Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Stephen Booth: Why the row about the Northern Ireland Protocol suggests that the EU’s position isn’t quite as strong as it likes to think

17 Sep

Stephen Booth is Head of the Britain in the World Project at Policy Exchange.

It is often said that Brexit is low on the list of the EU’s priorities. That national capitals have not been fully engaged in a process which they have delegated to Michel Barnier and the European Commission. The introduction of the Government’s Internal Market Bill has certainly got the EU’s attention.

The events of the last two weeks have upped the ante, but the two sides continue to talk and a deal between the UK and the EU is still possible, if the political appetite is there.

As I noted in my previous column, the negotiations over a new UK-EU free trade agreement have been locked in a stalemate over fishing and state aid for weeks, and a compromise can only be unlocked by high-level political intervention.

At the same time, a parallel, and up to now seemingly boring, process has been underway to implement the Withdrawal Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. It has long been clear that the UK and the EU have significant disagreements to resolve in the Joint Committee, the forum established under the Withdrawal Agreement empowered to iron out the practical details of the Protocol’s implementation.

In its May 2020 Command Paper on the subject, the UK identified its practical concerns. For example, under the Protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to the Union’s Customs Code, which requires exit summary declarations for goods leaving the area to which the rules apply.

However, the UK’s view is that export or exit summary declarations should not be required for NI to GB trade (since Article 6 of the Protocol states that nothing in the Protocol should prevent NI businesses from having “unfettered access” to the rest of the UK).

Removing this requirement should not be particularly controversial, since Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory (as stipulated in Article 4 of the Protocol) and therefore any risk of complaints about the arrangements in terms of international obligations should rest with the UK, rather than the EU.

Another, more significant issue is the status of goods travelling from GB to NI deemed to be “at risk” of entering the EU (and therefore subject to EU tariffs). The Joint Committee is tasked with defining which goods are “at risk” and therefore broadening the scope of goods that would not be subject to tariffs. However, the default is that goods are “at risk”, unless the Joint Committee agrees otherwise.

The powers taken in the Internal Market Bill are advertised as an “insurance policy” to be used in the event of failure to address the UK’s concerns about the Protocol (which include the state aid provisions as well as exit summary declarations) via agreement within the Joint Committee and/or via a free trade agreement. There are reports that the Government plans to use the forthcoming Finance Bill to give itself similar powers with regard to tariffs.

Leaving aside the legalities and the domestic politics for a moment, why might the UK have decided to initiate a row with Brussels now and pre-empt the Joint Committee process? Of course, we cannot divine the precise motivation. Perhaps no deal is now seen as an inevitable, or at least probable, outcome by some in Government? But the logic of the negotiations offers another plausible rationale.

Implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the wider free trade negotiations are theoretically on distinct tracks. While the Withdrawal Agreement committed both parties to seek to negotiate a free trade agreement in good faith, the Protocol comes into effect at the end of the transition period irrespective of any UK-EU trade agreement.

However, it is clear from the way the negotiations have been structured (at the strong insistence of Brussels) that the trade negotiation and the practical functioning of the Protocol are linked, and this gives the EU leverage over the trade negotiations. Since EU negotiators are not obliged to reach compromises in the Joint Committee on the issues causing the UK concern, they are able to hold the process up in order to apply pressure to the UK in the wider trade negotiation. Just because the EU is within its rights to do so, does not mean it should.

What the Government is doing, for better or worse, is to suggest to the EU that its leverage is not quite as strong as it would like to think. Ultimately, under the Protocol it is UK officials and agencies who will be tasked with enforcing EU rules. Realistically speaking, how plausible is it that the UK would do so zealously in a scenario where not only have the UK and the EU failed to reach a trade agreement, but the EU is also insisting on its maximalist interpretation of the Protocol?

The UK might have made this point more subtly if it had made clear that any measures it takes in the future would be strictly consistent with Article 16 of the Protocol, which allows either party to take unilaterally “appropriate safeguards” if the application of the Protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, and its pre-existing commitments under the Good Friday Agreement.

Equally, it should also be noted that the UK is not declining to implement other important aspects of the Protocol. Indeed, as Michael Gove noted in closing Monday’s debate and Brandon Lewis repeated in committee evidence yesterday morning, the UK is erecting border-inspection posts for sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks on goods entering Northern Ireland, which in an ideal world it would not have to and despite the opposition of the DUP.

Ultimately, what this row demonstrates is that a negotiated settlement on the Protocol and the wider trade issues should be preferable for both sides compared to an acrimonious breakdown in the UK-EU relationship. Indeed, the UK legislation introduced this week would be redundant if compromises can be reached.

A Protocol that is politically sustainable is in the EU’s interests. Equally, a UK-EU trade agreement would not remove all of the irritations thrown up by the Protocol but it could certainly help to smooth over some of the important issues. If there are no tariffs between the UK and the EU, there is less risk to the EU of goods entering the Single Market at a lower tariff. If the EU and UK reach agreements on SPS, like the EU has with New Zealand, then paperwork could be simplified. Equally, establishing a UK domestic subsidy regime, recognised by the EU in a free trade agreement, would help prevent the “reach back” of the state aid provisions in the Protocol that are also of concern to the UK.

Only time will tell if this episode is the beginning of the path to a deal or the point when things turned sour.

Profile: Erin O’Toole, the genial and reassuringly dull Conservative who could soon be Prime Minister of Canada

9 Sep

When the editor of ConHome, swift to discern a new trend, commissioned me to write a profile of Erin O’Toole, I confess I had no idea who he was talking about.

Brexit has prompted a renewed interest in the politics of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, previously seen as countries from which the United Kingdom had diverged.

But of those three countries, Canada has so far attracted the least coverage, and O’Toole’s election on 23rd August as leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, so as Leader of the Opposition and perhaps within a few months Prime Minister, was pretty much ignored in the British press.

Even in Canada, the result did not cause wild excitement. For although the Prime Minister since 2015, Justin Trudeau. has led, since last October’s general election, a minority government, which means there is a strong possibility of new elections, perhaps next spring, which the Conservatives might win, O’Toole’s manner is unexciting.

He a calm, genial, avuncular figure, and although, at 47, he is a year younger than Trudeau, he has the decency to look and sound a generation older.

If Canadians want someone who will stand up, in a stalwart but good-humoured way, for old-fashioned good manners against liberal iconoclasm, they will turn to O’Toole.

Here is a passage from his acceptance speech, delivered in the middle of the night after he won the leadership. He refers to his wife, Rebecca, and speaks quite often in French, while apologising for his English accent:

“Je suis né à Montréal et j’ai grandi en Ontario. J’ai appris mon français dans les Forces Armées Canadiennes. Et oui, je parle comme un anglo… mais un anglo qui respecte les francophones et qui est fier du français dans notre pays. Je suis en politique pour me battre pour tous les Canadiens et nos deux langues nationales.

“Like millions of Canadians, Rebecca and I have been juggling a lot of jobs lately. With our kids at home, COVID has made us appreciate teachers more than ever before.

“My mother, who passed away when I was nine, was a teacher. And, throughout my life, I have wished she was here to give me advice.  Right now, I wish she were here to see her child succeed.  But, I know she is here tonight because I can see her in my daughter who shares her name.”

O’Toole’s father worked for General Motors for 30 years, and from 1995 to 2014 was a member of the provincial assembly in Ontario.

This was an example of public service which the son decided to follow. But first he joined the Canadian air force, in which he hoped to serve as a pilot, but instead found himself selected to be navigator on “an old, antiquated helicopter”, rising to the rank of captain.

“You learn more from your setbacks than from your successes,” he said afterwards.

He loves the armed forces, and that indispensable extension of the armed forces, the Merchant Navy. While glancing down O’Toole’s Twitter feed, I came across a message from a few days ago adorned by the Canadian flag and the Union Jack, which said in English and French:

“Let us always remember the courage and determination of our Merchant Navy. We will never forget those we have lost and the service and sacrifice of our brave women and men in uniform.”

I was brought up on such sentiments. How wonderful to find them being expressed in 2020, by the man who might be the next Prime Minister of Canada.

On leaving the air force, he read law, and was soon profitably employed as a lawyer. In 2014, Bev Oda, the first Japanese Canadian MP and Cabinet minister, resigned her seat in Durham, north-west of Toronto, after being found to have made unacceptable expenses claims.

O’Toole’s father still represented Durham at provincial level. The son won the by-election to represent Durham in Ottawa.

He was soon made Minister of Veterans’ Affairs, his predecessor having infuriated the veterans. The new minister, who had taken a close interest in the welfare of veterans and had set up a mental health charity in that field, calmed things down.

In 2917, when he was still ordinary enough to pretend not to be a career politician, O’Toole ran for the Conservative leadership. He came third, but gained respect for declining to hurl personal abuse at his rivals, and was rewarded with the foreign affairs portfolio.

Andrew Scheer, victor of that contest, failed in 2019 to overthrow Trudeau, and was forced to stand down. O’Toole stood again, struck an angrier note than he had before, obtained the endorsement of Jason Kenney, the celebrated Premier of Alberta, and won by positioning himself as a True Blue Conservative who made right-wing noises without, generally speaking, committing himself to anything so inconvenient as right-wing policies.

He has, however, for several years been a firm supporter of CANZUK, the projected alliance between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

And he is in favour of eliminating the budget deficit, increasing child benefit, cutting and simplifying taxes, building the pipelines which are such a divisive issue in Canadian politics, and taking a hard line on China.

Conrad Black, one of the few Canadian pundits of whom readers of ConHome will almost certainly have heard, said in a recent piece for The National Post that O’Toole

“has the minor distinction of being the first holder of his position since John Bracken, who led the Progressive Conservatives in the 1945 general election, that I have never met. But I think his chances of success are quite promising, for several reasons. First, he is a confident man and has a largely self-made career… In addition to self-confidence and tactical skill, O’Toole appears to have an intuition about where the voters are… He is a bit ordinary, but so are most people (and most politicians).”

To get a better idea of O’Toole, and what might be called his dull quick-wittedness, it is worth watching his accomplished performance on Maclean’s 60-second challenge.

And here for purposes of comparison is Trudeau.

Which will the Canadians prefer? One can’t help feeling that Boris Johnson, so keen to cultivate his Australian contacts, may have missed a trick by failing to send his congratulations to O’Toole.

Howard Flight: From rising demand for out of town housing, to increases in savings, the Covid trends to look out for.

31 Aug

Lord Flight is Chairman of Flight & Partners Recovery Fund and is a former Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury.

I expect the UK to emerge from this Covid-related economic and health shakeup with permanent major changes of behaviour. These should in turn impact on the values and relative prices of goods and services.

The first most obvious area is housing, house prices and where you live. The discovery with modern communication and technology that people can work at least three days a week from home without their output suffering looks set to release a large “working from home” revolution, particularly in London and the home counties.

As a friend recently commented to me, it is a pleasure to be living most of the time in the country; it adds two hours a day to his free time and £500 per month (effectively tax free) to his disposable income.

This implies, longer term, upward price pressure on out of town housing and downward relative pressure on city centre properties. Also surely the correct economic policy for the rail operators would be to reduce fares to encourage greater usage of the network?

This economic crisis has already unleashed a significant increase in the savings rate – in the home counties plus £2,000 pa per person and rising. The main reason looks to be fear of unemployment, but there is also, clearly, a risk of interest costs rising substantially at some stage in the not too distant future.

A relatively permanent increase in the savings rate implies bad news for the service sector. Higher savings are likely to be made across the young, middle aged and older sections of the community where the latter is helping to finance the young.

Savings should logically be the largest amongst the middle aged part of the population. We are likely to see the young as the key inventors; the middle aged as the investors, and the older part of the population financing the young and predominately financing new investment.

A trend which is not yet apparent is the relative performance of Greater London versus the “Rest”. House price and interest rate developments leave London relatively less affluent and the rest of the country better off.

An apparent trend is a greater interest in education by both the young and their parents – particularly amongst the rising immigrant community who have been performing extremely well academically. This should be good for the economy.

The Conservative Government has had a rough time, at least half of this, their own fault. As the General Election witnessed, and I believe is still the case, the electorate is not interested in Communism. What it wants, particularly, is what is perceived as “fairness”.

Fairness is not just financial fairness. As the Government’s education blunders have witnessed, young students, their parents, teachers and many Conservative members of Parliament have been driven by the wish to see fairness as amongst the young effected.

As Liz Truss, the Secretary of State for International Trade, has commented, fairness is the main case for free trade. After joining the EU, we fell behind our allies in terms of trade; now we have the chance to change this.

We are in a series of negotiations with the US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand to strike new, fair free trade agreements and lower tariffs for our exporters. Talks with all four are progressing well. Round Four of the US negotiations starts soon.

From Japan we have consensus on the major elements of a deal that will go beyond the agreement the EU has with the country. We aim to have agreement in principal by the end of August. Round two of talks with Australia start in mid September and the second round of discussions with New Zealand start a month later.

These deals are an important step towards accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement which will hitch Britain to one of the fastest growing parts of the world.

CPTPP reduces tariffs on 95 per cent of goods between members and also sets high standards in areas like digital trade and data. Membership will help put Britain at the centre of a network of free trade agreements where parties treat each other fairly, play by the rules, and help make us a hub for businesses trading with the rest of the world.