these were born of a different age; they have grown difficult to reform; many allies fail to pull their weight; and it is proving ever-harder for the United Kingdom, like other democracies – even the United States – to secure its interests through them. It is vital to remember that multilateralism is not important for its own sake; multilateralism is important only if it helps Britain project its principles and secure its interests.

This does not mean, however, that the United Kingdom should descend into a clumsy transactional foreign policy, or facile isolationism.  What it does mean is that the government needs to be more selective about the alliances and international organisations it chooses to buttress and work with. It also means that Britain should be prepared to expand the functions of existing groups or, even, create new frameworks, to reflect new realities.

It is for this reason that reports that Johnson’s government is proposing to form a new coalition of democracies – potentially out of the G7 – should be particularly welcomed.

Notwithstanding Japan’s membership, the G7 is primarily Euro-Atlantic in orientation. It lost much of its rationale during the 2000s, as the centre of economic gravity shifted towards East and South-East Asia. The formalisation of the G20 after the financial crisis of 2007-2008 only confirmed its obsolescence.

Likewise, other organisations, even the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, have been rendered less relevant today than in the past as geopolitical competition has followed the previous economic shift towards China and the Indo-Pacific.

This is why a new coalition of democracies makes sense, particularly one that reflects new economic and geopolitical realities. Britain is said to be keen to build such a coalition – known as the Democratic 10, or ‘D10’ for short – to include the existing G7 members, alongside India, South Korea and Australia.

Ostensibly as a first step, Donald Trump suggested inviting the three countries to the upcoming G7 summit this autumn, perhaps alongside Russia – a proposal too far, which the British and Canadians, even the Russians themselves, quickly rejected.

It should come as no surprise that the concept of a community of democracies, even the D10, has been mooted in various guises for some time. That Britain is now prepared to push the idea – there will be ample opportunity during the British presidency of the G7 in 2021 – shows not only the fresh thinking Boris Johnson’s government is capable of, but also how much a new democratic coalition is needed.

An organisation like the D10 could help the democracies organise their efforts to resist the authoritarian revisionism of countries like Russia and China. It could provide a forum for technological cooperation at the strategic level, to ensure that an authoritarian power never again becomes the market or technological leader in the way that China has in relation to 5G telecommunications systems.

The D10 could also provide a platform for the democracies to coordinate the reversal of environmental degradation and their broader international development efforts, particularly as China accelerates and expands its vast £770 billion Belt and Road Initiative.

It could gradually expand to include additional democracies – such as Chile – that are able and willing to preserve an international order based on rules.  And, in time, the D10 could even facilitate greater military cooperation between its members, particularly if growing international tensions start to boil over.

Covid-19 has merely reconfirmed the fact that the democracies cannot take their security for granted. Britain’s proposal for the D10 shows that it is capable of putting the concept of ‘Global Britain’ into practice. It throws down the gauntlet to the Europeans, in an attempt to coax them out of their introspectiveness, while showing America, Japan, India and Australia that London takes their concerns seriously, particularly in relation to China. If implemented, it would rev-up multilateralism for a new age by preparing the world’s democracies for the challenges of the twenty-first century. And it proves that Britain is still at the crux of the international order – not a power shuffling away from it.

Roderick Crawford: We have interests in the rest of Europe, but must be free to run our own foreign policy

6 Jul

Roderick Crawford works on conflict resolution in countries such as Yemen, South Sudan and Iraq, and on Brexit-related matters. He is a former editor of Parliamentary Brief.

One could be forgiven a sense of déjà vu as we enter the second round of accelerated talks, this time in London. The high hopes of breakthrough at the start of last week’s talks were dashed as they broke up on Thursday last. The same sticking points remain: the legal structure of the agreement, level playing field commitments, including state aid, and of course fisheries. Specific details have not been released, so it is hard to comment on why the progress on getting agreement on underlying principles has failed to materialise.

Though working through the underlying principles of the agreement should help identify where the barriers to agreement lie, a look at the overarching principles of the negotiating positions of the two parties may throw better light on the lack of progress.

Last month, Der Spiegel ran an interview with the Anglophile former German Ambassador in London, Peter Wittig; he provided a revealing glimpse into the EU’s perspective on the negotiations. Asked whether, in effect, the EU should accept a hard Brexit and let the UK go, he says, no:

‘We should continue to endeavour to tie Britain as closely as possible to the European Union. Europe can only survive in the competition between the USA and China if it is strong and united. I always thought it was good that the Federal Government was the voice of pragmatic reason in all these difficult negotiation phases. I advise everyone not to think about the short-term effect, but to keep a strategic eye on where Europe should be in five, ten or 15 years.’

The quote is interesting because it is part of an intra-German conversation from a friend of the UK expressing pragmatic views on the big picture in which Brexit sits. While the UK has been caught up in its own arguments and political storms – and of course running ourselves down – we have lost sight of the impact of Brexit on the EU: it has been considerable.

The EU has lost its only global city, its only global finance centre, its most dynamic services economy, 12 per cent of its consumers – more when weighted for income – and its only universities ranked in the world’s top ten. It has lost a major pillar of good governance (the UK was a consistent upholder of the EU’s rules-based system) and a source of sound counsel.

As the EU looks to develop its common foreign policy and defence co-operation, it does so now from a far weaker base. The UK was one of two EU permanent members of the UN Security Council, one of two nuclear powers.

It had the only blue-water navy capable of working with the US; China has just achieved a two aircraft carrier capability – the UK will soon be there, too. It has a battle-tested professional army and air force. The UK alone had the capability of power projection across the world – albeit with limitations – and the will to do so. The Foreign Office, despite its shortcomings, is still world class and the UK’s influence is, arguably, stronger across the world than any single EU member state.

The EU is diminished, while the fault lines on which it sits become more unstable. To its east, Russia is reviving in confidence as its actions in Ukraine, Syria, and its challenges to the West demonstrate. Turkey has become a regional player, outside of the NATO fold, and looks to a future untied to the EU. The Middle East and North Africa are unstable, and a source of potential and probable mass migration to the EU driven by demographics, economic and political failures and climate change.

The UK looks out across the North Sea to Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, and across the Channel to Belgium and France; to our west lie the USA and Canada. It is an envious position to be in, though not one deserving of complacency: we still want a secure and stable EU. We are committed to the peace and security of Europe through NATO; in these respects, our interests and obligation in NATO, we are tied in.

One of the problems in the current negotiations is that the EU has re-written history to build up its own role in keeping the peace of the last half century. One of its foundational myths is that it has been the EU that has kept the peace in Europe. It even claims responsibility for the Belfast Agreement.

But its claims to success are absent of evidence. It is the transatlantic partnership that has kept the peace in Europe; it was the Northern Irish, London and Dublin – with US support – who brought about the Belfast Agreement. The EU forgets its role in the break up of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent wars and civil wars ended only with US engagement. Its diplomatic bungle over Kosovo, when it resurrected the July 1914 ultimatum to Serbia, ended likewise – and at great cost in civilian lives. The EU has not kept the peace in Europe.

The EU’s ambitious partnership proposal is overly ambitious, based as it is on inflated ideas of its own story and present capability; the ideas of uniquely shared values and interests ignore that they are shared with the English-speaking world and beyond. When the myth is removed, and the reality of the EU’s position is seen — its risk levels, its lack of investment in NATO and its own level of defence preparedness, and its poor relations with its neighbours — it is hardly an attractive partner; more of a liability.

The EU, quite understandably, wants the UK as closely tied in as possible to its defence and foreign policy (and economy). The UK, quite understandably, does not. Present commitments through NATO provide sufficient security to the EU’s members and help balance much, though not all, of their security concerns. The UK will do more, through co-operation bilaterally with members and freely alongside the EU too.

The EU and UK can co-operate to secure shared interests, but ultimately, though the UK wants a stable and secure EU and stability and security for its member states, there are differences in interests. The UK must be free to run its own foreign policy, champion alliances that may take precedence over that with the EU and policies that the EU will oppose — even the freedom to support member state interests against those of the EU institutions. It cannot be tied-in to a punitive governance structure to prevent it exercising such choices.

The overarching principles of the EU and the UK as regards governance of the future relationship are in conflict — we can’t be tied-in and free simultaneously; papering over the differences would breed confusion and likely lead to fresh upsets in the future. The UK cannot afford to accept a single overarching governance structure or claims upon it in the field of the EU’s common foreign policy and defence.

James Roberts: Big state spender Roosevelt shouldn’t be Gove’s new role model

1 Jul

James Roberts is Political Director of the Taxpayers’ Alliance.

Our de facto prime minister, Michael Gove, has been a busy man. On Tuesday, he was in the Commons explaining Mark Sedwill’s sudden departure. At the weekend, he delivered a much-vaunted address to the prestigious Ditchley Foundation, joining a long line of luminaries: Mark Carney, David Milliband, John Major, Chris Patten, to name but a few.

Sparing the blushes of the distinguished Ditchley crowd, Gove didn’t mention Brexit much. But what he did deliver was a rare tour de force about the challenges facing Western governments, delivered with daring incisiveness by the Government’s ‘Hand of the King’. If the ever-authoritative media talking heads (and rapidly-departing civil service barons) want to know what ‘hard rain’ that nasty Dominic Cummings has in store for them, Gove’s lecture was a good place to start.

He didn’t pull his punches. For the ‘Forgotten Man’, faith in the system has been broken, “compounded by cultural condescension and insulation from accountability”, with the policy-making elites in political parties and the civil servants in the dock.

Reasonable demands, or taxpayers’ money to be well spent on accessible public services that actually work have been ignored. The top tiers of mandarin management are stuffed with like-minded PPE-ists, dripping in self-reinforcing groupthink, preaching every form of diversity going – except diversity of thought.

Gove described with brutal accuracy the tendency to coalesce around a cosy Westminster consensus, perpetuated by media commentary and pressure group plaudits, with almost non-existent evaluation of real world delivery. But the government eco-system is dying – its credibility eroded away by constant deforestation to feed an insatiable 24 hour media cycle, the whims of easy-choices-only politicians and the childish tantrums of the Twitterati. The spirit of intellectual challenge has been driven out of the forest, with generic generalists climbing high and genuine innovators buried in the undergrowth.

He’s bang on. As Matt Ridley identified back in 2013, policy-making has long been broken: sometimes little more than a string of special interest spending demands; elaborated on by so-called experts; written into submissions by pedantic pen-pushers; approved by malleable ministers; and made into law by preoccupied politicians.

‘Doing something’ is the name of the game. If social media demands it, laws can be changed. If the media suggests it, money can be found. The Forgotten Man – that is, the taxpayers who pay for all this – be damned. Their preferences are secondary or even, as Gove suggests, absent entirely. A quick reference to ‘taxpayers’ money’ seems often enough to settle the consciences of Tory ministers, as they implement evermore expensive government intervention, because a hashtag told them to.

The TaxPayers’ Alliance knows calling this out doesn’t win you many friends: you can count on one hand the number of policy-makers willing to go against the grain. At DEFRA, lest we forget, Michael Gove was quick to join the chorus of environmentalist big spenders, navigating Theresa May towards a non-negotiable £1 trillion net zero commitment (which by our reckoning no government department has any idea of how to achieve). But then, there’s no zealot like a convert.

But a form of zealotry is exactly what government reform needs. The so-called ‘Rolls Royce’ civil service has broken down by the roadside. On that front, Gove wasn’t short on bold solutions. As our landmark polling last year with ConservativeHome’s columnist, James Frayne, showed, more than six in 10 working class taxpayers agree with the suggestion that we should move more central government offices and jobs outside of London.

Almost three quarters of them believe that all civil service jobs should be open to applicants without a degree, perhaps hoping to break the hold of the hapless humanities graduates. A hard-nosed look at value for money is vital, too.

Gove namechecked numerous programmes, including his old chum David Cameron’s £1 billion National Citizenship Service, which could benefit from a proper quantitative analysis of success and failure. There should be nothing noteworthy about a politician taking aim at programmes, like the £920 million Troubled Families scheme or (Gove’s own) Pupil Premium, and asking if these really delivered for taxpayers. But in the punch-and-judy pantomime of the current political debate, this feels revolutionary.

The same can be said of some of his other policy proposals. In a speech so wide ranging it would usually have a Prime Minister worried, Gove called for  planning reform to fast track beautiful development, better use of data in the NHS, transparency on court and school results, reviews for failed anti-radicalisation programmes, interrogating defence procurement contracts and accountability on the impact of aid spending. Many of these things should be music to taxpayers’ ears.

But the implications of all this are far from clear. As the punters know, policy outcomes matter more than policy processes. Reviews often come to nothing. Promises aren’t worth the paper they’re written on. The devil’s in the detail. What does Gove actually want to achieve?

Does turning to more data in the NHS mean only allowing for government-made track and trace apps, which inevitably fail? Does it follow that reviewing a failed social programme results in it actually being abolished, and taxpayers getting their money back? Does accountability for aid spending mean cutting back the £15.2 billion cashpoint in the sky, or simply swapping money between dodgy dictators and wasteful NGOs?

he voters we polled wanted foreign aid reduced and reallocated to other priority areas such as the police, the NHS and schools. Very few people care how the sausage is made – they just want aid cut. But that’s an uncomfortable view in SW1, and incidentally not one that Michael Gove shares. It’s the same with the majority (68 per cent of C2DE voters) who backed abolishing the BBC licence fee. When he becomes inconvenient, or wants things that really upset the Westminster village applecart, the Forgotten Man is once again forgotten. Politicians just come up with better ways of ignoring him – the endless reviews and the broken promises.

In that sense, Gove’s speech could easily have been given by a much more fitting figure for the Ditchley Foundation: Tony Blair. Like Gove, he reached for the model of America’s big spending New Deal, under Franklin Delano Roosevelt. New Labour offered innovation, clever solutions and new public service delivery models, with a pledge and a commission for every occasion. Gove and his Cameronite contemporaries looked on in awe, while most Conservative voters were horrified at the economic paternalism, metropolitan condescension and fiscal vandalism of the Blair years.

Many still believed that reams of government data and endless initiatives can never outgun the free and rational choices of millions of individuals. Their ears still rung with the mocking rebuke of Ronald Reagan: “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” Endless cash flow means that civil servants, not taxpayers, still made the rules. The TaxPayers’ Alliance itself was founded to take a stand.

Blair paid the price for ignoring his own voters, and taxpayers got sick of the Westminster consensus he created – ‘expert’ policy tsars, expensive PFI, and constant right-on crusades – arguably leading up to the EU referendim result in 2016. For a man so intimately involved in that campaign, Michael Gove may sadly be in danger of starting off down the same path. Replacing Oxford-educated experts with world-beating data whizz kids, or swapping a programme here with a review over there, won’t change the Blairite policy-making consensus – unless there is fundamental change of political intention at the top.

Britain’s forgotten taxpayers need Michael Gove’s intentions to be as bold as his analysis.

Alan Mak: Britain should champion a new Five Eyes critical minerals reserve system

30 Jun

Alan Mak is MP for Havant and Founder of the APPG on the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

The on-going trade dispute between the US and China has put the spotlight on so-called “critical minerals”. We in Britain cannot afford to be passive observers. Instead, we should take an active interest in this key strategic and economic issue, and play a leading role in safeguarding access to critical minerals, both for ourselves and our Five Eyes allies. Ensuring our scientists, manufacturers and technology businesses have a secure and reliable supply of critical minerals is vital for Britain’s leadership of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Critical minerals consist of the 17 Rare Earth Elements (REE) recognised by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, with names such as promethium and scandium, plus other economically valuable but relatively rare minerals such as lithium and cobalt (used in batteries), tungsten (used in defence products including missiles), bauxite (the source of aluminium) and graphite (key to battery production).

The REEs have unique magnetic, heat-resistant, and phosphorescent properties that no other elements have, which means they are often non-substitutable. Whilst used only in small quantities, they are key components in a wide range of consumer products from mobile phones, laptops and TVs, and have widespread defence applications in jet engines, satellites, lasers and missiles.

Although they are more abundant than their name implies, REEs and critical minerals are difficult and costly to mine and process. Converting critical minerals embedded in rocks from under the Earth’s crust to separated elements is a complex and costly process which often involves the use of highly concentrated acids and radiation.

China hosts most of the world’s processing capacity and supplied 80 percentemploy of the REEs imported by the US from 2014 to 2017. On average, China has accounted for more than 90 pe cent of the global production and supply of rare earths during the past decade, according to the US Geological Survey.

By contrast, the US has only one rare earth mining facility, and currently ships its mined tonnage to China for processing. Lynas Corporation, based in Australia, is the world’s only significant rare earths producer outside China. Other critical minerals are similarly concentrated in a small number of producer nations. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was responsible for around 90 per cent of the world’s cobalt production in 2018, whilst Guinea dominates bauxite, with around 35 per cent of the world’s reserves.

As globalisation and industrialisation accelerate around the world, critical minerals have become a highly sought-after resource for the high-technology, low-carbon and defence industries. They will play a vital role in Britain’s future plans for economic growth, innovation and green industrialisation, especially as we renew and expand our manufacturing base in the wake of Coronavirus.

Given the national strategic and economic importance of critical minerals, the UK needs to act now and lead efforts to protect our national supply for the future. Neither we nor our Five Eyes allies can remain reliant on one producer for anything, including critical minerals. Here are four steps we should take:

Establish a New Five Eyes critical minerals reserve stockpile

The Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the USA and the UK has been in existence since 1941 and provides the perfect foundation on which we should develop a new critical minerals reserve that would end our collective vulnerability of supply.

The reserve would consist of inter-connected physical national stockpiles of critical minerals, and then extend to become a processing chain that all partners could draw on. The US already maintains stockpiles, and creating others including in Britain would lead to new jobs. The UK is never going to become resource independent, but through international co-operation we can diversify supply and refine, through innovation, the processing of these elements.

Use our international aid budget to secure critical minerals supplies

As the Foreign Office and DFID merge, the UK can align its development goals alongside diplomatic priorities. We should deploy our international aid to unleash the untapped supply of critical minerals in developing countries, effectively funding the start-up of new critical mineral mines and processing plants. This would enhance our supply of these elements and create jobs, transforming communities around the globe through trade, not just aid. China has already implemented a similar strategy in Africa, for example providing Guinea with a $20 billion loan to develop the country’s mining sector.

Create a new National Critical Minerals Council

The Government should establish a new National Council composed of metallurgists, scientists and foreign policy experts to monitor global trends in critical minerals, and advise the Government on rare earths and its strategic stockpile. Given the national security and defence procurement implications, the National Council’s establishment would help to keep this issue at the forefront of future policymaking.

Become the world’s greenest stockpiler by incentivising private sector involvement in critical minerals processing

The Government should provide funding for greater research into how we can improve the processing chain of critical minerals with a focus on how we can tighten environmental controls in this sector internationally.

The UK should establish itself as the world’s “greenest stockpiler” of critical minerals by offering incentives that encourage private sector investment in recycling processes and reward companies that contribute to the UK stockpile. We need more facilities like the University of Birmingham’s Recycling Plant at Tyseley Energy Park, which is pioneering new techniques that are transforming the recycling of critical minerals such as neodymium, which is commonly found in hard disk drives.

The Coronavirus pandemic has taught us the importance of supply chain security, whether for PPE or critical minerals. With our reputation for scientific excellence, global alliances and diplomatic networks, we can help ourselves and our allies strengthen our access to the key minerals that will power our economic growth and innovation potential for decades to come.

This is the first in a three-part series on how to boost our economy after Coronavirus.

Neil Shastri-Hurst: Turkey and Hungary cannot be allowed to continue to contravene the principles of NATO

26 Jun

Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst is a former British Army Officer, surgeon, barrister, and senior member of the Voluntary Conservative Party in the West Midlands.

Determined, bold, and ambitious. All adjectives that could be used to describe the vision NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, put forward in a speech at the beginning of June. And yet, barely a mention in the newspapers. But whilst Covid-19 continues to dominate the news agenda, Stoltenberg’s speech should not be dismissed. It has the potential to significantly alter the position from which NATO seeks to operate.

NATO has been a powerful military alliance since its inception. National and international threats have not diminished over the last 70 years or so; rather they have grown. The current pandemic should not lure us into a false sense of security. The importance of a strong and effective military alliance, through the auspices of NATO, is fundamental to upholding the democratic principles we hold so dear.

However, in setting out a roadmap for the organisation for the decade ahead, its Secretary General has fixed his sights beyond that. He aspires to something much more ambitious. A shift to focus upon diplomatic and economic levers. A shift to operating more globally; beyond its current North Atlantic milieu. In essence, a shift to operating more politically.

Stoltenberg’s words will have been warmly heard in Washington. It was precisely this type of refocusing that the United States’ administration was pressing for when the alliance leaders met for the 70th anniversary summit on the 4th December 2019. It clearly acknowledges the growing threat that China plays in the wider global security challenges. That said, achieving this ambition will prove much harder than articulating it.

Whilst the focus of the Secretary General’s speech concentrated on the construct of a more political NATO – a NATO “using a broader range of tools”; both military and non-military – this ambitious vision can only be looked at in conjunction with the broader challenges facing the Alliance. Such a paradigm shift would necessitate a change in mindset from its member states.

NATO’s burgeoning inbox is frequently inundated with concerns posed by Vladimir Putin and Russian adventurism. This threat has not retreated. Putin’s posturing and strongman rhetoric continues to present a substantial risk to the Alliance. However, in recent years, there has been the development of a fresh danger. A danger posed by member states themselves. From Viktor Orbán in Hungary to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, there has been the emergence of a cohort of leaders who style themselves in the Putin mould.

The bedrock of NATO has always been its shared values. The alliance has been bound through a pledge of collective defence: each member state, a democracy that upholds the virtues of individual human rights. For the majority of the 29, this remains the case. However, a small, but vocal, minority within the alliance has strayed from this path. The principle of collective defence has diminished in importance for these nations.

The schism created by Erdoğan and his ever closer relationship with Russia are well documented. But Erdoğan is not the only leader who has chosen to pursue a more nationalistic political path. Casting one’s gaze to Hungary, we see a country that was once an exemplar of post-Cold War success; a former Communist regime that had succeeded in achieving a strong democracy.

But times have changed. Orbán has adopted an increasingly authoritarian domestic policy platform. However, from NATO’s perspective, it is Orbán’s adoption of a fragrantly pro-Russian foreign policy agenda that is even more worrying: one only has to consider Hungary’s attempts to progressively block and disrupt the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine in order to illustrate this. Whereas the sage heads sitting at the NATO top table recognise the malign influence of a Putin led Russia, Orbán and Erdoğan are amongst a powerful subset that willingly fail to do so.

It would be misleading to suggest that NATO, and its members, have always upheld its founding principles to the letter. Historically, member states have not always been governed under truly democratic principles. That said, the internal menace posed by the pro-Russian, authoritarian rule of some of its own members arguably presents the greatest threat to NATO’s integrity that it has suffered to date.

The importance of NATO cannot be underestimated. As recently as 2016, the Alliance set out its central mission: “to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and rule of law”. However, such a shared set of values operates on trust.

This brings me back to Stoltenberg’s vision for NATO 2030. An ambitious vision must be coupled with a compelling argument that member states’ defence and procurement strategies must be centred upon NATO’s intended direction. In a post-pandemic world, with the global economy having taken a battering, putting forward a persuasive case may be all the harder. Maintaining the two per cent minimum of GDP contribution has historically been challenging for many members. The reality is that, with competing demands upon treasury departments, a not insignificant contingent will formally rescind upon their commitment.

But that may be the least of NATO’s problems. The majority need to stand up to the minority and challenge its offending behaviour. Nation states such as Turkey and Hungary cannot be allowed to continue to operate in contravention of the principles of the Alliance. The Washington Treaty contains no provision to suspend members who do not act within the democratic ideals of NATO. However, that should not deter action against those states that fail to adhere to these; political and economic sanctions, for example, may well have the desired effect in the long-term, if not short-term.

And so, I end where I started. This is a determined, bold, and ambitious vision of NATO in 2030. It will however require an even more determined, a bolder, a more ambitious argument to be put forward in order for it to succeed. To have any chance of success, NATO itself will need to reform. It will need to assure member states that the collective Alliance remains true to its founding principles. It must convince its members to stand up against those who show a disregard for human rights or seek to pursue a pro-Russian agenda.

There is a Russian bear sitting behind the desk of the Kremlin; for the survival of NATO we must not let its cubs play in our midst.