Pieter Cleppe: The EU, Spain and arbitration – and why it should spare us lectures on the sanctity of international law

21 Jun

Pieter Cleppe is an EU policy analyst, based in Brussels, a research associate at various think tanks, and the editor-in-chief of BrusselsReport.eu.

With Boris Johnson having secured his job for now, attention returns to the ongoing tussles between the UK and the European Union – and Government has published plans to change the Protocol section of the Brexit deal. The goal is to make it easier for some goods to move between Britain and Northern Ireland. The EU is against this, as it claims this would break international law.

So what are the merits of these plans? And how unreasonable is the UK to tear up an international deal after having agreed it?

Yes, the UK signed up to checks in the Irish sea in return for avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, but the actual extent of the checks was never agreed. The understanding was that both sides would be reasonable and meet each other somewhere.

Surely this should not be so hard. If the EU is actually worried about goods sneaking into its Single Market – a fair concern – it ought to double down on checks in the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, the two big entry gates, not some back alley in Northern Ireland. According to the Mayor of Antwerp, both ports are “leaking like a sieve”.

The EU claims that its proposal amounts to minimising checks. However, what is often lost in this debate is that the EU has attached a stringent condition to ‘minimising checks’. It is demanding that, in return, the UK agrees to a Swiss-style deal on animal and plant standards, which would require the UK to continue to align its regulations with the EU’s.

As Daniel Hannan has argued, this, therefore, does not amount to a concession but to an extra demand, stating: “the real threat is this lamentable tendency in Brussels to think of the UK as a renegade province that needs to be brought to heel rather than as a strategic ally”.

This is really unfortunate, given that the EU could simply offer to minimise checks without making extra demands for regulatory alignment. Due to the standoff, the political situation in Northern Ireland is becoming even more complex than it already was. The Brexit deal did not provide each community in Northern Ireland with a veto, whereas this is one of the core pillars of the Good Friday Agreement to appease the situation. Perhaps one could argue in favour of this factor, but it doesn’t make it easier to sell the Brexit arrangement to the likes of the DUP.

In the end, the EU can drag the UK to court. Strangely, the EU’s own top court, the European Court of Justice, in Luxembourg, has been tasked to serve as the arbiter for differences resulting over anything to do with Northern Ireland. The UK now wants to water down the ECJ’s role. Perhaps the EU should take this request seriously, since having the top court of only one of the parties to serve as the arbiter may not be conducive to getting both parties to accept a fair resolution.

Indeed, the European Commission has already dragged the UK – the UK’s Supreme Court to be precise – before the ECJ, claiming that a February 2020 UK Supreme Court ruling in the “Micula” case – whereby Romania was ordered to pay compensation to investors who lost out on state subsidies – “breached the principle of sincere co-operation, and violated EU law”.

Clearly, the EU’s urge to respect international law does not seem to extend to cases where it is less convenient for the EU or certain member states. At the moment, the EU is also urging a D.C. federal court to overrule a €291 million arbitral award against Spain for having introduced drastic changes in 2013 to its financial support scheme for renewable energy installations, thereby changing the rules of the game for bona fide investors.

The award is one of many imposed on Spain, which is frantically resisting to pay its debt to companies like Nextera, Antin, Eiser or Greentech, having lost pretty much all of the many legal cases against it. Instead of simply compensating the investors, as it is ordered to do, the Spanish government legally challenges everything it is able to.

Overall, Spain has a pretty poor record of complying with arbitration rulings, whereby it finds itself in questionable company, together with the likes of Russia, Argentina and Venezuela. Last year, Spain even intervened in favour of Russia, in the Yukos case, encouraging them also not to pay. In 2011, when the lawsuit against Spain on the basis of the Energy Charter Treaty was launched, Spain was only the second Western European country to face a challenge. At that time, a person close to the groups bringing the case commented: “Spain is now in the same league as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan when it comes to investor confidence.”

Today, however, in its quest to challenge arbitration, Spain is receiving back-up from the European Union. During its intervention for the American court, which needs to rule on an appeal against the arbitration judgement which Spain lost, the EU is not merely arguing that the private arbitration court would not have properly interpreted the law.

It goes as far to claim that the case should not have gone to arbitration in the first place, referring to the 2018 “Achmea” ruling by the European Court of Justice, which decided that intra-EU legal disputes should not be subject to arbitration.

The reason why arbitration is relevant here is due to the fact that the EU signed up to the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty back in the 1990s. A number of EU member states, including Spain, are now trying to renegotiate the international agreement and have even threatened to withdraw from it.

Perhaps for the future, the EU should spare us its lectures about international law, and focus on finding satisfying solutions on how to implement checks in the Irish Sea that are proportionate with the risk that this would become a back door into the single market. The UK’s proposal to merely check goods arriving into Northern Ireland from Great Britain that are not destined to remain in Northern Ireland is a more than reasonable contribution to squaring the circle.

The post Pieter Cleppe: The EU, Spain and arbitration – and why it should spare us lectures on the sanctity of international law first appeared on Conservative Home.

David Davis: The Abolition of the Slave Trade Act. Our history is a lot more nuanced than many would have you believe.

17 Feb

David Davis is a former Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, and is MP for Haltemprice and Howden.

This week, David Lammy, wrote to the Government asking for a pardon of 70 slave rebel leaders involved in the 1823 Demerara rebellion.

Lammy is right and his call is a sensible one. As he highlights, these were some of the pioneers of the continuing abolition movement. And their actions helped pave the way for the final abolition of slavery in the British Empire 10 years later.

But our history with slavery is a lot more nuanced than many would have you believe. And when matters such as this are raised, it is important we take a closer look at our real history.

Undoubtedly, Britain played a terrible part in the 17th and 18th-century history of slavery. Millions of human souls were captured and traded. Hundreds of thousands died in the terrible Atlantic crossing, and hundreds of thousands more died in the cruel and oppressive conditions when they arrived in the Caribbean and the Americas. It was an evil trade.

Britain was not alone in this evil pursuit. Every European nation with a maritime presence took part, as well as several African kingdoms that sold human beings to the European slavers. Spain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands were particularly prominent. That does not exonerate Britain from its guilt in this matter. As the biggest maritime power, we were the second biggest offender.

But Britain did something that nobody else did, something that was astonishing in its motivation and in its eventually dramatic effect.

The Abolition of the Slave Trade Act on March 25, 1807 was, perhaps, the most under underappreciated moment in our history. This was the first legislative step by Parliament to abolish slavery and the first major success of the abolitionist movement.

The Act was both the ending of a decades-long struggle and the beginning of a sweeping political and societal change.

Its passage was the celebrated achievement of the leadership of inspirational figures such as Ignatius Sancho (the first African in Britain to receive an obituary), Olaudah Equiano, Thomas Clarkson, and of course, William Wilberforce. But it also recognised the almost 400,000 people who had signed petitions calling for change.

At the end of February the book Capitalism and Slavery by Eric Williams – the first Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago – will be published in the UK for the first time.

In it Williams asserts that not only was Britain’s role in the slave trade driven by wealth creation, so too was our role in its abolition. As it happens I think that this argument is nonsense. The Clapham sect, who drove the demand for reform, were driven by religious and moral fervor on slavery and on other social reforms. The 400,000 petitioners were not petitioning for profit. The brave sailors who volunteered for dangerous service to defeat the trade were hardly driven by a the interests of the capitalists of the day. Indeed they were sued by them!

Abolition is a landmark moment in our history. It transformed the world.

For thousands of years, humanity had been characterised by the enslavement of one people by another. Over 550 years ago, Europeans began the transatlantic slave trade.

While Britain was not the worst practitioner of this evil, we must acknowledge our part; we can no more re-write history than those who tear down statues. Over the course of 150 years, British ships purchased an estimated three-and-a-half million Africans. Almost three million survived the “middle passage” and were sold into slavery in the Americas.

But as British society developed amid the Enlightenment, more people thought slavery was anathema to modern understandings of liberty.

Change was needed.

Under the leadership of Wilberforce and others, in 1807 the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act passed by a massive majority of 283 votes to 16.

This was a monumental moment that realised the triumph of political will and mass protest. And in what Britain did next, it spawned a heroic moral endeavour that has never been matched.

Today’s critics conveniently forget this in their version of history.

The cost to Britain in abolishing the slave trade was huge.

Prior to the Act, British ships had carried 52 per cent of all transported slaves, and British colonies – dependent on slave labour – produced 55 per cent of the world’s sugar. Britain conducted more trade with the West Indies than anywhere else.

After abolition, British sugar production fell by 25 per cent, while rival economies more than doubled. In global terms, Britain’s share fell from 55 per cent in 1805 to 15 per cent by 1850. This cost Britain two per cent of GDP annually from 1808 to 1867.

This was a massive financial cost. The British Parliament knew this, and yet they persisted regardless – because it was the right thing to do.

It was the most costly overseas ethical intervention in history. We should be very proud of it.

And yet, Williams claimed, in his book in 1938, that slavery was abolished in much of the empire out of economic self-interest and not as a result of extensive campaigning over the course of decades.

Whilst the role of Britain in the slave trade is well known, the role of the Royal Navy in correcting that injustice is barely mentioned in the discussion of our legacy.

Founded in 1808, the West Africa Squadron of the Royal Navy had the singular purpose of stopping transatlantic slave ships. For over 60 years, the force patrolled international waters, captured 1,600 slaver ships and rescued 150,000 slaves.

It was the first chapter in the British Navy’s history against the international slave trade. It was an astonishing tale of derring-do and heroism, of great deeds done solely for the purpose of destroying a great evil.

It was done at great personal cost to many of the sailors involved. The death rate from action and disease was the highest in the Navy, at about six per cent per annum. Two hundred men died from disease in 1829 alone.

It was an astonishing period, with the ongoing battle between the Royal Navy and the slave traders marked by an arms race between frigates and fast clippers, and then paddle steamers. There were stories of prolonged pursuits and sea fights, of rescues of slaves thrown overboard, and of individual heroism worthy of Nelson’s successors.

Naval officers and seamen returned year after year to the fight, risking death from yellow fever, malaria, hepatitis, and the violence of battles with everybody from slaver ships to the soldiers of the African slaver kingdoms.

Because their own ships were not fast enough to catch the Baltimore clippers, naval captains sometimes bought captured slave boats with their own money and converted them for action. The most famous of these was the clipper Henriquetta, captured, bought, and renamed the Black Joke. Armed with a single 18 pounder and five marines, time after time she captured slave ships and pirates that outran the conventional naval vessels. All told she captured at least ten ships, including a 14 gun slaving vessel that was twice her size, after a 31 hour chase and battle.

Naval captains used their military power to destroy the “slave factories” along the African coast, sometimes with the prior approval of the British government, sometimes not. One of them ended up facing a law suit brought by slaver interests in the London courts for these actions. But the battle went on.

Often it seemed like a futile and hopeless contest, rather similar to today’s “war on drugs”, with almost no hope of success. But neither the Navy, nor successive British governments of all colours, ever gave up

The West Africa Squadron’s task was made more important because other colonial powers continued their slave trade. France permitted slave trading until 1826 and Portugal continued to trade slaves with Brazil until 1851. The British government used the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, financial pressures and treaties to coerce other European powers to give up part or all of their slave trading activities.

The relentless work of the squadron peaked in the mid-19th century. And eventually it succeeded, with the Atlantic slave trade being stamped out in 1867.

This does not absolve Britain of our role in a global tragedy, but it provides a broader lens with which to view history. It was a unique action that our country, and only our country, can be proud of.

The idea that Wilberforce et al pioneered abolition out of a desire to enhance Britain’s economic position only does them, and the hundreds of thousands of fellow campaigners a disservice. Abolitionists were not popular. Careers were put on the line in the passing of the Act, not to mention the lives of thousands of sailors that were laid down enacting it.

Today, we are at serious risk of distorting history beyond all recognition. This is the real risk of the saga of the Colston statue in Bristol.

But instead of tearing down our history, we need a proper, reasoned and mature debate about it and the legacy it imparts on our society.

As it stands, that is impossible with those who violently tear down statues and seek to dismiss opponents through character assassination.

There are some who believe that our history is a litany of abuses – that is nonsense. Our history has its dark times, but in the round it is a long one, full of episodes of high principle, creativity, bravery, and genius.

Of course, we have a duty to teach the full history of our country – the peaks and the troughs.

But we are doing our children a disservice by not celebrating that which we should rightly be proud of. We need to inspire our children with principled heroes such as Equiano and Wilberforce, Sancho and Clarkson, and heroic naval commanders like Collier and Denman.

The Abolition of the Slave Trade Act 1807 was a transformational moment in British history and it changed the history of the world for the better, for ever.

That is worth remembering, regardless of what others may say. Perhaps the proper response to the Colston statue episode is to make March 25, the anniversary of the Abolition Act, an annual holiday: Anti Slavery Day, perhaps. That date can also serve as a celebration of the pardoning of leading abolitionists.

And while we are at it, why not replace the statues of Colston and his like with statues of the heroic naval captains whose courage helped bring slavery to an end across much of the globe.

Ryan Bourne: A government that wants to Build Back Better must address supply-side constraints on the economy

26 Jan

Ryan Bourne is Chair in Public Understanding of Economics at the Cato Institute.

Well, so long, “Plan B.” In jettisoning some of the most intrusive remaining Covid-19 restrictions, England (with the home nations to follow) could soon rival parts of the U.S. in being the most “normalised” policy environments in the developed world. Yes, mandatory self-isolation for those testing positive will remain, for now. But as with the vaccine rollout, Britain appears now to be leading the world into the new approach of “learning to live with the virus.”

This will bring with it an economic fillip, albeit disrupted in near-term statistics by Omicron. We have certainly been in need of one. Though headline GDP figures across countries can be misleading about the impact of the pandemic given measurement differences, an analysis by The Economist combining five indicators – GDP, household income per person, share prices, investment, and public debt – found that through September last year Britain had been the second most adversely affected major economy from the pandemic, behind only Spain.

In its ranking of 23 OECD countries, Britain was deemed third worst for the fall in household income (behind Austria and Spain), third worst for the decline in share prices (behind Chile and Spain), worst for the fall in investment, and second worst (behind Spain) for the public debt surge. With Covid-19 deaths per capita here relatively high – above all other major European or G7 economies except for the U.S., Belgium and Italy – we suffered a pandemic double-whammy of both poor health outcomes and a big economic hit.

Does analysing the change in these variables mislead about how the UK shapes up internationally after Covid? Perhaps. It’s not as if the public health crisis was the only thing happening during this time. And it’s important to remember that looking at changes to economic variables in the pandemic can hide that Britain entered it with significant structural strengths too.

In mid-2019, The FT’s Chris Giles was able to write that incoming Chancellor Sajid Javid enjoyed unemployment at its lowest rate since 1974, with the share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work at close to record levels, inflation bang on target, average earnings growing at their highest rate for 11 years, and public borrowing modest. The biggest ongoing economic weakness then was clearly productivity – with GDP per hour worked around 15 per cent lower than seen in France or the U.S., after a decade of weak economic growth.

So the UK entered the crisis with many macroeconomic variables healthy. Even the shock of the pandemic has therefore left the country’s headline statistics looking largely unremarkable in comparison with other economies.

UK unemployment is still low by international standards, for example. At 4.1 per cent for September through December 2021, the UK’s rate was similar to the U.S., and bettered only by Japan (2.8 per cent) and Germany (3.2 per cent) within the G7. The employment rate for 16-64 year olds of 75.5 per cent, although still 1.1 percentage points below its pre-crisis peak, is similarly only exceeded by the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and the Netherlands within Europe and then Japan too in the G7.

Pandemic-induced disruption and rising energy prices (on the supply-side) and huge macroeconomic stimulus (on the demand-side) has left us worried about inflation and a cost-of-living crisis. But, again, this is not an affliction unique to Britain, belying the idea it is mainly caused by Brexit. At 5.4 per cent in the 12 months to December, consumer price index inflation was almost identical to EU-wide inflation (5.3 per cent), and lower than some countries within it, such as Germany. Compared to G7 countries, the UK was decisively average too, with only Japan and France with significantly lower rates.

On GDP, it’s true that – putting measurement differences aside – the UK had one of the biggest headline falls in output during the pandemic. GDP in Q3 2021 was still 1.5 per cent below the pre-crisis peak, with only Japan having suffered a worse performance among G7 countries. But the OECD expects faster UK growth going forwards. And as economist Julian Jessop has noted, it’s highly likely that the UK will be doing better than the eurozone in terms of GDP relative to its pre-crisis peak through 2022, although still lagging far behind the U.S.

What about the public finances? Well, up to September 2021, the IMF had calculated that the UK had the third biggest total Covid-19 fiscal support package, amounting to a massive 19.3 per cent of GDP, and so behind only New Zealand and the United States. It’s therefore no surprise that public net debt has surged to new highs in peacetime. And yet, within the G7, the only country with a gross debt-to-GDP level lower than the UK is Germany and the UK is slap bang in the middle of the seven for its projected primary budget deficit this year.

The after-shocks associated with Covid-19 might be felt for years to come, through disruption to demand patterns, experiments with more home working, a spatial reallocation of activity and lingering effects on attitudes to risk. But the UK’s broad macroeconomic situation is not dissimilar to that of many other comparable countries. And that should make us ponder a few lessons from elsewhere as we tackle the immediate challenges we face.

In particular, the country that has stood out in suffering a worse inflation problem than the UK is the U.S. – where households were showered with cash such that the government effectively delivered a money drop to households. So why the guys at the Social Market Foundation appear to be urging the Chancellor to introduce a £500 “Rishi Cost of Living Allowance” as if that’s a cure to inflation here is beyond me.

Unemployment spiked very high and then plummeted in the U.S. below all G7 countries bar Germany and Japan – showing the long-term virtues of flexible labour markets. If Britain wants to regain its full, robust employment performance of 2019, it should beware new policies prioritising worker “security” over continuing a liberal hiring and firing environment as things normalise.

But, most of all, the UK’s key economic challenge – weak growth – remains and becomes even more pertinent given Covid-19-induced constraints. The pandemic has tested to destruction the idea that macroeconomic problems can be solved by throwing more and more stimulus and “demand” at things. If the Government is serious about “Building Back Better”, it needs to do the hard yards in thinking about the supply-side constraints on the economy and how to turn more demand into real growth, rather than rising prices.

The two variables that will predict the extent of the NHS winter crisis. And what we can do about them.

16 Dec

Over the last few weeks, and in the months preceding, there’s been a huge amount of media coverage about the NHS’s “looming winter crisis”. “The NHS staffing crisis is killing people – and this winter it will be even worse”, reads one paper, and you can expect fears to increase as we head towards January, when demand for health services normally peaks.

Clearly there are reasons to be worried about what lies ahead, due to multiple pressures on the NHS, which has been put on its level of emergency preparedness due to the Omicron variant. There’s the strain caused by the “twindemic” of flu and Coronavirus, both of which flourish in winter; the fact that millions of non-Covid procedures, including operations, have been scrapped to ensure that GPs and otherwise can focus on urgent needs and vaccinations; and there are staff shortages too. It’s estimated that the NHS has a shortfall of up to 100,000 employees in total, with vacancies for medical practitioners rising 15 per cent in the last year and seven per cent for nurses. 

Are we about to head into one of the worst crises on record? When I ask Dr Raghib Ali, Senior Clinical Research Associate at the University of Cambridge and a consultant at Oxford University Hospitals, where we are on a timeline of events, he replies “If you mean [by a crisis] ‘will the NHS not be able to deliver all services, as was the case in both the first and second waves, then that is likely – in fact, it’s already happening to an extent because some elective services are being cancelled in some places.” He explains that “the NHS is under a lot of pressure now because of non-Covid… we’re much, much busier than we were certainly in the first wave and, to an extent, even the second wave.”

Ali believes that there are a number of variables that will influence what January looks like. One is how big the backlog is of a) the people who avoid coming into hospital around Christmas and b) those currently staying away, in their own “voluntary lockdown”.

The crucial factor, though, is how effective vaccines are against hospitalisations for the Omicron variant. In short, the less effective, the more hospital beds will start to fill up. Ali says that we should have the hospitalisation data in around one to two weeks, which will mean SAGE – and the Government – is far more able to predict what kind of winter the NHS is in for, and whether it should take preventative measures.

Should the worst outcome prove true (that hospitalisations increase rapidly as a result of Omicron), expect Keir Starmer to use this to argue that the Government did “too little, too late”, even though he knows Boris Johnson would have an extremely challenging time trying to get any more restrictions through (judging by Tuesday’s vote). Were the Labour leader to be granted a vote on the measures, which he’d probably vote through, he could still take the view that they were introduced too late or not enough, as a means to knock the PM.

When I ask Liam Fox, also a doctor, about where we are in the “crisis” timeline, he says we have a chronic problem of under capacity. “I think the question we have to ask is why is it that the NHS seems at almost all times of the year now to be in what we used to call a winter crisis, and what does this tell us about the capacity of the system and the way it’s being run?” 

Fox cites two major factors that are destabilising the system. One is that “the NHS runs at a bed occupancy rate that is too high” which “leaves it lacking resilience” if demand changes suddenly (e.g. Covid patients increasing).

The other is medical practitioners’ “lack of ability to discharge patients who don’t need to be in hospitals” partly due to the closures of community hospitals and respite care – particularly in the 90s. He says that “we’ve been obsessed with increasing high-tech medicine, without considering convalescence as a concept”, which is – in turn – leading to imbalances in healthcare.

Similarly, Ali believes that part of dealing with NHS pressures means working out how to physically discharge patients (who have been medically discharged), who don’t have support afterwards. He believes that key to solving this is better funding for social care; and that this would be economically wise, too, as the cost of hospital beds being taken up by medically discharged people is probably more than the cost of paying social care workers more (who can look after them).

The Government has made a start on tackling this area. Hotels have been transformed into temporary care facilities, for one, and workers from Spain and Greece have been flown in to take care of patients. It seems ministers are well aware of some of the main ways to relieve the strain on the NHS, but they will come under pressure to create reforms for the long-term.

In conclusion, it’s impossible to predict whether the NHS was justified to move into its highest level of emergency preparedness, mainly due to the unknowns about the Omicron variant, which – in the best case scenario – could be highly transmissible, but less severe than others. There’s also the booster jab programme, whose success could radically change the situation. But the Government does know what structural remedies can help it avoid, as one paper put it, “the worst winter.”

Omicron or no Omicron, high-income nations should have promoted a more equitable distribution of vaccines

29 Nov

After a fairly “relaxed” few months in the Coronavirus wars, many of us were dispirited last week to learn of the emergence of a highly transmissible new variant, Omicron, which was first identified by scientists in South Africa

In a joint press conference on Friday with Patrick Vallance, England’s Chief Scientific Adviser, and Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer, Boris Johnson levelled with the nation about its seriousness – and what measures the UK would take to combat it, from the re-introduction of compulsory mask wearing and a new PCR test requirement for people arriving at airports. Jonathan Van-Tam, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, has today expanded on the threat it poses.

Whether the Government’s steps are enough will be the subject of many questions over the next few weeks. But perhaps the most important is what Omicron symbolises for the international community; specifically around whether the distribution of vaccines has been as equitable as it could have been.

From the early stages of the crisis, prominent experts and the World Health Organization have warned of the importance of equitable vaccine distribution, first for moral reasons, but also because an imbalance could leave a vacuum for new variants to develop, and evade vaccines/ treatment. The emergence of Omicron has only added to that concern – due to the fact that it emerged in a part of the world with low inoculation rates (only 24 per cent of the population in South Africa has been inoculated).

That the variant was discovered in South Africa does not mean it is where it originated (rather, its scientists have some of the best detection tools); indeed, there are cases in Hong Kong, Canada and the UK. But it has nonetheless opened up the debate on whether more even vaccination rates around the globe could have made a difference, and how many new variants will take off elsewhere without better-protected communities. 

There are still shocking statistics on inoculation rates worldwide; only 2.5 per cent of the population in low income countries, for example, have received full protection, with 3.5 billion people across the globe waiting for their first dose of the vaccine. At the same time, 66 per cent of high-income countries have been vaccinated, with many onto their booster jabs and plans to inoculate children.

Could high-income countries do more? It’s worth saying that many have gone to extraordinary efforts to get vaccines out. In July this year, for instance, the UK began donating millions of vaccinations as part of the international Covax scheme, and has pledged to donate 100 million overseas by June 2022. 

As of September, the United States had donated approximately 140 million doses to around 83 countries, making it the highest donor, followed by China, Japan, India, the UK, France, Canada, Spain, Sweden and Poland

But even these staggering figures – Covax’s initial goal is to provide two billion doses of vaccines worldwide in 2021 and 1.8 billion doses to 92 poorer countries by early 2022 – may need to be improved upon. There will also be pressure on countries to be more flexible about vaccine patents; the European Union is being asked to share more information with others.

Furthermore, some countries may need help overcoming logistical challenges to rolling out their vaccines, from having difficulties with storage, to experiencing shortages in health workers who can administer inoculations. It is not a simple case of more jabs, job done; governments have to consider these additional barriers.

Either way, it’s clear that equitable distribution will become much more of a talking point with the new variant; it is a reminder that the world is in it “together” when it comes to beating the virus. This often seems to be forgotten in all the talk about booster jabs – and it’s a shame that it only gets brought up when growing variants hit home. Even before Omicron, developed nations had a duty to do more here.

Mark Francois: Why, following the crisis in Afghanistan, Johnson must avoid a Love Actually moment with Biden

25 Aug

Mark Francois is the MP for Rayleigh and Wickford, a former Armed Forces Minister and a Member of the House of Commons Defence Committee.

There is an old saying that hindsight makes geniuses of all of us. However, the events of the last fortnight in Afghanistan have certainly demonstrated a lack of foresight, especially in the Biden White House.

When Parliament was recalled to discuss what went gone wrong, I was one of those who was highly critical of the Biden Administration for withdrawing so hastily, which has led to a strategic defeat for NATO, for the first time in its 72-year history.

Whole libraries have been written about the so-called “special relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States. The term itself was first coined by Winston Churchill, whose very close relationship with US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was fundamental to the allied victory in World War Two.

Similarly, the very strong partnership between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan was undoubtedly essential to winning the Cold War. Although it is often overlooked, a young Senator Joe Biden even supported the UK’s position during the Falklands Crisis in 1982.

Nevertheless, 39 years on, Biden’s address to the American people on August 16 2021 was inherently isolationist. It put US domestic political interests way above foreign policy considerations and America’s relations with its allies, including us.

So, what should we do now? Does our Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, need to create a “Love Actually moment” of his own and start making Johnsonian wisecracks about Americans invoking the 25th Amendment? Probably not. But some are now asking can we credibly create a European defence, sufficient to deter a revanchist Russia, without the active involvement of the United States?

NATO now has 30 member nations, a third of which now meet the recommended alliance minimum of spending at least two per cent of their GDP on Defence. According to NATO’s own latest figures, (which helpfully compare apples with apples), Greece is now the highest spender in proportional terms, at an estimated 3.82 per cent in 2021, compared to 3.52 per cent for the United States.

The UK is now fourth at 2.29 per cent; with all three Baltic States a bit over 2.0 per cent. France sits almost exactly on 2.0 per cent, with Italy on 1.41 per cent and Spain, at barely one per cent at all. Still, in most cases this actually represents an increase, since Russia invaded Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014.

France, which maintains Armed Forces broadly comparable to Britain’s, including its own strategic nuclear deterrent, has increased its defence spending over the last seven years, has bilateral Defence ties with the UK under the auspices of the Lancaster House Agreement and is involved in a number of Anglo-French equipment programmes.

However, the calls by President Macron of France for the creation of a “European Army” have not been met by a sizeable increase in the French Defence budget to help facilitate such a concept which, for a number of NATO nations, including the U.K. is politically unrealistic anyway. Still, the French do maintain professional and operationally credible armed forces, which exercise regularly with our own.

But the great drag anchor in terms of any increased European defence capability is Germany. Although Germany recently signed a low-key bilateral defence declaration with the UK (described by one colleague of mine as, “a poor man’s Lancaster House”) even now the German defence budget has been only creeping upwards, to 1.53 per cent of GDP this year and is not due to achieve the two per cent target for several years yet – much to the repeated annoyance of former President Trump.

Moreover, the German Armed Forces are now a shadow of their former, highly operationally focused, Cold War selves. Much of Germany’s military equipment is in poor repair, with depressingly low levels of operational availability in everything from submarines to fighter aircraft. They are also a risky industrial partner, because of increasingly hostile attitudes to defence exports within the Bundestag.

Similarly, Germany’s close relationship with Russia, for instance in advocating the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, may suit Germany’s peacetime energy needs but does not help bolster NATO security, especially among its Eastern European members.

Much now hinges on the forthcoming German Federal Elections, with the era of the Merkel ascendency coming to an end and the race for her successor seemingly wide open.

Whether the largest party emerging from the elections is the CDP/CSU or the SPD, any subsequent coalition Government which meaningfully involves either Der Linke or the Greens is unlikely to be keen on the sort of very significant increase in German defence spending – and hardening of the line on Russia – that would likely be required to give a meaningful edge to a European Defence identity. Pious declarations are all very well but, as Stalin brutally put it: “How many divisions has the Pope?”

So, where does all this leave us? First, it means that we should look to strengthen defence ties with our European allies – but with a clear-eyed realism about the limits of what this is likely to achieve. For the foreseeable future, the idea that NATO’s European partners could credibly deter Russia entirely on their own is completely fanciful; they just aren’t prepared to pay for it – and even the most junior analyst in Moscow knows it.

That means that we need to try and repair the damage caused to NATO by the disastrous events of the past fortnight. In that context, the Anglo-American link is absolutely crucial. Historically, whoever has been in the White House or Downing Street, Anglo-American links at the diplomatic, military and intelligence (Five Eyes) have remained strong, and we now need to bolster them again. As one example, the previous US Ambassador, Woody Johnson, was a high-profile and popular Anglophile and we need to see someone equally charismatic appointed without delay.

Hard left opponents in Britain have sometimes railed about the “Anglo-American deep State”; well, if such a thing exists, now is surely the time to use all of these contacts to best advantage to bolster Western security.

To those in the American security establishment who have become obsessed with China, we need to remind them that Russia possesses thousands of nuclear weapons too, has invaded neighbouring countries on the European landmass within the last decade.

Russian spokesmen have even boasted about new nuclear torpedoes, which could cause an irradiated tsunami against cities on the eastern seaboard of the United States (and NATO believes these weapons actually exist). Finally, Taiwan, while an important Western ally, is not a member of NATO – but Estonia most certainly is.

The Atlantic Charter, which led, in turn, to the creation of the United Nations, was originally an Anglo-American construct. The American Eagle and the British Lion have stood side by side in defence of the free world for many decades now and we cannot allow any one individual, no matter how senior, to get in the way of that.

Ryan Bourne: The tax hikes that could fall in the south. And tear the Tory coalition apart

22 Jun

Ryan Bourne is Chair in Public Understanding of Economics at the Cato Institute.

Who’s going to pay for all this? Andrew Neil’s GB News interview of Rishi Sunak has changed the fiscal conversation. The Chancellor deflected the question by saying he couldn’t discuss tax policy outside of Parliamentary “fiscal events.” Convenient. But many commentators are “rolling the pitch” for higher taxes to fund all this higher government spending already – often devoid of context of today’s true burden.

Much debate starts with the ahistorical view that the UK is a “low tax” economy. Yet revenues from taxes are already forecast to exceed 34 percent of GDP every year from 2023/24 onwards—a threshold not breached in consecutive years since Hugh Gaitskell and Rab Butler were Chancellors in the early 1950s. The world wars don’t bode well for the longer-term legacy of an acute borrowing shock either. Ten years’ after World War One, the tax burden was 12.5 per cent of GDP higher than pre-war; ten years’ after WW2, it was 11.4 percent higher again.

The pandemic is shorter and less destructive than mass mobilisation wars. We also don’t need a second welfare state. But we do have an aging population and slower growth. With those pressures, any government unwilling to reform age-related entitlements and committed to major new state investments will need revenues eventually.

Internationally, many Western European countries tax their populations more heavily than us. The UK was just below the OECD average as a share of GDP in 2019. But UK taxes are already higher than in English-speaking developed economies: Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the United States. The rises that Sunak has pre-announced would take us close to the levels of pre-pandemic Spain and Poland. Go a bit further, and we will have gone Germanic.

That, sadly, appears where we are headed. ConHome’s Editor explained yesterday that  “levelling up” need not mean just more tax-and-spend, but might be centred on the supply-side. He should tell CCHQ. The “levelling up” member survey recently used that banner to ask for views on more NHS spending, the “lifetime skills guarantee,” catch-up schools funding, infrastructure investment, the Towns Fund, and money for high-street regeneration. The direction of travel is clear: levelling up means more redistribution—hence why a strange coalition of fiscal conservatives and certain level-uppers want to whack up taxes on the old Tory base to shower the new.

This is where the politics of tax becomes interesting though. For the “progressives of all the parties” have talked so far as if “someone else will pay” for any largesse. Polly Toynbee says that UK voters want a Scandivanian welfare state with US-style tax rates. But it’s the redistributionists that are selling the Red Wall something for nothing. How about “asking for more” from the top one per cent, big tech companies, wealthy homeowners, tax-avoiding multinationals or other bogeymen, they say? Ordinary hard-working families will be spared for all the goodies.

As a new Institute for Fiscal Studies tax tool shows, however, the difference between the UK and the big governments of Western Europe is not lower taxes on the rich. No, broad-based social security contributions are higher in Europe. The evidence there suggests a more generous welfare state or higher permanent spatial redistribution requires tax rises “larger for the median worker than for one near the top of the distribution”. Good luck selling to your new blue-collar voters.

And so, thus far, an unwillingness for broader hikes, coupled with an uncertainty about the wisdom of burning the old base, has meant that the “tax debate” has been all smoke and mirrors. Efforts to raise revenues have been stealthy. The headline Corporation Tax rate is being raised again, with Sunak stating that it was “fair and necessary to ask businesses to contribute.” Of course, research shows the ultimate burden of profit taxes falls on workers, as well as shareholders – not the message the Chancellor would be keen to promote.

Income tax thresholds have similarly been frozen until 2026, and the 45p rate threshold has been kept at £150,000 since 2010. This will slowly lure more and more upper middle income families into higher tax nets. The problem is that spiralling spending demands quickly use up the options which voters don’t notice. Eventually you need other big sources of revenue, and that’s when the discussion usually re-centres on taxing savings income or pensions more heavily, or indeed hiking property taxes—despite the fact that the UK has the highest overall property tax burden in the OECD already.

Let’s leave aside the economics here. What do these policies all have in common? Well, the highest earners, the more expensive properties, and those with the highest savings are more likely to reside in the South East. The only Conservatives making the running on the “who is going to pay for it?” question so far, then, are those level-uppers who want to whack the South East to keep the goodies for the north flowing.

Yet not all are convinced. This is a growing Conservative faultline among MPs and the party’s voters. The Brexit coalition incorporated relatively affluent home counties’ areas and a working class elderly base nationwide. For some Westminster types, it simply makes sense to deliver for the new voters by squeezing the south.

Others, though, think the older working class Northerners don’t want Labour-lite, and that the best way to deliver for both would be targeted hawkishness on spending. For what it’s worth, Dominic Cummings told me: “the gvt wastes so much I’d rather save and not put up taxes.” He usually understands what these voters truly want, but would Johnson’s government slay any meaningful spending projects without him?

Tax policy, I suspect, will really test this Tory coalition. Hot housing markets in the South East have widened regional wealth inequality in the past 15 years, but after-housing-cost incomes have risen slower in London as people rent or service large mortgages. So many people feel squeezed, even before new tax bills come in. And massive geographic redistribution occurs already: London and the South East generate large public sector surpluses—averaging net public surpluses of £4,350 and £2,380 per person.

Now I’m not going to go all Mary Riddell and suggest last week’s by-election result already reflected a middle-class tax revolt. But if the mood music is for higher and higher spending in the North, and the conversation about paying for it focuses on raising property taxes, raiding pension pots, taxing savings, alongside stealthy income tax squeezes for the middle-classes, would it be surprising if voters in traditional Tory heartlands reassessed their allegiances? In a world of ever-rising spending and an unwillingness for broadening tax bases, there’s only so long the Chancellor can obfuscate on who will really pay.

The Government’s most politically challenging travel list turns out to be amber

26 May

For many people, May 17 was an exciting date – not only signalling that we could go inside a pub again, but giving people the chance to go abroad too. That’s until the Government released its “green” travel list of safe destinations to visit.

Only 12 countries made the cut, but some of them were/ are so difficult to get into that they might as well have been on the “red” list. 

It turns out, however, that the holiday list causing the most political controversy is “amber”, which lots of people took as an indication they could go abroad. Thousands of Brits, in fact, booked holidays in amber countries, including France, Greece, Spain and the US, only to find out that they shouldn’t have under the guidelines.

The Government has given fairly mixed messages on the subject. George Eustice, the Environment Secretary, said people could go to amber list countries to see friends, so long as they quarantined upon their return. (Currently anyone who goes to an amber destination has to take Coronavirus tests and self-isolate for 10 days at home. If they leave, they face a fine of up to £10,000.)

But soon afterwards, the Prime Minister warned that an amber country “is not somewhere where you should be going on holiday”, and added that the only suitable explanations were “pressing family or [an] urgent business reason”. Keir Starmer grilled him on this in last week’s PMQs, saying: “I think everybody would agree that, having moved 170 countries to the amber list, absolute clarity is needed about the circumstances in which people can travel to an amber country.”

Starmer had a point (and it’s not often that this happens). It seems that the Government might as well have placed these countries on the red list, too, for all the trouble caused by uncertainty. Travel insiders have said that the lack of clarity is damaging – and several companies have refused refunds to customers who’ve booked holidays to amber destinations, only to find out that it’s not feasible.

Hopefully in the next few weeks the Government will be able to give more clarity to the situation. The next review is on June 7, a fortnight before more lockdown restrictions are lifted. Grant Shapps has suggested today that islands to which there are direct flights, including Mykonos and Ibiza, could be added to the list for quarantine-free travel next month.

There’s even more pressure on the Government to speed up after the EU revealed it would be introducing a bloc-wide EU Digital Covid Certificate on July 1 – to ensure that people can move around quickly. Travel organisations hope that this will encourage the Government to be more flexible.

At the same time, it has been criticised for not being tough enough on border control (Dominic Cummings said in his hearing that the controls are “deja vu all over again”). Trying to navigate this area is intensely complex, not least because it also relies on other countries’ travel requirements – and the status of the vaccine around the world. Yes, the amber system has caused big problems – but it’s a fallacy to think there are simple answers to travel.

Garvan Walshe: We can be sure that those who have been vaccinated won’t die of Covid. So the case for lockdowns is vanishing fast.

18 Feb

Garvan Walshe is a former National and International Security Policy Adviser to the Conservative Party.

Having detected three cases of Covid–19, Melbourne has been put into lockdown. The European Centre for Disease Control suggests it might have to be maintained until the summer. Germany is getting increasingly jumpy about new variants, despite never exceeding 300 cases per 100,000 people.

Spurred by vaccine delays – particularly acute thanks to the European Commision’s utter mess of procurment – a narrative is taking hold. It states that the vaccines are ineffective against new variants, and could be ineffective against variants yet to emerge. What is needed, the argument goes, is to prevent the circulation of the virus, and therefore the chance that these variants could ever emerge.

We know, of course that for the elderly, and for those with co-morbidities, Covid is lethal. In old and fat Western societies, these can easily be millions of people. For the rest of us, it, with a few exceptions, is not unlike other afflictions: it ranges from utterly harmless to deeply unpleasant – sometimes with long-term effects. We don’t shut society down to eliminate these in the case of other diseases.

For the last year, most of these populations have been deprived of their freedom. They have sacrificed their ability to pursue their normal life and exist as social beings in order to protect the vulnerable in society. Perhaps the introverted don’t mind do much: the other day I asked a friend, a writer of scholarly books who lives in America, how he was coping, and he replied “since I’m a hermit, I’ve nothing to complain about”.

But some of us like company, and have been hard hit. And since in our open societies people tend to gravitate to jobs that suit them, the inequality is sharpened.

Strict, long confinements like France’s and Belgium’s are the toughest to bear. In Spain, by contrast, cafes and restaurants have usually remained open, if for fewer hours. People with secure jobs in the public sector will come out of this pandemic with higher savings ,because there’s nothing to spend money on.

But if you run a small business, the difficulty in meeting people makes finding new clients extremely hard, even if you’re not in a sector hit by restrictions. It’s worst of all for workers in hospitality and travel – hugely improtant in sunny southern Europe.

The mental health effects of enforced solitude are only slightly leavened by our knowledge that everybody else is going through the same thing. Thankfully, Spanish and Italian authorities have been less draconian this time, and don’t restrict people from walking outside.

That’s not the case in Paris, where you are formally limited to staying within a kilometre of your home. It goes without saying that it helps to be richer: self-isolating in a cramped flatshare with unsympathetic housemates is much more difficult than in a spacious family home with a garden. For people trapped in abusive relationships, it’s a living hell.

It’s one thing to endure all this in order to prevent people dying, and for a relatively short period of time; quite another because something could happen that might return us to this situation. Our nerves are already wearing thin, capital running low and reserves of hope becoming exhausted.

As the most basic level, the aggregate effect of vaccination is to reduce the number of people susceptible to the virus. So what would happen if restrictions were lifted entirely once the vulnerable were vaccinated?

If 80 per cent of the vulnerable are vaccinated, instead of 10–15 per cent of the population being at serious risk, then two to three per cent are.  If their infection fatality rate is five per cent, they are all infected, and vaccination is 70 per cent effective, that would result in 0.2 per cent death rate – or around 90,000–120,000 deaths in the UK.

But in reality, their death and serious illness numbers would be considerably lower than that. For a start, they would not all be infected. Though vaccination is at least 70 per cent effective against infection, it is 100 per cent effective against serious illness and death: this is true even for the variants. We can be sure that anyone who has been vaccinated won’t die of Covid.

Indeed, evidence is now emerging that vaccination reduces transmissibility as well as severity of infection: this is good in itself, and also because it reduces the number of copies of the virus that are capable of generating mutations, and therefore the likelihood of more troublesome variants emerging.

Finally, with good surveillance of infection strains, we will have time to adapt the vaccine to variants that emerge. This is because the maths of exponential growth leads to an explosion, but only after a phase of slow expansion. That phase, which lasts several months with Covid, is enough time to refine vaccines, provided the mutations are detected early.

This changes the calculation that justified the earlier lockdowns. Last year, Imperial College’s modelling calculated that 550,000 people could die, and so justified the extreme restrictions that were imposed.

As the threat recedes, reopening should not be an all or nothing affair. Measures that don’t cost very much, such as tests before international travel, masks on public transport, working from home where possible, limitations on capacity for cinemas and theatres, bans on large events where superspreading can occur, and so on, should continue for longer.

But basic restrictions on seeing our fellow human beings, particularly outside, and on people who make their living serving food and drink while we do so need to be among the first to go.

Timing is critical, of course, because vaccinations take a few weeks before they generate strong immunity, but their effects can be tested by observing the number of more severe cases and hospitalisations. The dramatic success of Israel’s vaccination programme has been overshadowed by the ultra-Orthodox community’s refusal to take part in even basic social distancing but, even there, the make-up of hospitalisations has changed. As vaccines are distributed, the proportion of severe cases will go down, and pressure on hospitals will ease, allowing more opening up. This – not the mere fact of vaccines being administered, nor the complete elimination of Covid cases – is the essential metric.

Actual eradication of viruses is extremely difficult, and seems only to have been achieved with smallpox. Covid will stay endemic and mutate in the world population. However, that’s not as scary as it sounds. The virus only cares about replicating and finding new hosts. Mutations that help it spread harmlessly are much more useful to Covid than the ones that kill us.

As long as most of us are exposed to it while young, like the other coronaviruses that circulate and cause colds, it won’t cause a public health crisis. That, not zero-covid, is an outcome that we, and the virus can both live with.

Ryan Bourne: How many lives will we save by choosing our own vaccination programme, not the EU’s? Let’s start at nine thousand.

3 Feb

Ryan Bourne is Chair in Public Understanding of Economics at the Cato Institute.

Delay is extremely costly in this pandemic. When the post-mortems are written, lethargy will rank high on the list of consequential policy mistakes. With a rapidly spreading virus, procedural bureaucracy or a failure to grease the wheels for vaccine rollouts will be found to have cost tens of thousands of lives in each advanced country, alongside incalculable damage to livelihoods.

As I explain in my forthcoming book, Economics In One Virus, governments have certainly spent big on testing, tracing, and vaccines. But the sums are piddling in comparison to the amount allocated for economic relief.

The latter is demanded by voters, but it would have been wiser to put more funds into paying over-the-odds to encourage vaccine manufacturing scale-up, to overcome bottlenecks, and to facilitate around-the-clock rollout as soon as vaccines were ready. This would have handsomely paid for itself in a more rapid economic normalisation, not to mention the lives saved. As economist Alex Tabarrok has written, this was the easiest cost-benefit analysis in the world for policymakers. When the inquiries begin, governments will lament their relative stinginess on spending where it mattered most.

As of writing this on Monday, the UK’s vaccine rollout performance is improving still, of course, with nearly 600,000 jabs registered Saturday and England’s figures for Sunday up 45 per cent on the week. It might seem a bizarre time then to lament that we didn’t go quicker still. Yet two months after the first vaccine was approved, still only around 14 per cent of the public have received at least one dose. While the manufacturers and the NHS are (understandably and heroically) pulling every lever given where we are, we will surely regret in future not having had an Israeli-style mobilisation in place.

That’s not to say the UK’s performance has not been *relatively* impressive. The dexterity of the MHRA in understanding the trade-offs associated with the approvals process puts the US to shame, as that country stalls on approving AstraZeneca’s vaccine despite tens of thousands of Americans dying per week. The UK government’s willingness to stump up more cash has exposed the false economy of the EU’s haggling over pennies in contracts too.

For the costs of delay are exacerbated by the way this virus and the vaccines operate. An infection might take three to four weeks before it manifests as a death. Vaccines themselves take a couple of weeks before they are high efficacy. So now we see the consequence of the relative lack of acquired protection for many elderly people in mid-January. It is only in the next three to five weeks that we should start seeing the big vaccine-induced falls in mortality, if indeed vaccines really do have near the 100 percent touted effectiveness in preventing deaths.

The Covid-19 Actuaries Group (CAG) believes that if the Government delivers on its eminently achievable target of vaccinating all over-70s, care home staff, frontline health and social care workers, and the clinically vulnerable, by mid-February, daily Covid-19 deaths will fall by two-thirds by the end of the month. By the tail end of March, deaths should be down 86 percent against a world without vaccines. So one can understand the angst inside the EU—their tardiness in getting vulnerable populations vaccinated will cost lives that will be all the more observable if British trends go as expected.

How many extra deaths have we avoided through our speedier rollout? Calculating the exact magnitude is extraordinarily difficult. Lockdowns and tier restrictions perversely lower the immediate “lives saved from vaccines,” because without them more people would have been exposed. Working out how many lives the UK will save compared to the EU in the coming months is also muddied by not knowing the eventual speed of each country’s vaccination program or the underlying prevalence of the disease for the nations.

But comparing the UK to France, Germany, Italy and Spain (the EU-4) gives us an idea of magnitudes. These countries have only vaccinated between two and four percent of their populations respectively, and are currently vaccinating at a rate of 0.11 to 0.12 percent of their populations per day.

The UK has vaccinated 14 percent of its population, and is currently vaccinating over 0.55 percent of its population per day. If extrapolated forwards, the UK would vaccinate its four priority groups once by mid-February. The EU-4 would achieve the same proportion of population dose numbers by mid-to-late July. Indeed, even if the EU-4 were suddenly able to up their daily vaccinations to UK rates from now, they would not hit the same number of doses as a proportion of the population as the UK’s February target until early March—three weeks behind.

My calculations based on the Covid-19 Actuaries Group report suggests that, if the vaccine is 100 percent effective in eliminating death, the UK has already seen around 1,300 fewer deaths as a result of vaccines. Given the lags discussed between infections and deaths, as well as the time it takes for vaccine efficacy, this is almost certainly close to 1,300 more lives saved than would have been saved had we been as tardy as the EU.

Projecting forwards to how many lives are being saved from the recent and current vaccinations is more difficult. We have to try to model what cases and deaths would have looked like absent a vaccine. We would also need to know how fast the EU vaccination program will become, something that I profess no knowledge of.

But, for illustrative purposes, let’s assume that, absent a vaccine, deaths would otherwise have fallen through February and March as a pure reflection of how they rose in December and January. Under this scenario, the UK has already locked in 9,000 fewer deaths through mid-April than if it had moved at the EU-4’s vaccination pace to date (saving 20,000 lives overall). And that’s assuming the EU-4 countries wake up tomorrow and suddenly match the UK’s speed.

Realistically, of course, some of the EU-4 are not planning to widely vaccinate for a month or two, while they are sticking to the regimen of two doses sooner that will leave fewer people on the Continent protected in the near-term. So, it’s very safe to say the UK will have saved tens of thousands of additional lives relative to going at the EU-4’s pace over the coming months, with the gap especially dramatic if the EU does not up its game in the very near future or if, as a result of vaccinations, the UK then relaxes its lockdown restrictions. The costs of delay in public health and economic terms are clearly enormous.