Stephen Booth: Brexit is a process, not an event. So it’s far too early to judge whether it’s working.

16 Jun

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

Next week will see another Brexit anniversary as we reach six years since the 2016 referendum. Meanwhile, the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which marked the beginning of the UK’s new relationship with the EU has been in place for nearly 18 months. No doubt we will be debating the merits and consequences of Brexit for many years to come, but what can be said at this point?

Much of the Brexit debate has focused on trade and the economy, and the deteriorating economic situation has prompted some commentators to lay the blame squarely at the door of Brexit. However, it is almost impossible to disentangle any Brexit effect from the much larger economic shock resulting from the pandemic, and now the war in Ukraine, which have taken a heavy toll on the global economy.

Due to the volatility caused by these global events, it is difficult to make short-term comparisons across economies. However, according to OECD figures, the UK economy exceeded its pre-pandemic (Quarter Four, 2019) level of GDP for the first time in the first quarter of 2022, by 0.7 per cent. I

By contrast, German and Italian GDP was still below pre-pandemic levels (by 1.0 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively) in the first quarter of 2022. And while UK inflation is at the high end compared to other economies, the Netherlands and Poland are both experiencing higher levels, illustrating that the UK is not a particular European outlier.

Given the degree of change to the UK’s trading arrangements, it would be a surprise if Brexit had no impact. At the time of the Spring Statement, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility noted that UK trade had not recovered as quickly as other advanced economies and that the trade intensity of the UK economy had fallen as a result. However, looking beyond the headline figures presents a complicated picture, not easily explained by Brexit alone.

The biggest contributors to the UK’s decrease in trade intensity are from a decline in imports of goods and services from the EU, even though the barriers to trade have overwhelmingly been erected on the EU side of the border (the UK has delayed imposing checks on EU goods entering the UK).

Equally, UK exports of goods to the EU have recovered more strongly than UK exports to non-EU countries. The reorientation of supply chains may have played a role in this. However, much of the global demand for goods was generated by US consumers, and the UK is not a major exporter of the products (computers and electrical equipment) that the US imported over this period.

Finally, the UK’s export mix is more dominated by services than its competitors. The pandemic has had far-reaching consequences for trade in services and, paradoxically, again it is imports rather than exports of services to the EU that have seen the biggest falls since the pandemic. This evidence would suggest that greater barriers to exporting to the EU seem to be playing only a limited role in the UK’s disappointing post-pandemic trade performance. This shouldn’t be cause for celebration, but it is important to diagnose the problem properly.

On the question of immigration, which dominated political debate prior to the referendum, it is notable that the UK has remained open to global talent and skills. The tight labour market is primarily to do with older UK workers exiting the market rather than the loss of EU workers, the vast majority of which have been replaced from outside the EU under the UK’s liberalised visa system.

Net migration to the UK was estimated by the Office of National Statistics to be 239,000 in the year ending June 2021 and work-related immigration to the UK has recovered strongly in the wake of the pandemic. There were 277,069 work-related visas granted in the year ending March 2022 (including dependants). This was a 129 per cent increase on the year ending March 2021 and is 50 per cent higher than in the year ending March 2020.

It is also clear that despite continuing high numbers of arrivals, public attitudes on immigration have softened significantly now that the UK is able to devise its own policy without the strictures of EU freedom of movement. According to Ipsos-Mori, the proportion of people wanting to see immigration reduced has fallen from around 65 per cent in 2015 to 42 per cent in 2022. The share saying immigration levels should stay the same or be increased has risen to 50 per cent from around 30 per cent. Those dissatisfied with the Government’s handling of immigration are largely concerned with illegal Channel crossings.

Meanwhile, there was a fear that Brexit would consign the UK to geopolitical irrelevance on the global stage. However, the UK entered into the new AUKUS security partnership with the US and Australia and it has played a leading role in the international effort to support Ukraine.

The crisis with Russia has not united the EU behind a common foreign policy to the exclusion of Britain. As I noted in a previous column, Emmanuel Macron’s drive for EU “strategic autonomy” on foreign and security policy has been severely undermined, probably fatally, by the fact that many in Northern and Eastern Europe have concluded that the US and the UK are more reliable partners in this field than France and Germany.

This is not to suggest that Brexit has been plain sailing or that the UK does not face significant difficulties. Clearly, the row between London and Brussels over the Northern Ireland Protocol has the potential to escalate and fundamentally destabilise the UK-EU relationship yet again. The domestic economic and political challenges of increasing productivity, improving economic performance across the entire country, and reforming public services pre-date Brexit.

Some Brexiteers are impatient for greater divergence from the EU. Some Remainers will continue to see Brexit as the root of every problem. However, Brexit is a process rather than an event and the experience of the past six years should demonstrate that the UK’s decision to leave the EU does not in of and itself mean it is on the road to success or failure.

The post Stephen Booth: Brexit is a process, not an event. So it’s far too early to judge whether it’s working. first appeared on Conservative Home.

Matt Hancock: Putin’s war is reminding us of a lasting truth – that our system and values are better than his

25 May

Matt Hancock is a former Secretary of State for Health, and is MP for West Suffolk.

The battles we see across Eastern Ukraine, for Mariupol, Donetsk, Severodonetsk and countless towns and villages, is not just a fight to protect European security against brutal, criminal, aggression. Of course, it is that – and, alone, that need to bring justice for the horrific crimes committed is enough to justify the war.

It is not even just a fight for the immutability of international borders, and the protection of all nations from strong offensive neighbours, vital as that is. It is not even just about protecting the food supplies to the poorest countries on earth, although that alone is an ethical imperative.

The battle for Ukraine is a fight for enlightenment values, of the liberty of people and the freedom of self-determination of nation states.

The brave soldiers fighting these battles for Ukraine are winning a fight for us all. In doing so, it is critical we support Ukraine in a fight to win. It is, as the inspirational Volodymyr Zelensky has said, for Ukraine and Ukraine alone to determine her future. That is what self-determination is all about.

The recent drive, apparently coordinated between Paris and Berlin, to push Ukraine for a compromise settlement must be resisted, as it would incentivise aggression, on the grounds that at least you might win some ground. Would you offer a wolf the sacrifice of just one limb?

On the contrary, Russia’s attack has so spectacularly failed in its bid to split NATO and undermine the West, and we must ensure that Ukraine alone decides her future. Giving up any ground now may appear to help in the short term, but it will undoubtedly cause far-reaching problems down the line.

If we fail to support Ukraine to win back her land, what’s stopping China, or any other dictatorship for that matter, doing exactly what Russia has done to Ukraine? Any such action would inevitably act as a green light – offering little to no deterrent.

While the war in Ukraine still rages on, we have seen some progress this week. Amid the bitter fighting, one border post was recaptured, painted in the now familiar yellow and blue that we see on flagpoles everywhere. In a highly symbolic manoeuvre, the Ukrainian army has pushed back the invaders to their border. Who are we to tell the Ukrainian people that some of them would have to live under the Russian yolk, with the dictatorial tyranny this brings?

For this war is bigger than being about security, or justice. It’s about our way of life.

Here, I see a glimmer of hope. For we can now see, with the clarity that comes from a shocking sight, that the drift to dictatorship in Russia and China has awful consequences.  Throughout my political life, support for democracy has waned, and those who see the cacophony of debate as a weakness have espoused their “strong man” theory of government.

I have long worried about the increasing numbers of people who have seemingly admired one party systems, and seen the long term horizons and lack of debate as a good thing, or at least, a price worth paying for prosperity and strength. In the wake of the economic crash, the expenses scandal, and growing social media noise over the past decade or so, it’s been harder to make the argument for the principles embedded in the enlightenment of the promotion of individual liberty and democratic institutions as the cornerstone of a good society.

If, like me, you think that everyone has a contribution to make, and that the role of society is to help everyone reach that potential, then the counterexample that the rights of the individual should be subordinate to the needs of the state seemed to be gaining ground. Open, liberal democracies support innovation and protect people from the overweening state.

Instead, over the past decade, the Russian invasion of Crimea, and President Xi’s removal of term limits should have told us clearly where this move away from supporting democracy would lead. But the case for democracy, especially among younger voters, has increasingly fell on deaf ears.

But democracy isn’t only morally superior but practically superior too. Dictatorship is not only bad but rubbish. Dictators and dictatorships suffocate innovation. By their very nature, they restrict freedom and don’t allow people to get on with whatever they choose to do without getting consent from any given dictatorial regime.

In a dictatorship, people tell you what they think you want to hear. I know from experience that, in liberal democracies like ours, plenty of people tell you what you don’t want to hear. It is essential we in the West don’t take this for granted and win again the case for democracy.

Now those of us who cherish democracy, with all of its noise and flaws, have two stark and real examples. China’s continued attempt at a Zero Covid policy is bringing misery.  Its refusal to use vaccines that work, like the Oxford vaccine, because they aren’t Chinese, is plunging their economy into freewill and driving up prices and harming prosperity everywhere. And just look at the shocking treatment by the Chinese dictatorship revealed by the Uyghur Police Files story this week.

China’s abuses of minorities and Russia’s horrific war are showing dictatorship up for what it is. Talking to the wonderful Ukrainian family I’m hosting in my home in West Suffolk makes me feel this particularly acutely.

No longer can democracy be seen as a soft alternative to bold and decisive regimes.  So yes, we must help Ukraine win its war, for the justice for people in Ukraine, and we must support them to win without concession to bolster security everywhere.

But even more than that, we must win once again the case for freedom, for the moral force of the democratic way of life, and win over another generation that this, in the words of Churchill, is the worst system, except all the others that have been tried. That, once more, is proving itself a timeless truth. That is what our brothers and sisters in Ukraine are fighting for – and we must be with them to the end.

Garvan Walshe: Finland and Sweden’s NATO application shows how much Russia has already lost 

12 May

Garvan Walshe is a former National and International Security Policy Adviser to the Conservative Party.

Finland and Sweden applying to join NATO is more evidence that Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been a monstrous mistake. Moscow has maintained an effective veto on Swedish and Finnish membership since ether Cold War. Now, with Russian troops bogged down in the Donbas, Helsinki and Stockholm can join while Russia’s too busy to do much about it.

It also complicates Putin’s tactical situation.  NATO forces could soon be positioned to open a second front north of St Petersburg, limiting Russia’s ability to intimidate the Baltic States, and to broaden the directions from which Murmansk on the Arctic coast can be subject to counterattacks.

Instead of Finland defending a 830 mile border with Russia, Russia will now have to defend another 830 miles of border with NATO. The island of Gotland, from which the Baltic Sea can be controlled, will be a NATO, not just a Swedish, island.

But the most important difference is geopolitical. Look at the globe from the top, and list the countries across the Pole from Russia: the United States (through Alaska), Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the UK, Norway, Sweden and Finland. This arc sweeps down through the Baltic States, Poland and the other countries that escaped Soviet domination in 1989, to Ukraine. All except Ukraine are in NATO – and Ukraine is inflicting the biggest defeat of Russia since the Japanese in 1905.

Apart from the US and Canada, which must also pay attention to Chinese ambitions in the Pacific, all these states see resisting Russian aggression as their main defence policy task. 

This will remain the case until the Russian state comes to understand that its purpose should be to improve the lives of Russian people, and that this is hindered, not helped, by paranoid militarism. Yet that process won’t even begin until Putin leaves office, and could well be reversed, even if he’s followed by a liberalising successor. Both Tsar Alexander II’s and Boris Yeltsin’s openings were overturned.  

These first-line states, of which the UK, Poland and Ukraine are the main military powers, can expect to maintain decades of containment of Moscow. As well as strengthening their own cooperation, they need to keep the rest of the Western alliance involved. 

Even setting aside the risk of a second Trump administration, a United States that returns to isolationism, or is simply focused on China, would be unable to help mount a defence against Russian aggression in the way it has this time. Continental European powers such as France and Germany under less immediate threat to Russia need to be persuaded who their real friends are.

The German government is divided. While Annalena Baerbock, its Foreign Minister, has been steadfast in her support for Ukraine, Olaf Scholz appears to lack the courage of his convictions, and needs continually to be pushed to live up to the Zeitenwende he announced immediately after Russia invaded.

And as Emmanuel’s Macron’s speech on Monday showed, France still struggles to shrug off its reflex of seeking somehow to involve Russia in contributing to security in Europe. This thinking has long been obsolete: a democratic Germany inside the EU has long made a Russian balance to Prussia unnecessary, and Poland’s integration into the West made it unsustainable.

But winning the political battles in France and Germany (and maintaining Mario Draghi’s new pro-Ukrainian consensus in Italy) will take more concerted diplomatic effort. It’s been entertaining to watch the friendly rivalry by former European schoolmates as they compete for visits to Kyiv and videotaped addresses by Volodomyr Zelensky. Whether they are Anglo-Swedish NLAWs (anti-tank weapons), US Javelins, German Panzerfausts or French CAESAR howitzers, all contribute to Ukraine’s fight for freedom. This is not a race, but a collective effort in which all democracies should take part.  

Finland and Sweden’s entry into NATO, accompanied by British security guarantees for both countries until the NATO accession process is complete, is one such initiative. Denmark joining the EU’s defence policy (it currently has an opt out: a referendum is due on 1 June, and ‘join’ has a 20 point lead) is another.  The requirement is not necessarily unity of institutions, but unity of action, which must be pursued through NATO, EU initiatives and the British-led Joint Expeditionary force. 

Next winter, when inflation and high energy prices are due to bite, will prove critical. Russia will put every ounce of its political manipulation effort into splitting Germany, France and Italy from the front line states. It is an essential British interest that these efforts fail. 

Lasting peace in Europe will only come once Russia, like Germany has, abandons imperialist ambitions, reforms its militaristic culture, and retreats from all territory in other states that it has occupied. Putin’s defeat won’t be enough on its own to trigger the introspection and reconstruction that Russia needs. But it is a necessary step, and his inability to enforce Moscow’s ban on Finnish and Swedish NATO membership is evidence that he is starting to lose. 

Stephen Booth: Brexit’s legacy, the Northern Ireland Protocol, small boats – and Britain’s tense relationship with Macron

5 May

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

To the relief of the French and European establishment, Emmanuel Macron’s re-election makes him the first two-term French President in 20 years since Jacques Chirac. However, the 17-point margin of his victory over Marine Le Pen does not tell the whole story. Voter turnout was the lowest in a presidential run-off since 1969 and Le Pen increased her vote tally from 10.6 million in the second round in 2017 to 13.2 million this time around.

It is probable that Macron will secure a working majority in the National Assembly elections in June. But with such a high percentage of disaffected voters on the left and the right, and both camps opposed to giving Macron a mandate to pursue his economic reforms, surprises cannot be ruled out.

Five years is a long time in politics. However, the nature of Macron’s victory and the trend towards polarisation of the French political system does beg the question of what his domestic legacy will be. Having decimated the traditional centre-left and centre-right parties, which has allowed the fringes on the left and right to flourish, can the centre produce a successor to Macron in 2027?

Nevertheless, in the immediate term, Macron will feel that his victory puts him in the ascendency on the European stage and he will continue have a strong influence over the direction of the EU, including on relations with the UK. Hopes of a swift reset of Anglo-French relations following Macron’s re-election look unlikely to materialise. France’s Finance Minister, Bruno Le Maire, made a point of telling reporters after Macron’s victory that “our first challenge will not be the relationship between the UK and France.”

Macron is likely to double down on his vision for EU integration and “strategic autonomy”. He has some like-minded allies for this agenda, such as Italy’s Prime Minister, Mario Draghi, who this week called for “pragmatic federalism” in the fields of economy, energy, and security and defence.

However, in security and foreign policy, Macron could struggle to assert French leadership within the EU as he would like. The crisis in Ukraine has strengthened the position of key UK allies, particularly among the Nordics, Baltics, and several Eastern countries, that EU policy must not undermine or be in competition with NATO. Macron’s previous efforts to open a seemingly unilateral dialogue with Vladimir Putin and his ambivalence towards US leadership of NATO continue to make them suspicious of French strategic direction in this area.

The Prime Minister’s leadership on Ukraine has built up goodwill towards the UK in many of these countries, and the UK should continue to work with these nations on making the case that European security cooperation should enhance rather than detract from NATO. The UK’s response to Ukraine illustrates that Global Britain does not come at the expense of a commitment to European security and prosperity in the most fundamental sense.

Clearly, there remain difficult issues between the UK and France where Macron appears reluctant to help. For example, notwithstanding the Government’s new policies to tackle people smuggling and illegal cross-Channel migrant crossings on small boats, the problem would be much more easily addressed through French cooperation to stop the perilous crossings at source on the French coast. However, politically, this remains a bigger problem for the Government than for Macron.

Meanwhile, France remains strongly opposed to a softening of the EU’s stance in the talks on the Northern Ireland Protocol. The Queen’s Speech on 10 May is expected to include plans for a bill giving the Government new powers to replace parts of the Northern Ireland Protocol unilaterally, in an effort to break the impasse.

The UK should brace itself for a political reaction from Brussels, but it should continue to underline its overriding responsibility to uphold the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. It should emphasise to its allies, in the EU and outside it, that a new political bargain that commands the consent of both communities in Northern Ireland is in the wider European interest and trumps the narrow focus on the EU’s technocratic regulatory order.

With growing fears over unfair Chinese competition and supply chain resilience resulting from the experience of the pandemic, France’s calls for a more interventionist and strategic EU industrial policy may find an increasingly receptive audience. This could have implications for economic competition and cooperation between the UK and the EU, particularly in strategic technological and energy sectors.

The UK should work with Germany to ensure that a renewed EU focus on resilience does not spiral into a form of protectionism that strains UK-EU economic relations further. Germany’s Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, is still bedding into the leadership role vacated by Angela Merkel. His three-way coalition is in the process of dramatically changing the course of German foreign and energy policy in response to the war in Ukraine, and Berlin’s recent commitment to buy US F-35 jet aircraft illustrates that Germany will not necessarily instinctively “buy European”, as Macron would wish.

Meanwhile, despite the recent Anglo-French flashpoints, which also included the row over the AUKUS alliance, more amiable bilateral relations in several areas should be mutually advantageous. The UK should continue to emphasise that both countries remain important security partners within the NATO framework. Germany’s newfound appetite for defence spending may offer Macron another option on paper, but German strategic culture and its readiness to act is likely take far longer to change significantly.

Equally, the UK, unlike Germany, shares French enthusiasm for nuclear power as a means of bolstering domestic energy production. The UK would benefit from French industrial expertise and the UK offers a willing commercial partner.

Much has been made of the poor state of the Anglo-French relationship since Brexit. Personality clashes between Macron and Boris Johnson may well have something to do with it. However, the root remains the geopolitical fallout from Brexit, as viewed in London and in Paris, which are to be found in the concepts of Global Britain and EU strategic autonomy. Both countries therefore look set to continue to rub along uneasily, mixing elements of cooperation and competition along the way, but the UK has tools at its disposal to offer a constructive Anglo-French and UK-EU relationship.

Anand Menon: Europe and the war. Will the unity engendered by Russia’s invasion last?

18 Apr

Anand Menon is Director of the UK in a Changing Europe.

‘Europe will be forged in crisis and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.’ If ever there were a moment to ponder the import of Jean Monnet’s words, it is now. The war in Ukraine has come as a shock to the system of a union that, for years, has failed to deliver when it comes to its security ambitions.

Unlike, say, the Eurozone or migration crises, events in Ukraine have not proven intrinsically divisive. In the face of the armed invasion of a neighbouring sovereign state by a country already recognised as a potential threat, and acting in lockstep with the United States, unity amongst member states has been (relatively) easy to maintain. If the Donald Trump presidency (and accompanying threats – at least according to John Bolton – to leave NATO) had illustrated the fragility of the NATO shield, Ukraine has rammed home its continued importance by underlining the reality of the Russian sword.

The shock delivered to the collective EU system seems to have spawned a realisation, going beyond the usual cheap talk, that its ‘geopolitical holiday’ is over. And not simply because of the conflict itself. More broadly, many of the other challenges the Union faces in its neighbourhood – in the Middle East, Africa, the Sahel, and the Balkans – will be exacerbated by the war. As the EU’s newly minted ‘Strategic Compass’ puts it, the EU is ‘surrounded by instability and conflicts’.

How has the EU responded?

At Versailles in March, EU leaders declared their intention to ensure the EU could ‘take more responsibility for its own security’. The Strategic Compass published ten days later declared that the ‘EU and its Member States must invest more in their security and defence to be a stronger political and security actor.’

And, crucially, member states seem intent on rising to the challenge. In a dramatic half hour on 27 February, Olaf Scholtz reversed decades of German strategic thinking. German defence spending will rise from 1.5 per cent in 2021 to two per cent; a 100-billion-euro fund will be created for the armed forces. Germany will become the world’s third biggest military spender.

Nor is Germany alone. Denmark and Poland have also announced increases in defence spending. The former has announced a referendum on its opt-out from EU security policies. Finland and Sweden are reconsidering the issue of NATO membership. And, in a stark break with past reticence, the EU itself pledged to provide Ukraine with €1 billion in military assistance.

There is of course a long way to go before rousing words are translated into meaningful action. Yet it does seem that one consequence of the current crisis will be significantly enhanced European military capabilities.

So far, so overdue. Europeans have been free riders on American power for far too long. However, capabilities are one thing. Deploying them is quite another. Taking greater responsibility for European security implies working collectively. Working collectively, in turn, requires consensus (because a genuine ‘European Army’ is not on the cards). Perhaps the biggest question emerging from the present crisis is whether the unity engendered by the Russian invasion will last.

While the EU has imposed five separate sanctions packages on Russia, the longer the conflict lasts, or the nastier it gets, the greater the pressure will be to extend these to cover oil and gas. Germany, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria, however, are highly dependent on Russian gas exports, raising the prospect of bitter arguments to come.

Which raises the thornier question as to how member states might respond to Russian attempts to negotiate a settlement. Emmanuel Macron has maintained a dialogue with Vladimir Putin, despite the obvious irritation this caused among some of the former’s partners (‘nobody negotiated with Hitler’, as the Polish Prime Minister put it). A firm offer of de-escalation in return for concessions on sanctions might well exacerbate such tensions.

Then there is Ukraine itself. While many of the Central European and Baltic states favour a rapid path to EU membership, the French and Dutch have expressed reservations. The Versailles declaration was typically vague, promising support for Ukraine in ‘pursuing its European path’ whilst affirming (meaninglessly) that ‘Ukraine belongs to our European family’. Again, it is not hard to imagine the debate about the appropriate relationship with a post-war Ukraine becoming a running sore within the EU.

And of course such sores existed well before the current conflict. Internal disputes over the rule of law are now being viewed through the lens of events in Ukraine. The European Commission is preparing to release billions in recovery funds for Poland, which has been in the frontline of the refugee crisis. In contrast, two days after the re-election of Viktor Orbán (with his clear sympathies for Putin), the Commission announced plans to trigger a rule of law mechanism allowing it to deprive Hungary of millions of euros in scheduled payments.

It is too early to predict the possible medium-term consequences of all this. On the one hand, the crisis might prompt Poland to reconcile with the European Union. Or, it might encourage political leaders in Warsaw to believe they can act as they like at home as long as they keep in step with EU external policy. As for Hungary, with Orbán’s refusal to countenance weapons deliveries or sanctions on Russian gas exports already straining relations with other member states, it seems reasonable to assume that tensions between Budapest and Brussels will continue to bedevil the Union.

However endless the conflict in Ukraine may be coming to feel, we are still in its early phase. And this might be the easy phase as far as the EU is concerned. How long the war lasts, and the circumstances in which it ends will obviously help shape its longer-term consequences for the Union. It seems likely, though, that member states will emerge with enhanced military capabilities. Whether or not they agree on the foreign policy objectives to which these capabilities will contribute, however, is far from certain.

Stephen Booth: The Ukraine war has revived American leadership and dashed dreams of European autonomy

7 Apr

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

In the 1990s, Mark Eyskens, then Belgium’s foreign minister, described the EU as an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm. This depiction has since been invoked in dozens of articles and speeches about EU foreign and security policy.

The unprecedented speed and scale of the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine therefore displayed a surprising degree of unity and capacity to act, from what was admittedly a rather low base. The EU agreed to provide Ukraine with €450 million worth of weapons, and joined the US and the UK in imposing significant economic sanctions on the Russian financial system. Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, described it as the EU’s “geopolitical awakening”.

Maintaining a unified EU response will be increasingly difficult as the crisis goes on and tougher decisions are called for. For example, this week, the EU agreed sanctions on Russian coal and shipping but was unable to extend this to oil, amid resistance from large energy importers such as Germany.

And while some in Brussels might hail the response as giving fresh impetus to the concepts of “European sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy”, in many ways the crisis has only underlined and intensified the EU’s reliance on the US and NATO.

The first references to the concept of EU “strategic autonomy” date back nearly a decadem but Emmanuel Macron has sought to put the idea at the heart of French and European foreign policy since assuming office. He first drew on this theme early in his presidency in a 2017 speech at the Sorbonne as a response to what he described as “gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States”.

While pitched as a “complement” to NATO and the transatlantic alliance, Macron was clear that the concept meant equipping the EU with the tools to take decisions and action independently based on its own interests, from foreign and security policy to energy and technology. In 2019, Macron described the “brain death” of NATO.

The EU institutions in Brussels were keen to run with the theme. In 2019, the incoming Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, promised a “geopolitical Commission”. This promise was made in response to the decline in multilateralism and growing great power rivalry between the US and China. Brexit, and the loss of one of the EU’s two major foreign policy and security players, no doubt also acted as a catalyst for the renewed emphasis on developing the EU’s geopolitical role.

However, the EU has struggled to define what strategic autonomy means in practice. Economically, the French desire to create European champions clashes with the instincts of more liberal member states. Clément Beaune, France’s EU minister, said last month that the war should push the EU “to reduce our interdependence with the outside world, to create not an autocracy but a form of European independence.” Mark Rutte, Holland’s Prime Minister, has stressed the need for “open strategic autonomy”.

On security, there has been a renewed focus on increasing investment in defence capabilities, which has been accelerated by the Ukraine crisis, particularly dramatically in Germany. However, there had remained an unresolved tension between those states for whom strategic autonomy is a means of regaining political independence from Washington, and others for whom it should be avoided precisely for fear of accelerating US disengagement. The Ukraine crisis has strengthened the hand of those in the latter camp, including the Eastern and Nordic states.

Observers have noted that, on assuming the EU’s rotating presidency at the start of this year, Macron dropped the term “strategic autonomy” in favour of “European sovereignty”, precisely because the term autonomy risked becoming divisive.

The EU recently published its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, which was supposed to be the centrepiece of the French EU presidency and a landmark signpost towards a more geopolitical EU. Based on the “first-ever comprehensive EU threat analysis”, conducted in 2020, it has been rather overtaken by events.

The Compass has been hastily updated to reflect the Ukraine war, but the major threat analysis was conducted before the Russian invasion changed the geopolitical landscape, and that threat analysis also did not anticipate the risk of Russian military action. Notably, US and UK intelligence warnings of an imminent Russian attack proved to be correct, whereas French and German agencies appeared unconvinced, leading to the departure of the head of French military intelligence.

One of the key proposals of the Strategic Compass is the development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5,000 troops for different types of crises. However, the Ukraine crisis has only underlined that, for hard power, NATO is the only game in town. In the words of NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, “so all these efforts – as long as they complement NATO – we welcome them, but the EU cannot defend Europe.”

The crisis has amplified the voices of the more Atlanticist member states, particularly in Eastern Europe. Estonia has called for a larger permanent presence of NATO forces on the eastern flank to act as a stronger deterrent. Romania has also called for more troops and has pledged to increase defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, Poland has quietly lowered the temperature in its legal disputes with Brussels, giving it the opportunity to rekindle ties with the Biden Administration and urge the EU to do more on sanctions and support for Ukraine.

The US is also poised to play a significant role in the EU’s transition away from dependence on Russian energy. The US and the EU recently reached a deal to secure greater shipments of US liquified natural gas up to 2030 to help reduce energy dependence on Russian gas in the coming years. Von der Leyen noted that the target to import 50 billion cubic metres per year “is replacing one-third already of the Russian gas going to Europe today.”

If the horrors of the crisis in Ukraine have finally revealed the dangers and consequences of strategic ambiguity towards Putin’s Russia, European policies (in the EU and in the UK) towards China are also likely to come under increased scrutiny. During the recent EU-China summit, Xi Jinping reportedly called on the EU “to pursue an independent policy towards China,” in a thinly veiled warning to Brussels not to coordinate too closely with the US. But if China continues to support Russia, currently Europe’s gravest security threat, then greater proximity to Washington is the only likely answer.

This crisis has demonstrated the enduring power of the US. If this gives fresh momentum to Atlanticism within the EU and a greater focus on improving capabilities rather than stressing autonomy, this would be good for the West. It would also provide a more productive atmosphere for UK-EU cooperation on shared threats and challenges.

Allan Mallinson: What if Putin opts to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine?

22 Mar

Allan Mallinson is a former soldier, and a novelist and writer. His The Making of the British Army is published by Penguin Random House.

Ben Wallace wrote on this site last week that Vladiir Putin should be in no doubt that escalation will meet a robust response. A day earlier, Garvan Walshe described the need for “escalation dominance”.

They’re right, of course. And unthinkable though it may seem, we need therefore to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. We’ve almost forgotten what they were.

The only thing that ever bothered me in the 1980s, when the Cold War was at a dangerous fork in the road and I was commanding a squadron in Germany, was the periodic guard duty at the nuclear ammunition storage site near Paderborn.

It wasn’t the thought of a nuclear accident – where else to be in that event but at ground zero? – or attack by Spetsnaz or terrorist gangs, for we could have dealt with that. Rather was it the military police battalion of the 59th (US) Ordnance Brigade (Special Ammunition Support).

The MPs’ job was security, and they took it hyper-seriously. (If not, why not?). A Lance Corporal that stumbled when interrogated about his precise orders could bring a career-stopping rebuke from the Commander-in-Chief for the officer in command.

The ammunition was nothing to do with the strategic nuclear deterrent (Polaris), technically. These were low-yield shells for the Royal Artillery’s eight-inch calibre howitzer (range about 12 miles), and warheads for the Lance ballistic missile (range, 50 miles or so): they were tactical – “battlefield” – nuclear weapons (TNW).

Each national contingent on NATO’s Central Front — the US, British, Canadian, German, Dutch and Belgian — fielded the same delivery systems, but the warheads were American, to be out-loaded during a crisis, and fiercely guarded for the rest of the time.

The Royal Air Force (Germany), along with the other national air contingents, had sub-strategic nuclear bombs and missiles of their own. The targets of RAF(G)’s TNWs were troop concentrations to the east of the River Weser, in the event of Soviet spearheads breaching the so-called Weser Line on the western side of the Upper Weser valley. The Lances and howitzers of the Royal Artillery’s 39th Heavy and 50th Missile regiments would have joined in the interdiction.

That, however, was the purely military view of TNW, and there were indeed some who regarded nuclear artillery as “just a bigger bang.”

The other view was that of the policy staff in Whitehall. I remember during my first week in the directorate of military operations being told by a senior mandarin that the General Staff did not understand deterrence.

In essence, the policy staff’s view was that of Sir Humphrey Appleby when he explained Deterrence to the Jim Hacker in Yes, Prime Minister.  Hacker thought he probably wouldn’t use Trident in the event of a nuclear attack on Britain, and that they, the Soviets, probably knew it – so buying Trident was pointless.

Sir Humphrey agreed, up to a point: “Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn’t. But they can’t certainly know.”

Hacker doubted this. “They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn’t.”

Sir Humphrey was then at pains to explain the essential element of uncertainty in deterrence theory: “Yes, but though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn’t, they don’t certainly know that, although you probably wouldn’t, there is no probability that you certainly would.”

Which is why when in 2015 Jeremy Corbyn, pressed by Sarah Montague, the Today presenter, on whether there were any circumstances in which he would use the nuclear option, said “No”, he effectively cancelled deterrence and made himself unelectable as Prime Minister.

Sir Humphrey didn’t explain to Jim Hacker the role of TNW in deterrence theory. It was comedy, after all, and the joke was better delivered quickly. But the purpose of TNW, said the real Sir Humphreys in the 1980s, was to provide a plausible ladder of escalation: graduated response, rather than the erstwhile and rather less plausible doctrine of massive retaliation, with its notion of mutually assured destruction.

What those eight-inch nuclear shells did was provide multiple threads in the seamless cloak of escalatory deterrence logic – from the first rifle shots as Soviet troops set foot across the Inner German Border, to the release of multiple warheads over Russian cities.

TNWs weren’t meant to be used; they were meant to demonstrate that the cloak of deterrence was indeed seamless, and that there was therefore real peril for the Soviets in any offensive. Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were inseparable in deterring both conventional and nuclear attack, which was why NATO could never sign up to “no first use.”

The Soviets had to be convinced of the real peril, of course – and so the soldiers and airmen had to plan for the actual use of TNW, practise their firing, and store the warheads and missiles well forward. And indeed the policy staff tended to view calls for any substantial strengthening of conventional defence, as the soldiers were always urging, as potentially diminishing deterrence, since it might increase the threshold of tactical nuclear release and therefore tempt a Soviet conventional attack with limited objectives.

Some soldiers thought this was all nonsense. Several chiefs of the general staff in the 1980s, notably two of the most cerebral – Dwin Bramall and Nigel Bagnall – would happily have scrapped all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical.

They supposed the Soviets acted with the same rationality as they themselves, and were probably right to, although we’ll never know because the Soviet leadership was never put to the ultimate test. The arguments ceased with the collapse of the Soviet Union, when TNW were withdrawn from Europe and, in effect, scrapped. The Russians, on the other hand, did not scrap theirs.

Putin quite evidently acts with a different rationality, his logic based on different premises. What if, therefore, in contemplating using TNW, he becomes sufficiently certain that NATO, unable to respond with other than strategic nuclear weapons, will never gain the authority of its members to escalate?

In the public imagination, his crude but tellingly vague nuclear threats over Ukraine suggest intercontinental strikes. But what if he were contemplating a TNW strike against a “legitimate military target”? And how, in any future confrontation with NATO, would the alliance deter that same threat — or if deterrence fails, would restore deterrence?

To win Cold War Two, we must get real again about deterrence. NATO rearmament must address the seam that has been inserted in the previously seamless cloak.

Alicia Kearns: This week’s NATO summit must be used to speed Russia’s defeat

22 Mar

Alicia Kearns is the MP for Rutland and Melton.

Last week, I had the humbling privilege of hosting a delegation of Ukrainian MPs. They call themselves the Women’s Diplomatic Battalion of Ukraine: Lesia Vasylenko, Alona Shkrum, Maria Mezentseva, and Olena Khomenko. It is currently treason for a Ukrainian MP to leave their country, but the four had secured special presidential dispensations to visit the UK to secure further support from their foremost bilateral ally.

At the time of writing, it is Day 23 of Putin’s invasion – an invasion that has followed almost exactly the intelligence assessments I received in Kyiv in January: Putin would invade within the month, he would seek to decapitate the country by occupying Kyiv and that, contrary to his assessments, the Ukrainian people would fight like lions.

It was also foreseen then that there would be an enormous capability and speed gap between Putin’s understanding of his armed forces and the reality. This has all played out, with our Ukrainian allies pulverising Russian troops thanks to British NLAWs (Next Generation Anti-tank weapons), American Javelins and Turkish Bayraktar drones provided in anticipation of invasion.

The Russian setbacks are extraordinary. There are rumours that ultra-loyalist “Zagradotryady” had to be formed – barrier units to shoot Russian soldiers who retreat or desert. But these losses have unleashed a new level of barbarity; in which Putin’s forces indiscriminately bomb civilians in an attempt to break Ukraine’s resolve.

This week, an emergency NATO Summit is being held, and the UK’s voice is pivotal. We must redouble our efforts around Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, surge support for the humanitarian catastrophe and bolster deterrence against chemical weapons’ use, as well as launching deterrence diplomacy to prevent Putin’s aggression from turning to the Western Balkans.

On defensive capabilities, the UK is walking a line whereby we cannot be accused by Putin of escalating the conflict, and culpability for any escalation is on him. There has been much discussion about a no-fly zone and, whilst all options must remain on the table, these are proving a distraction from the meaningful efforts of the UK to establish a de-facto no-fly zone through the use of surface-to-air weapons.

Through this means, Putin’s forces have already been unable to establish air dominance and are barely able to fly in the daytime. We must entirely deny them the air, and the deployment of new StarStreak missiles announced by Ben Wallace will further support this aim.

It is artillery causing a great deal of the damage we’re seeing, and at the NATO summit our allies must step forward with anti-artillery weapons. In this respect we have been world-leading, but our counterparts are not pulling their weight. Just one-fifth of Germany’s promised (if very late) defensive weapons have arrived. Ukraine fights for our shared freedoms, and if our allies fail Ukraine now, they fail us all.

On the humanitarian side, just one word is needed to understand the depravity of Putin: Mariupol. Once a coastal hub for heavy industry and education, Ukraine’s besieged city has become a byword for the barbarity of his campaign.

Ninety per cent of its buildings are damaged or destroyed, and its population of just under half a million has been without food or water for days. Civilians are forced to drink sewer water and, last Wednesday, the city theatre – where women and children were sheltering – was destroyed by Russian air strikes. Satellite photos show that before it was hit, the Russian word for children, “DETI” had been spelled out in large letters by the building in the hope Russian pilots would find a conscience. Mariupol is Ukraine’s Aleppo.

However, there’s one enormous difference: aid agencies just aren’t on the ground working to preserve life and protect the vulnerable. The Government has just pledged another £80 million of aid, and the generosity and goodwill of British public is likely also in the millions.

But while we are giving, Ukraine is having difficulty receiving, as international agencies squabble over mandates and appallingly, the idea that Russian permission is needed to be on the ground. These same agencies were working on the ground in Syria, Libya and Afghanistan – why have they abandoned Mariupol? We must lead calls for international humanitarian bodies to step in to save lives; it is not enough to be in Lviv alone.

There is an equally dark element of this conflict that has been largely absent from reporting: rape and sexual violence. Survivors of sexual violence are too often silenced by the shame that is wrongly inflicted upon them. In Ukraine, women are being raped, and that almost certainly means that men and children are as well. There are reports of women over 60, those unable to get out, being raped and then hung or committing suicide. The International Criminal Court prosecutes crimes against humanity, including rape. The UK should lead efforts to expose and document these war crimes and support survivors.

As Putin grows more desperate, his use of thermobaric bombs and cluster munitions becomes more extensive, and we face the threat of chemical weapons use. We and our allies must determine now the repercussions Putin would face: we have a legal duty to intervene if chemical weapons are used, and that is a duty we must not fail.

Much has been made of the threat of Putin pressing his big red button, but this belies a much more likely reality. Ukraine has fifteen nuclear reactors, several of which are now controlled by invading Russian forces. Destroying a nuclear reactor is very difficult, but damaging a nuclear waste facility is frighteningly feasible, and any such incident would disperse radioactive particulates across Europe, reaching the UK, as they did following the Chernobyl disaster.

NATO and all freedom-loving nations must be resolute in telling Putin now, that any nuclear incident in Ukraine – no matter how extensive the false flags – will be met with the swiftest and harshest repercussions.

Whilst we rightly focus on Ukraine, we must not forget Putin’s wider ambitions and the potential of a second front in the Western Balkans.

Earlier this week, Russia’s Ambassador to Bosnia & Herzegovina threatened the country with the “same” as Ukraine. There is a fragile peace, one already under attack from Putin’s stooges such as the secessionist leader, Milorad Dodik.

Now is the time for NATO to prove that deterrence diplomacy can work, and prevent bloodshed on two fronts. Certain European countries disregarded the UK and US’s intelligence assessments on an invasion of Ukraine. At the NATO Summit we must ensure the same complacency and arrogance does not enable bloodshed in Bosnia.

It was a difficult goodbye last week. These courageous women travelled back to Ukraine knowing that Putin has put all Ukrainian MPs on one of two lists: a kill list, and those to be taken to Moscow.

One sentence our Ukrainian counterparts used repeatedly haunts me: “You will have no choice but to intervene, but this decision is being measured not in hours or days, but by the numbers of Ukrainians killed.” These brave MPs made their mark in Parliament this week, and did their country proud. When the war is over, and Ukraine has won, we’ll all meet again in Kyiv; but for now we must use this NATO summit to do all we can to hasten Putin’s defeat.

Adrian Lee: The Düsseldorf Agreement, when British industry almost got into bed with the Nazis

18 Mar

Adrian Lee is a Solicitor-Advocate in London, specialising in criminal defence, and was twice a Conservative Parliamentary Candidate.

The media is currently full of stories of Westerners who grew rich in the service of the Russian regime. Perhaps the tallest poppy to fall from grace is Gerhard Schröder, the former German Chancellor, who since leaving office in 2005 has served as Chairman of both the Russian energy giant Rosneft and Nord Steam AG.

Not for nothing is he regarded as the key figure in weening Germany onto the economic cocaine of cheap Russian gas, and thereby neutralising its political independence. Indeed, his close business relationship with Russia continued until the eve of the invasion of Ukraine: Schröder was nominated as a director of Gazprom in February 2022.

No wonder then that he has not only frequently spoken of his long-lasting friendship with Vladimir Putin, but once went so far as to state that he was convinced that the Russian President was “a flawless democrat”.

As years went by, Schröder never seemed to miss an opportunity to physically embrace Putin before the cameras whenever they publicly met. So close where they, that it reminded some Germans of the infamous 1979 photograph of Erich Honecker french-kissing Leonid Brezhnev in supposed “socialist fraternity”.

When Georgia was attacked by Russia in 2008, and when the Crimea was “annexed” in 2014, Schröder always had the same explanation: it was the West’s fault. At the start of February 2022, just a few weeks before Russia crossed the Ukrainian border, he accused the Zelensky government of “sabre-rattling”.

Unsurprisingly, the former statesman’s reputation has gone through something of a reassessment in recent weeks. On 1 March, Schröder’s entire office staff resigned in protest at their boss’s relationship with Russia. A week later, on 8 March, he faced two further blows.

Firstly, the German Social Democrat Party (which he once led and had been a member of since he was 19) initiated proceedings to expel him. Secondly, the Public Prosecutor General announced a formal investigation of his complicity in crimes against humanity, due to his senior role in Russian state-owned corporations. Whatever the eventual outcome, it is fair to say that Schröder’s personal reputation is unlikely to recover.

He is just the latest example of a prominent figure from a democracy who thought that it was desirable to trade with a dictatorship. Exactly 83 years ago this month, in March 1939, leading representatives of British industry signed “The Düsseldorf Agreement”, a trade pact that pointed the way towards closer commercial cooperation between Great Britain and the Third Reich. This late exercise in appeasement has largely been forgotten, and deserves closer re-examination.

The Federation of British Industries (FBI) started life in 1916 as the United British Industries Association, with a membership of 124 large firms. It soon became the leading British employers’ association, changed to the FBI moniker, and was duly incorporated by Royal Charter in 1923. It is still going today, but following merger with two smaller bodies, it again changed its name in 1965 to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), whom we all know and love.

First attempts to establish a trade deal between the UK and Nazi Germany began in July 1938. The FBI was in contact with its German counterpart, an organisation called Reichsgruppe Industrie (RI) and both agreed that the two governments would enter into negotiations as soon as possible regarding Anglo-German economic integration.

The next step was to organise a face-to-face meeting between industrialists from the two nations. This took place in London on 9 November between representatives of the British Board of Trade and the FBI and, on the German side, the Reich Ministry of Economics and RI.

By all accounts, things went well between them, and a firm date was pencilled in for a full conference to achieve a formal agreement. The overseas representatives then took their leave and returned to Germany.

Later that evening, the Nazis started burning synagogues as the officially sanctioned Kristallnacht pogrom began. Nevertheless, preparations continued for the big event (now planned for 15-16 March 1939 in Düsseldorf) and a further preliminary event was held in London between 21- 22 December. On this occasion, an agreement was reached on the establishment of Anglo-German coal cartel.

In February 1939, the British Government gave direct support to the forthcoming Düsseldorf negotiations by sending Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, director of the economics department at the Foreign Office and personal confidant of Neville Chamberlain, to Berlin for “consultations and preliminary investigations”.

The Nazis rolled out the red carpet for Ashton-Gwatkin. He was officially “received” during his visit by both Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s Foreign Minister, and Reichsmarshall Herman Göring, the so-called “Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan”.

The trip went so well that within days two British Ministers, Sir Oliver Stanley, President of the Board of Trade, and Robert Hudson, Minster for Overseas Trade, made their own “virtually unprecedented” pilgrimage to Berlin and hosted a banquet for representatives of British industry.

With the main conference fast approaching, a high-profile delegation representing all corners of British industry was assembled by the FBI and led by their President, Sir Peter Bennett. On the eve of their departure to Germany for the conference, they were told by Walter Runciman, Lord President of the Council, “Gentlemen, the peace of Europe is in your hands.”

The group then ventured to Düsseldorf, but if they detected that the German government was a little preoccupied with other matters when they arrived, they would have been correct. History records that on the night of 14 March, the Reich’s industrial supremo, Herman Göring, was busy inducing a heart attack in Emil Hacha, the visiting Czech President, by threatening to bomb his capital if he failed to surrender his country.

Next morning, on 15 March, as the British trade delegation arrived for the first session of the conference, German tanks were entering Prague. Still the conference went ahead and on the following day the Agreement was ready to be signed.

The document took the form of a 12-point declaration and envisaged “a world economic partnership between the business communities” of Britain and Germany. The declared aim was to prevent “destructive competition” by implementation of quotas, price fixing, market sharing and joint development schemes.

Different industries in both countries were to be encouraged to begin negotiations to form bi-lateral cartels. British manufacturers were to be compelled to organise themselves according to the desire of the State. The FBI and RI pledged to invoke the powers of their governments to force third-country industries to comply with the terms of the Anglo-German arrangement.

If the delegates returned home pleased with themselves, it was to be short lived. To their astonishment, the world had moved on and, shocked by Germany’s occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the Government decided not to ratify the Düsseldorf Agreement.

So, all of the FBI’s work had apparently been for nothing. However, not everyone went without recognition. Sir Peter Bennett, the FBI President who led the British delegation to Germany, was honoured by being elected to Parliament in December 1940, replacing Neville Chamberlain in Birmingham Edgbaston, and was later elevated to the peerage.

Sarah Atherton MP: Russia’s Ukraine war. We must review our army cuts, reconsider fracking – and park Net Zero

14 Mar

Sarah Atherton is a member of the Defence Select Committee and is MP for Wrexham.

The invasion of Ukraine is a dreadful, shameless crime, perpetrated by a corrupt leader entertaining a fantasy of rebuilding the old Soviet Union. In the same way that the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc were brought to an end by the brave people that lived there, we can only hope that Russia’s own people and the heroic people of Ukraine will defeat him. The occupation and destruction of a peaceful European nation in the twenty-first century is truly horrifying.

Events have also shown that the West and our shared defence aims have been left lacking: whilst Russia and China have built formidable military forces, used misinformation tactics to exert pressure and resorted to domestic genocide and international war crimes, one might say that the West has been too focused on woke minority issues.

There have also been signs of what was to come: the illegal annexation of Crimea, the Salisbury poisonings, and widespread allegations of election interference. But what did NATO do – as a defence organisation and military alliance – to counter these events?

Yes, there were stern words of condemnation and the expulsion of Russian diplomats, but the West’s responses to these events look now to have been lacking. If NATO is to prevent future aggressions, we must all have ‘big sticks’ to back up our words of diplomacy and our democracy.

Francis Fukuyama famously declared the post-Cold War era to be the ‘end of history’. There was an assumption that the threat of a European land war was over, and we have allowed ourselves to forget the hard-fought lessons of European history. We have sleepwalked into these current events, believing that the collapse of the Berlin Wall meant that we could take our eye off the defence of our nation. The ‘end of history’, the so-called ‘peace dividend’ of Thatcher and George H.W. Bush, has proved to be a false dawn.

Whilst I welcomed the recent Integrated Review and continue to believe it proposes a solid plan for the future, looking towards the Indo-Pacific whilst recognising the changing nature of warfare, we must fundamentally rethink our national and global aims in light of what has happened in Ukraine. The belief is that defence spending should be linked to the threat that the UK faces, and this is why I believe we should increase spending to at least three per cent of GDP. The Foreign Secretary said this recently, and I agree with her.

To start, we must reconsider the cuts to personnel – particularly to the infantry and our armoured capability.

But defence – and our nation’s safety – should also look at our reliance on foreign energy sources and supplies. To ensure that we are no longer reliant upon Russia, directly or indirectly, this Government has been right to rethink how we supply energy to our nation. Recent announcements are welcome but the Government must come up with more – and fast.

We must roll out a new generation of nuclear reactors, and quickly, and we should be re-assessing fracking and tidal enhancement. Radical new energy policies will take time to take effect, but the longer-term implications for energy security will be welcomed.

As part of this, we should also park, for the time being, the Net Zero endeavour. Of course, it can and should remain a long-term aim but ensuring that we can, as a nation, generate the energy we need without a reliance on overseas sources should come first.

In my constituency of Wrexham, we have a large and hardworking Polish community – the largest outside of London and a history dating back to World War Two. We should be engaging a similar welcoming spirit this time around by welcoming into our town, and nation, those displaced from Ukraine who are true European refugees and victims of Europe’s latest war. It is right that the Government are engaging and re-evaluating support for refugees as this crisis evolves.

The appalling invasion of a democratic and sovereign European nation in the twenty first century will change our lives forever. It has already caused a seismic shift in global politics. Just look at Germany, where Olaf Scholz’s has executed an about-turn on German domestic and international policy. Scholz’s decision to increase defence spending and cancel Nordstream 2 goes in the face of German political orthodoxy under Angela Merkel.

The Government is rightly considering how to act in the face of this new reality – because some of the decisions of 2021 are now up for debate.