Ben Roback: When the southern border opens, trouble will brew for Biden and Harris

14 Jul

Ben Roback is Head of Trade and International Policy at Cicero Group.

President Biden knows, just like his Democratic predecessors, that the immigration problem on the southern border is hard to solve. It almost certainly explains why he put Kamala Harris, the Vice President, in direct charge of the border, with one eye on re-election in 2024 and the possibility that his main Democratic challenger could be Harris herself. It is the most poisoned of chalices.

On this site before, I have written about whether controlling the influx at the border really matters to this administration. We are about to find out. The southern border is expected to reopen in a phased manner in the coming weeks.

While the thousands of miles that separate the USA and Mexico are often thought of as route to freedom for immigrants, it is also a critical trade artery linking two interconnected economies. The economic need to reopen the border has to be counterbalanced with concerns about security.

White House allies are worried that neither Biden nor Harris are ready for the logistical and humanitarian impact of opening the border. Politically, the real concern is the impact and optics of tens of thousands of migrants surging towards the border and claiming a right to live and work in the United States.

Currently and until restrictions change, the United States is limiting land border crossings from Mexico and Canada to “essential travel”. The list of what constitutes “essential” is not short, but what is clear is a shared desire to limit border crossings as much as possible over ongoing Covid concerns.

Restrictions are slated to remain in effect until 23:59 on July 21. Without an extension, legal land crossing for work and recreation will resume. Like night follows day, what will also resume is the attempted illegal border crossings that take place every year.

It is hardly a shock that the Biden administration will take a softer approach to immigration on the southern border compared to Donald Trump. Law and order, immigration control and border enforcement has been a Republican talking point and policy platform for decades. Democrats have tried harder to strike a balance between border control and creating a path to citizenship for children of immigrants.

The Obama administration created the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. Since that date, DACA has allowed more than 800,000 immigrant youth who came to the United States as children to temporarily remain in the USA, get an education and pursue gainful employment.

On June 15 this year – “DACA Day” – Biden gave a speech continuing his support for deferred citizenship. The House of Representatives passed the American Dream and Promise Act in March, and a draft U.S. Citizenship Act creates a pathway to citizenship for undocumented individuals in the USA, including Dreamers.

Are Democrats walking into a Republican trap?

Democrats want to create a legal pathway to citizenship for child immigrants. The progressive left is especially passionate about this cause and wants Biden and Harris to soften their tone on migrant caravans travelling through central America and arriving at the border.

Republicans wants to solidify the southern border and protect existing communities. Building new and enforcing existing border fencing was a top priority of Trump on the campaign trail and when president. It remains a central issue for the GOP.

With the mid-term elections next year and a presidential election in 2024, Republicans sense White House weakness and a political opportunity.

At this weekend’s Conservative Political Action Committee (CPAC) conference, Trump gave a vintage Trump speech. Among a long list of familiar gripes – stolen election, big tech, cancel culture – and some unfamiliar talking points – magnets, steam engines, toothbrushes – were repeated mentions of the “border”. Twenty three of them to be precise.

This matters because of how structurally central Trump is to the Republican Party. Trump comfortably outpolled the field in a straw poll at CPAC, with 70 per cent favouring him to run for the presidency in 2024. Trump’s approval rating amongst CPAC attendees was 98 per cent. Where he goes, others will follow.

Use the 45th president’s CPAC speech to better understand the themes on which Republicans want to fight the midterms and 2024 presidential election:

With the help of everyone here today, we will defeat the radical left, the socialists, Marxists, and the critical race theorists. Whoever thought would be even using that term. We will secure our borders. We will stop left wing cancel culture. We will restore free speech and fair elections, and we will make America great again. It’s very simple. Very simple.

Even if this White House take a gradual and phased approach to the border, the thorniest issues will persist. The ultimate dilemma is whether to hold immigrants in detention centres or release them as they await their court proceedings. The former results in a policy that progressives consider unacceptably inhumane and positively Trumpian. The latter can create a backlog which can take years to clear.

The Biden administration would do well to listen to voters, as well as its members

Biden is working hard to keep his Congressmen and Senators on side. With the Senate split 50-50, history dictates that the Democrats will lose their de facto majority in next year’s midterms. With that, the White House will lose the ability to get legislation approved in a simple up-and-down vote. So, keeping the caucus happy matters now more than ever.

A new poll by the National Republican Senate Committee and the Republican Governors Association showed 53 per cent of voters say they are less likely to support Democrats for Congress because of the increase in migrants at the border.

Can Biden keep his party happy while ensuring he does not gift political mileage on a favourite issue of his likely opponent in 2024, Trump? We will find out soon.

Daniel Hannan: London was always going to be fine post-Brexit. But now we must cut EU rules and allow it to prosper.

7 Jul

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere is a Conservative peer, writer and columnist. He was a Conservative MEP from 1999 to 2020, and is now President of the Initiative for Free Trade.

Brexit was never going to kill the City. It is a measure of how demented our culture war became after 2016 that that notion was ever seriously entertained. London gained the top spot through strong property rights, incorruptible courts, secure contracts, light-touch regulation and low taxes. Everyone understood that the system was impartial, that the rules would not be rigged against foreign companies, that all were equal under the law.

Those features allowed London to retain its pre-eminence despite the decline of sterling as a global currency, despite the Second World War, and despite the economic collapse of the 1970s. Companies from around the world recognised that the best and cheapest money markets were disproportionately concentrated in the Square Mile. EEC membership had little to do with it.

Eurocrats never saw things that way, of course. In their eyes, London was a parasite, moving money around while honest Europeans did the more “real” work of making cars, producing chemicals and ploughing fields. Brexit, they believed, was an opportunity to shift jobs to Paris, Frankfurt and Milan, and to divert the accompanying tax revenues to their own coffers.

Emmanuel Macron came to London and pitched directly for companies to relocate. His ministers set up offices to advise on the transition. Frankfurt expanded its English-language schools.

Meanwhile, Brussels set out to be as bellicose as possible. UK-based firms found that the letter of the law was suddenly being forced on them with a perversity that their Japanese or American rivals were spared. At the same time, the EU refused to grant equivalence to British financial services providers.

Equivalence – essentially an agreement to trust each other’s regulators – is a normal courtesy among advanced economies. The EU offers it to Brazilian, Chinese and Mexican companies. Britain, naturally, offers it to the EU. But the EU evidently believed that refusing to reciprocate might somehow asphyxiate London.

It didn’t work. This would have been obvious had it not been for the hysterical tone of Britain’s Europhile broadcasters, determined as they were to show that Brexit had been a catastrophe.

Every relocation of a UK job to the Continent was drooled over with a kind of excited despair, while almost no attention was paid to jobs moving the other way – or, indeed, new jobs being created. When, as a result of EU restrictions, Amsterdam briefly overtook London in the volume of shares being traded, there was terrific excitement; when London reclaimed its place last week, coverage was muted.

The EU’s strategy is self-harming. Protectionism always makes the state applying it poorer. Making it harder for continental firms to access London finance does more damage to the continental firms than to London. It also signals to the world that Brussels discriminates on the basis of nationality, subordinating prosperity to prejudice.

Had the EU been more adroit, it might have sought to make itself more attractive. Instead of denying Britain equivalence, it would have looked for ways to lower its own taxes and to reassure the world that it would not tilt the scales against foreign companies. But, for whatever reason, it cannot bring itself to think that way.

Don’t imagine for a moment, though, that London’s dominance is guaranteed. The City has no automatic right to the top slot. It must earn that place anew every day. Brexit doesn’t just allow the City to make its regulatory regime more competitive; it obliges it to do so.

As Andrew Bailey, the Governor of the Bank of England, put it earlier this year: “I’m afraid a world in which the EU dictates and determines what rules and standards we have in the UK is not going to work”.

There was an argument – a weak argument, in my view, but an argument – for matching some EU standards for the sake of equivalence. But when Brussels won’t recognise even our current rules, which are identical to its own, there is no argument whatever for holding back.

We should begin by repealing those EU rules which were opposed by the industry when they were brought in, even if, having now assimilated the compliance costs, some established actors have lost interest in repeal. We need to think of future businesses as well as existing ones. We should undo the parts of the EU’s MiFID 2 and Solvency 2 regimes that we opposed at the time, and scrap the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive and the short-selling ban.

More broadly, we need lighter-touch regulation. Many of our rules are still aimed at preventing the 2008 crash, rather than at facilitating future growth in fintech, green investment and digital trade. At the very least, we should make competitiveness an explicit part of the regulators’ mandate – certainly no less than stability, confidence or consumer protection. Other regulators, such as Singapore’s, take it for granted that boosting competitiveness is part of their role.

And let’s not be shy about cutting taxes in ways that will attract investment and so, over time, increase revenue. It is hard, on Laffer curve grounds, to justify the bank corporation tax surcharge or stamp duty on share trading. We also need to end the absurd rule which limits bonuses – thus whacking up bankers’ basic salaries and reducing the link between performance and pay.

Some of these reforms might be unpopular. But, with our public finances in the state they are in, we can’t afford to subordinate our recovery to the prejudices of focus groups. Financial services are, to Britain, what tourism is to the Maldives. As our mediaeval wealth rested on wool, so our modern wealth rests on banking, insurance and investment. I’m not asking you to like bankers and hedgies; I’m just asking you to recognise that they pay 10 per cent of Britain’s taxes.

The PM wants to show that Brexit has tangible benefits, and commissioned Iain Duncan Smith, George Freeman and Theresa Villiers to look at ways to raise our competitiveness. Their report in May set out a measured and realistic plan to do precisely this.

But, as anyone who has worked in politics will tell you, the real challenge is turning your vision into hard policies over the head of an often change-averse civil service. “Between the idea and the reality,” wrote T S Eliot, “Between the motion and the act falls the Shadow”. Between the speech and the implementation, between the report and the legislation, between the ambition and the deregulation – falls the Shadow.

Roger Gale: Special relationship or coercion? America’s approach to extradition is not the conduct of an ally.

5 Feb

Sir Roger Gale is MP for North Thanet.

A great deal has changed in the US since the election of President Biden. After just a couple of weeks in office he has made sweeping changes to both US domestic and foreign policy, from suspending the construction of the US-Mexico border wall to rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement. However, one thing that has not yet changed is the United States’ coercive use of extradition arrangements.

This became clear just two weeks ago when Biden reaffirmed the Trump administration’s refusal to extradite Anne Sacoolas to face trial for the killing of Harry Dunn. When a spokesperson for the Foreign Office said the refusal “amounts to a denial of justice”, they surely echoed the feelings of Britons up and down the country.

Unfortunately, this is part of a long pattern of the US exploiting the 2003 UK-US Extradition Treaty to exert extraterritorial influence, often in situations related to commercial disputes rather than the terrorism for which it was intended.

On too many occasions the US has sought to extradite British citizens for alleged crimes which have taken place entirely on UK soil. According to figures from June 2020, since 2007 the US has extradited 177 people from the UK, of which at least 99 were accused of non-violent crimes.

The majority of these have been white collar business people who pose no physical threat to UK or US citizens, and yet the US authorities have been allowed to exploit the law to suit their own purpose. In return the American authorities have handed over just 67 citizens to the UK to face trial in Britain.

This coercive approach to extradition, from a country that is one of our closest allies, illustrates why we must re-examine the asymmetry in the 2003 UK-US Extradition Treaty, made law in the Extradition Act 2003, as a matter of urgency.

To extradite from the US to the UK under the 2003 Treaty the UK has to produce prima facie evidence of a crime showing “probable cause”, but to extradite from the UK to the US only requires there to be “reasonable suspicion” and an indictment from a Grand Jury that meets in secret with the defendant not present. Similarly, the legal frameworks are worded to state that the US “may” extradite when requested, while the UK “must” extradite.

This means that, in reality, a UK defendant has to go to court to prove why they should not be extradited which is a reversal of the fundamental principle that a man or woman is innocent until proven guilty. This matters because, once extradited, it is significantly harder to mount a defence within a US justice system, under which an improbable 97 per cent of indictments end in conviction, often via the also coercive “plea bargain” process.

There have been academic arguments over the impact of the differences between the impact in the UK and the US of the 2003 Treaty and whether they represent an imbalance. This debate misses the point. What matters is how the force of law is applied in practice and whether it is being used appropriately and for the reason for which it was originally intended.

The latest pressing example of the problems with the use of the current system is the case of Dr Mike Lynch, whose extradition hearing is taking place next week. Lynch was CEO of Autonomy, a successful British software company which was acquired by the US company HP for $11.7 billion in 2011. After his departure as CEO of Autonomy in 2012, HP wrote down $8.8 billion of Autonomy’s value later that year, and the US is now seeking to extradite Lynch over allegations of fraud associated with the purchase.

Lynch is a British citizen who has lived in the UK throughout his whole life. He ran a UK company under UK law that was listed on the London Stock Exchange. The alleged conduct took place in the UK, and evidence and witnesses relating to the events are clearly available in the UK, as demonstrated by the long-running civil case that was tried in the High Court in 2019-20.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of that case, Lynch demonstrably poses no physical threat to the people of Britain or America. Extraditing him to the US, where his ability to defend himself would be severely curtailed, would run contrary to the Forum Bar protection which prevents extradition if a substantial amount of the alleged activity took place in the UK. It would also make a nonsense of the British judicial system.

The UK does not use its extradition arrangements to assert extraterritorial reach. Not with the US, not with any country. It is unimaginable that the UK would pursue an American person living in the US for actions that occurred in the US under US laws and US regulations. We, rightly, only pursue people, such as Sacoolas, who have fled the UK after being suspected of committing a crime here and not those who have acted entirely on US soil.

The Forum Bar was added to the Extradition Act in 2013 to protect British citizens against an overweening American Department of Justice and it gives UK courts the power to refuse extraditions if the UK is the more appropriate place for the case to be heard. Lynch’s case will test the extent to which the Forum Bar truly protects British citizens.

As we look towards a more global Britain and an evolving trading relationship with the US we must reflect on whether we can acceptably continue to operate under these conditions. How many more Britons who have never even set foot in the US will we allow to be exposed to the whims of the American court system?

The rejection of the extradition request against Lynch is a necessary and vital step towards re-establishing balance in what is at present an unjust agreement. Ultimately, treaty reform must be a long-term consideration if this Government is finally to rectify the issue of UK-US extradition and to honour its duty to protect British citizens.

Daniel Hannan: Ignore the Europhile sneers. Joining the Pacific bloc marks the rebirth of Global Britain.

3 Feb

Daniel Hannan is a writer and columnist. He was a Conservative MEP from 1999 to 2020, and is now President of the Initiative for Free Trade.

She’s unstoppable, that Liz Truss. The epidemic has put most Whitehall ministries in damage limitation mode, but the Department of International Trade is on a roll, signing 62 free trade agreements to date – plus, obviously, the deal with the EU itself.

Those who can’t bear the thought of Brexit succeeding are, naturally, scoffing. These deals, they say, are largely replicas of what we already had as EU members. Their new line of criticism is, I suppose, an improvement on the position that they took until 12 months ago, namely that we would barely be able to strike any deals at all.

But it’s still not true. Many of the “rollover” treaties go further in small ways: more generous quotas, fewer restrictions. True, these liberalisations are chiefly tokens of intent. But that intent is real. With limited capacity, our priority has been to negotiate new FTAs – that is FTAs with countries where the EU currently has no trade deals, such as Australia and the United States.

Where there are serviceable existing arrangements, we have tended to say, in effect: “Let’s leave things roughly as they are for now, and agree to come back to it next year”. Even in these cases, though, we have often taken the opportunity to go further. The UK-Japan deal, for example, is more comprehensive when it comes to services and cross-border data flows than the EU-Japan deal, even though the latter had only just entered into effect.

This week, Britain took a momentous step when it applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a free trade zone comprising Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.

Again, many Europhiles are sneering. Joining a Pacific trade pact, they say, defies geography. And it is of course true that Britain is not a Pacific country (other than in the technical sense of owning the Pitcairn islands). But we have exceptionally close links to a number of CPTPP members. Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Canada are common law, English-speaking nations. So, to a degree, are Brunei and Malaysia.

One of the arguments for Brexit was that, in the internet age, cultural proximity trumps physical proximity. That argument is stronger now than it was a year ago. The lockdown has habituated us to using Zoom or Teams for important discussions. When travel returns, it is hard to imagine that business people will be as ready to hop over to Düsseldorf for the day to make a presentation. If you’re online, Rotorua is no further than Rennes – indeed, nearer in the sense that it shares your language, legal system and accounting methods.

Another argument for Brexit was that, by global standards, the EU was a slow-growth region. That argument, too, is now looking stronger. Although we talk of the pandemic as a global event, the truth is that it hit Europe much harder than Asia, Africa or the Antipodes.

But the biggest difference between the EU and the CPTPP is that the latter is a trade agreement rather than a state-in-the-making. Its members simply seek to maximise their prosperity through greater specialisation and exchange. Joining the CPTPP does not involve making budget transfers to its poorer regions, or accepting the supremacy of its laws over our parliamentary statutes, or adopting a common flag, passport or anthem. Nor does it require a member to alter its standards on non-exported goods and services.

Viewed purely as a trade pact, the CPTPP is preferable to the EU because it elevates mutual recognition over harmonisation. The essence of the CPTPP is that its members agree to refrain from certain actions that would restrict free commerce. It is perfectly possible for CPTPP members simultaneously to have ambitious trade deals with each other and with the EU – as, for example, Japan and Canada do. On services and on professional qualifications, CPTPP uses a “negative list” approach. In other words, it assumes that whatever is legal in one state is legal in all the others unless it is expressly exempted in the treaty.

It is fair to say that the CPTPP is wide rather than deep. It does not go as far as, say, the Australia–New Zealand deal, which is arguably the most advanced on the planet. But, as Australia and New Zealand demonstrate, a deeper trade deal can nestle within a broader one.

Our aim should be to negotiate a deal similar to that which Australia and New Zealand enjoy with one another – assuming that is, that our protectionists in DEFRA and the NFU will let us. We should, in other words, seek both to participate fully in the CPTPP and, under its auspices, to secure even more ambitious agreements with the countries closest to us in terms of GDP per capita and regulatory interoperability – namely, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore.

Indeed, New Zealand, Singapore and Chile – three of the world’s greatest free-traders – are currently setting the pace when it comes to digital trade. If Britain peels itself away from the wary and watchful EU, which has never been comfortable with the free-wheeling nature of the internet, and joins these Hayekian states, it is likely to end up crafting standards on digital trade that every competitive country will want to adopt.

Finally, there is a geopolitical case for membership. Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Pacific deal at the last minute opened the door to China which, three months ago, created a rival trade pact with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and all ten members of ASEAN.

My guess is that the Biden administration will want to reverse Trump’s mistake. After all, many of its leading members had been involved with putting the Trans-Pacific Partnership together in the first place under Obama. British membership of the zone, as well as being in itself a useful counterweight to Beijing’s ambitions in the region, will set the context for UK-US trade talks.

To sum up, then, our CPTPP application will boost jobs and growth, strengthen the Anglosphere, improve the prospects for a bilateral American deal, accelerate our pivot to the fastest-growing markets on Earth, and elevate Global Britain. Not bad. Not bad at all.

Richard Holden: Biden’s inauguration this week boosts Britain’s new opportunity to pivot to the world

18 Jan

Richard Holden is MP for North West Durham.

Office of Richard Holden, Medomsley Rd, Consett.

Some readers will have seen and many more heard of the hit American musical, Hamilton. I saw it and loved so much that I went back again a few months later to see it a second time.

One of the songs that stuck with me, even though it isn’t one of the top tunes from the show, is called “One Last Time”. It’s about George Washington’s decision to step aside rather than continue to fight for further terms as President. Washington tells Hamilton that he’s doing so to teach the fledgeling republic “how to say goodbye.”

Sadly, the turmoil in the United States that has gripped the world in the last few weeks stands in stark contrast to Washington’s idealism. The vanity of a soon-to-be former President and the violent protests he caused are appalling.

And most shamefully, what could have been a moment of unity for the United States and a marker to the world about democracy and the peaceful transition of power has distracted from a real totalitarian government elsewhere: the moves by the Chinese Communist Party to end the democratic rights of the people of Hong Kong, plus its continued oppression of the Uighur people.

Amidst this melee, a new US President will be inaugurated. He has already signalled his intent to re-establish the role of the United States on the world stage. The United Kingdom is busily involved with this change, too, following Brexit and is rightly pursuing it – especially in relation to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP for short).

The global ‘pivot to the Indo-Pacific’ has been going on for some time, and CPTPP provides two things. Most importantly, reduced tariff barriers to a new free trade zone with the established (Australia, Canada, Japan etc) and emerging and growing (Vietnam, Mexico, Chile, etc) economies of the Pacific rim. Second, with 13 per cent of global GDP (16 per cent if the UK joins) working together, this provides a strong counter-weight that, if the UK joins, will be as large as China economically.

To take advantage of this emerging space of global power, the UK needs to demonstrate that we’re up for being a long-term partner to the region via the CPTPP. Importantly, such a move would ensure that we can retain our place, with our new-found status as a newly independent trading nation, as the pre-eminent global hub for business – especially legal and financial services and high specification manufacturing exports.

Critically, as the global coronavirus pandemic has shown too, we’ve got to both look at better domestic supply chains, but also at more diverse international supply chains. That means looking further than just China to broader partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. That’s especially critical as we push to be global champions of free trade and fighting protectionism – while also tied to a rules-based international system of countries that respect the rule of law,

Following Brexit, Liz Truss and her team at the Department of International Trade have been busily signing trade deals around the world – the ones that some people said we couldn’t do or would be wouldn’t be as good for Britain, but have proved quite the opposite. The UK already has or is in the late stages of, bilateral trade agreements with nine out of the 11 existing CPTPP member countries.

With UK investments in CPTPP countries at £98 billion, these countries accounting for £111 billion worth of UK trade in 2019  and trade growing at eight per cent a year, joining now opens the way to putting nitrous oxide into our tank for increase trade with the Indo-Pacific region.

With the CPTPP removing tariffs on 95 per cent of goods traded between members and cutting other barriers to trade, there would be boosts to such sectors such as the automotive one, which exported £3 billion in cars to the CPTPP countries last year. This is massively important to help level up our regions with good, private sector jobs, which are the basis for funding our public services.

With the United Kingdom having just taken up the presidency of the G7, a new US president in place imminently, and increasing revulsion around the world at the way China is treating both the Uighur people and the people of Hong Kong, there is a new opportunity. For a new internationalism with the twin aims of rules based international security and rules based international trade in which Global Britain can play a crucial role. Accessing the CPTPP and building those bridges worldwide is a natural next step that Britain should now take with confidence.

Ranil Jayawardena: The trade deals keep coming. And today, as the new EU agreement takes effect, we look forward to more.

1 Jan

Ranil Jayawardena is Minister for International Trade, and is MP for North East Hampshire.

In 2019, I voted against Theresa May’s deal three times. Not because I wanted to leave the EU with No Deal, but because I believed we deserved better. This was the view of the British people too and, as Boris Johnson, David Frost and their team have proven, a better deal was possible. It is this deal – in force from today – that unleashes Britain’s potential, at home and around the world.

We are no longer restricted by the EU and can demonstrate our true potential on the world stage. In the last few weeks, I am delighted that we have secured trade deals with our good friends in Kenya, Vietnam, Singapore, and many more. Just this week, we signed a trade agreement with Turkey, a major win for British automotive, manufacturing and steel industries. These deals are only the tip of the iceberg in our mission to establish a truly Global Britain, leading from the front and championing free and fair trade.

In just two years, the United Kingdom has agreed trade deals with 63 countries outside the EU, from Japan and South Korea to Moldova and Mexico. This in itself is an unprecedented achievement, as no other country has ever negotiated so many trade deals simultaneously.

We’ve secured preferential trading terms for some £217 billion in non-EU bilateral trade, including the deal we signed with Japan – negotiated in record time and virtually – which guarantees better provisions for our world-leading services, digital and data sectors.

Britain is – once again – an independent trading nation, free to look beyond the horizon and seize the opportunities out there. It is through trade that she can build ever stronger partnerships around the world that not only generate economic value but, importantly, support our values – protecting our natural environment, defending democracy, and helping to transform the lives of people less fortunate around the world for the better.

We have now secured 97 per cent of the trade value that we set out to reach agreements for first, beyond the EU. And there’s more to come. Trade talks – as will now be apparent to all – often go down to the wire.

Laying the foundations for ambitious new trade deals

These agreements provide a strong foundation for our future trading relationships as we look to strengthen further trade ties globally through negotiating new and ambitious free trade agreements. By working together with forward-looking, like-minded nations, we will secure ambitious trade deals that benefit great British businesses, keep consumers in mind, and drive economic growth globally.

Our United Kingdom-Canada continuity trade deal signed this month slays the foundations – and secured commitment – to begin negotiating a bespoke British deal this year.

And our United Kingdom-Mexico deal enshrines our commitment to start negotiating a new trade deal with our Mexican friends too, which will secure even more benefits for British industry, and go further in areas of mutual interest such as data, digital trade, services and intellectual property.

That’s in addition to our ongoing negotiations with United States, Australia and New Zealand.

And our deal with Kenya, delivers long-term certainty, and preferential conditions, for businesses in both countries, benefitting consumers and investors, and supporting economic development. The deal has been constructed in such a way that other countries in East Africa will be able to join it and benefit their own people whenever they are ready.

Many of these deals and negotiations are significant steps towards Britain’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) too, to which we aim to apply for formal accession in early 2021.

Joining the CPTPP would put Britain at the heart of an increasingly influential trade network of 11 dynamic economies in the Asia-Pacific region that already accounts for 13 per cent of global GDP and would rise to 16 per cent with our accession. This is a trade network that doesn’t tell countries how to govern themselves nor how they can trade with their friends – but it does help remove tariffs on 95 per cent of goods.

All of this is ultimately good news for great British manufacturers, producers and exporters, supporting jobs in every corner of the United Kingdom. But it is not just our businesses that will benefit. British consumers will be able to continue to enjoy cheaper household goods on supermarket shelves from Chilean Wine to Kenyan Tea.

We have secured all this against the odds and facing unprecedented challenges.

The deals we’ve done are just the beginning, but they do set out clearly our ambition as a free trading nation to champion British interests and push for ambitious and forward-thinking trade partnerships. And that’s why I have been getting into the detail with our friends in India and the subcontinent, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Mercosur.

Our future trading relationships, over the next few years, will be based on strong relationships and will be all about the detail.

Global Britain in the years ahead

Having served as the Conservative Party’s Deputy Chairman – and Vice-Chairman previously, with responsibility for policy – I enjoyed meeting Party members, listening to Parliamentarians, and working with the Cabinet and advisers in devising our manifesto ahead of the General Election, then campaigning on it on the doorsteps of constituencies across the country.

One of its clear promises was to secure free trade deals with countries that cover 80 per cent of our trade within three years – and it is good news that we are well on our way. All the folks at the Department for International Trade have been working flat out to strike the trade deals we have.

But it is clear that, now more than ever, we must also look to new markets, to help diversify our trade routes and supply chains in regions like Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.

As Britain lifts her eyes for the first time in almost 50 years, our guiding principle over the next few years will remain the same; we will negotiate new trade deals that champion the interests of British businesses and the British people.

Global Britain is here, and is ready to show the world her true potential once again.

Iain Dale: Your Brexit trade talks countdown. Fifteen days left until transition ends fully.

18 Dec

Iain Dale presents the evening show on LBC Radio and the For the Many podcast with Jacqui Smith.

As I write my final column of 2020, the Brexit free trade negotiation is still not done.  Recent indications were that it will be, although their fate stlll seems swing back and forth.

But surely it has to be settled very soon if any deal is to be ratified by January 1st. I wouldn’t put it past the European Parliament to put a last minute spanner in the works, and declare that MEPs haven’t had time to scrutinise it. Let’s hope it doesn’t get to that.

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This week, Liz Truss signed a trade agreement with Mexico, a country we do £7 billion worth of trade with each year.

I’m going to be honest, and say that I was rather surprised when she topped the ConHome list of cabinet ministers last month but, when you think about it, she’s quietly got on with her job, and done what she’s there to do – sign trade agreements.

We’ve now got rollover agreements with most of the G20 countries which the EU already had a trade agreement with. I remember the days when Remainers said this would be impossible to do.

Well, Truss has proved the opposite.No grandstanding, no fuss, just getting on with it. When she was appointed, I thought it was a strange one, but she’s risen to the challenge and proved herself.

Only six months ago, she was being tipped for the chop in a reshuffle. If she were ditched now, it would be incredibly unfair. When people prove themselves in a job, it’s often a good idea to leave them there – and the next twelve months are going to be absolutely vital in the promotion of Global Britain. It would be no time for a trade novice.

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The announcement on Wednesday of the four nation approach to Covid restrictions over Christmas was a disaster from a communications viewpoint. To try to pretend, as the Prime Minister did, that the policy and guidelines remained unchanged was ridiculous, and further undermined the government’s approach.

When circumstances change – and they have changed since the initial announcement of the Christmas rules on December 2 – it would be wholly reasonable to change approach, even if there might be a political backlash.

Infections are rising in large parts of the country, as are hospital admissions. Death numbers are rising again, too. In those circumstances, would surely be reasonable to tighten the guidelines. Other European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands have done it. It’s called leadership.

Boris Johnson appears to think the British public wouldn’t swallow it. All the polling suggests that they would. There will always be people who ignore anything the Government says and deliberately do the exact opposite, but most people do take notice of what Ministers and scientists say.

We know from the spike that happened after Thanksgiving in the America what happens when families get together. The virus spreads. And that’s what is undoubtedly going to happen over Christmas.

Would we be having this five day long super-spreader event, were it not for this annual holiday? No, of course we wouldn’t. In fact, I suspect much more severe measures than Tier Three would be imposed.

So when we get to the middle of January and we’re getting 40-50,000 new infections a day, and at the end of that month the death rate climbs to more than a thousand a day, many people will look back and blame the Prime Minister directly for it.

You can explain all you like that it’s individual people’s lack of discipline or adherence to the safety measures but the commentators and scientists will blame one person: Johnson.

I hope he’s got a good explanation ready. Having said all that, it will be interesting to compare infection rates in January in Wales with those of the rest of the UK. Mark Drakeford has said only two families may meet over Christmas rather than three, and is criminalising anyone caught breaching the limit. Nicola Sturgeon hasn’t gone that far, but she’s advising people only to meet on one day, with no overnight stay.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister is saying that just because you can doesn’t mean you should, and that we should all enjoy a smaller, shorter Christmas. In essence, he’s trusting the people to do the right thing. In normal circumstances, that ought to be the right message. In this case, that message has been undermined, yet again, by a lack of clarity. It’s something I suspect we’re all going to live to regret.

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As this is my final column of the year, let me conclude by wishing you all a very Happy Christmas – and let’s hope that 2021 is a much better year for all of us and the country.

What would President Biden and Vice President Harris mean for the Special Relationship?

12 Aug

Ben Roback is Head of Trade and International Policy at Cicero Group.

Contrary to some of the analysis of late, Joe Biden is by no means a shoo-in for the presidency in November. Nationally, polls are tightening and at the same point with 84 days to go in 2016, Hillary Clinton’s lead in the Five Thirty Eight polling average was 6.6 per cent. The Biden campaign will begin to face accusations of losing momentum if Donald Trump continues to chip away at his lead. On that basis, it makes sense that Biden has sought to wrestle back the narrative by announcing Senator Kamala Harris as his running mate. If the Biden-Harris ticket is victorious in November, the White House will look like a very different place to the current occupants of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Biden on Britain and Brexit

Biden is no Brexiteer like Trump. Biden and his old boss, President Obama, fell into line with David Cameron when they effectively backed the Remain campaign by declaring an independent UK would be at the “back of the queue” when it came to negotiating a US trade deal. The day after the EU referendum in 2016, Biden was in Dublin and remarked “We’d have preferred a different outcome”.

Nevertheless, the political imperative of the Special Relationship means there is no chance that Biden would abandon the UK on day one of his presidency. On the contrary, one would expect a presidential visit to London, Edinburgh, Belfast and Dublin within the first six months of President Biden’s tenure. It is the final two stops of that likely trip that provide the most interesting topics for discussion.

Both presidential candidates have direct links to the UK. Donald Trump is an Anglophile and reveres his Scottish heritage. Biden’s proximity lies in Ireland. His great grandfather, James Finnegan, emigrated from County Louth as a child, in 1850. In advance of his 2016 visit to Ireland, Biden said: “James Joyce wrote, ‘When I die, Dublin will be written on my heart. Well, Northeast Pennsylvania will be written on my heart. But Ireland will be written on my soul.’” On a purely personal basis therefore, we have grounds for optimism that the Special Relationship is in safe hands no matter the election outcome.

Negotiating a US-UK FTA in a Biden presidency

Biden would almost certainly cool some of the Trump White House’s more aggressive trade policies such as obstructing the work of the World Trade Organization. But Biden’s 40 years of political experience means he knows which way the wind is blowing on trade. He will want to ensure any deal is seen to protect US jobs and domestic production, while maximising export potential.

What is more, Harris, Biden’s newly announced running mate, has said she would oppose any trade deals that don’t include high labour and environmental standards. She opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2016 citing insufficient protection for US workers.

That rings alarm bells for those hoping the UK could ascend to the CPTPP – assuming the United States would do the same – therefore subverting the need for a bilateral US-UK FTA. Furthermore, Harris has little experience of the Special Relationship to speak of. On the foreign policy section of her website, she lists as “key partners” Japan, India, Mexico, and Korea. The UK is conspicuous in its absence for a potential future Vice President of the US

Where Washington and Westminster could align

In four clear instances we see Washington and Westminster aligning under the prospective leadership of Biden and Johnson respectively.

First, the Trump campaign and Republican Party are trying to paint Biden as a puppet of China. Consequently, he is being pushed into a more hawkish corner. That will mean alignment with an increasingly Sino-scepetic Downing Street and Parliament. Trump initially courted Chinese President Xi Jinping but since then has made an aggressively anti-China stance a key plank of his presidency. Having banned Huawei from our 5G infrastructure, Downing Street looks set to be largely in lockstep with Washington regardless of the outcome in November.

Second, Johnson’s government has shown little interest in entertaining Trump’s more excessive foreign policy ideals. The Trump administration has done its best to erode the World Trade Organization, considering it too kind to China. Conversely, Johnson has nominated Liam Fox to be its next Director-General. Both Fox and his successor at DIT, Liz Truss, extol the virtues of global trade and the rules-based international order that governs it. The British government aspires to be an invisible link in the chain that connects trading nations. In that regard, Biden would be supportive.

Third, environmental policy is one area in which Johnson and Trump do not see eye to eye. The stark divergence in approach has become an awkward rift between the two allies. The UK was a key supporter of the Paris Climate Accord from which Trump removed the US. As the Chair of the COP26 summit in Glasgow, Downing Street would undoubtedly favour a US President who considers climate change one of the world’s biggest and most pressing priorities. That only applies to Biden.

Lastly, Iran. As Foreign Secretary, Johnson failed in his attempt to persuade the Trump administration to stay in the Iran nuclear deal. Biden would rejoin it in a heartbeat, having been a part of the Obama administration who orchestrated it in the first place.

In summary, the Special Relationship will endure irrespective of the winner in November. Built on a shared understanding and common values, the relationship transcends presidents and prime ministers. On China, the US and UK look set to form an even closer alliance alongside their Five Eyes allies. That is something both Trump and Biden appear to agree on.

Alexander Stafford: Renewables – not just providers of green energy, but enablers of levelling up

15 Jul

Alexander Stafford is MP for Rother Valley.

In every conversation around the clean recovery there is, rightfully, a tendency of NGOs and commentators to look at how we can take the steps needed to achieve our net zero ambition. Job-rich initiatives such as energy efficiency and EV charging development are particularly alluring. The development of green hydrogen is promoted as strongly for its regional growth benefits as much as its importance for decarbonising heat.

The potential role of renewables in the green recovery is celebrated, but often overlooked. But it is these that are already driving jobs in the North of England and would help with this Government’s “levelling-up agenda”, as well as being the most publicly popular.

The Government has an ambitious target of 40GW of offshore wind by 2030, which will bring over £50 billion of investment into the UK over the next decade. The industry is already transforming ports across the country such as Grimsby, Great Yarmouth and Tyneside, employing thousands in high-wage high-value jobs and supporting our levelling up ambitions.

What’s more, as the cheapest large-scale new power source, the offshore wind that the UK will be building in the coming years, and indeed the onshore wind and solar, will be helping the British economy stay competitive.

Our competitive market framework of Contract of Difference auctions has ensured consumers get the lowest cost renewables, whilst supporting the development of a world-leading supply chain. New companies like Tekmar in Sedgefield have emerged as world-leaders in cables. Traditional oil and gas companies such as James Fisher, headquartered in Barrow-in-Furness, have found new contracts servicing offshore wind farms. However, we could be doing much more to support the development of the UK’s supply chain.

The Prime Minister is looking for infrastructure investment which will unlock future regional growth. The next generation of offshore wind turbines will be almost as tall as the Shard, so it is essential that we re-develop our ports so that they’re able to handle these incredible machines and their component parts.

Similarly, our manifesto rightly saw the opportunity of floating offshore wind, and the Government is looking at the CfD reform needed to develop it. We are well placed to become world leaders, with an established wind industry supply chain, expertise, and great wind resources. There’s the potential to power millions of homes by developing floating offshore wind in the Celtic Sea and deep in the North Sea, but we need to invest in ports like Milford Haven and Nigg to do so – vitally, to maximise the development of the UK supply chain in the process.

We know proactive industrial strategy works in renewables. It was a mixture of market opportunity and Government support that unlocked £310 milliom of private investment in the Siemens Gamesa blade factory in Hull, which now employs over a thousand people, 96 per cent of whom live within a 30 mile radius of the factory.

We need to reignite bilateral conversations with major supply chain companies, and set up a policy environment that better supports the vast number of UK SMEs. Test facilities like the ORE Catapult in Blyth are fantastic in allowing UK innovators to trial new products on wind turbines but, once they’re proven, we will need to ensure the grants, tax relief or financial de-risking schemes are in place which help these innovators to scale-up their businesses.

Increasing our research and development funding to the levels of competitor countries like Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Japan will ultimately ensure UK’s companies are at the forefront of innovation and remain competitive in the global market.

When the global market in offshore wind is set to increase to at least £30 billion a year by 2030, we should be increasing our export ambitions and the support that government gives companies in entering these global markets.

Just as Denmark has an ecosystem of multiple agencies working to boost renewable exports, we too should work across Government. We’re rightly levering our role as COP President and world leadership in offshore wind to encourage countries such as Brazil, Mexico and India to take advantage of their vast wind and seabed resources too. We do so for the future of the world’s climate. But we should also acknowledge that, in doing so, we’re developing markets for our supply chain companies, and departments should act accordingly.

Finally, and most importantly,  the Government shouldn’t lose sight of the importance of also ensuring that people are re-skilled so they can take advantage of the jobs we create through the nurture of our renewables sector. We need to manage the transition.