Esther McVey: How to deliver Brexit from here. We must prepare properly for no deal.

When I tried to focus these concerns by calling for a vote to see if this deal did indeed have the agreement of Cabinet, opposition crumbled – and my colleagues fell silent.

Esther McVey is a former Work and Pensions Secretary, and is MP for Tatton.

Resigning from Cabinet is often described as one of the most difficult decisions that a politician can make, but for me it was entirely logical.

From the outset, it was clear that the Withdrawal Agreement failed to honour the outcome of the EU referendum, secure our long-term economic independence and take full advantage of the UK leaving the constraints of the EU. How could I remain in the Cabinet knowing that?

I could not, hand on heart, sign up to a deal that sells the UK short. So keeping my job paled into insignificance compared to the enormity of the effects that this bad deal will have on the future prosperity of our country. Its effects will last far longer than any of our careers; it will shape the UK’s future for generations to come.

Concerns about the agreement around the Cabinet table were palpable, and the legal advice from Geoffrey Cox was damning.  This was the one chance that the Cabinet had to avert the UK accepting a bad deal.  But when I tried to focus these concerns by calling for a vote to see if this deal did indeed have the agreement of Cabinet, opposition crumbled – and my colleagues fell silent.

In politics, trust is paramount.  Once it is lost you cannot get it back.  Leaving the EU on the terms set out in the Withdrawal Agreement would see us lose public trust on the biggest issue of our age.  And we were risking that trust on an agreement which had zero chance of passing a vote in the Commons.

Even now, I find it hard to believe that my colleagues could not see that this deal was doomed from the outset. Since I left the Cabinet, I have watched with disbelief as events have unfolded – like everyone else.  The attempts to sell this fundamentally bad deal through a full Ministerial tour and PR campaign actually saw opposition harden.  The Government was left with no option this week but to pull the meaningful vote to avoid a defeat of historic proportions.

In her statement on the delay to the vote, the Prime Minister spoke of the need to provide ‘reassurances’ on the backstop for the Northern Irish Border.  This was a major misreading of the concerns which I and many others have over the backstop and of the deal which will see us hand over £39 billion with zero guarantees over a future trade agreement.

The Prime Minister has now won a confidence vote of Parliamentary colleagues, but it is clear there are significant concerns over what remains a bad deal for the UK.  However, rather than using this moment to reassess the Government’s approach to the terms of our exit, the Prime Minister continues to talk about seeking further reassurances.  Mere reassurances fall far short of addressing what is wrong with this deal. We need fundamental changes, including to the legally binding agreement.

The Prime Minister must now do what she should have done when it was clear that the deal she presented to Cabinet did not honour the outcome of the referendum, failed to secure our long term economic independence and risked missing the huge opportunities of leaving the constraints of the European Union.

She must use the clear domestic concerns about the agreement to push for two fundamental changes

  • That the backstop is ultimately unacceptable and must be removed and,
  • That the £39 billion must be linked to a future trade agreement.

The clock is ticking, so we simply do not have the time to pretend that, with a little bit of tinkering, this fundamentally bad deal can be made acceptable to the British people.  The more time we waste on an agreement which cannot meet the wishes of both sides, the more likely it is that we will default to an abrupt departure at the end of March.

t is better to focus our time, resources and energy on preparing a planned Brexit now and to come up with a clear plan for what will follow.  To continue with a charade that tweaking here and there and tacking on assurances will somehow make this flawed agreement better risks the Government failing properly to prepare for what comes next.

With little over three months remaining, we must pursue these two conditions with the EU and, if they are rejected, then we must accept that it has not been possible to secure a deal which satisfies the interests of both the UK and the EU.  In the event of this outcome, we must focus all our resources on securing an orderly exit from the EU.

Moving to a planned Brexit should follow these recommendations to ensure that it is as orderly as possible in the time that we have available:

  • Identify the pragmatic and tactical agreements based upon mutual interest which we can make with the EU and bi-laterally with individual member states to minimise disruption to both parties upon the UK’s exit from the European Union.
  • Put in place the contingency measures that we can begin to implement now, giving clarity to people and businesses. Immediately review all no deal planning conducted to date and scale up planning in key areas before 29 March to allow the UK to mitigate known areas of impact.
  • Negotiate a ‘no deal implementation period’, like the one in place for a deal situation, and pay the EU our membership fee during that time (circa £10 billion a per year net).
  • Identify investments in new systems, such as those in operation at the border which need to be implemented, scaled up or brought forward to support an orderly Brexit.
  • Begin immediate discussions with the Republic of Ireland on the operation of an open border post-Brexit, since both the UK and the Republic have committed to no hard border even in the event of no deal.
  • Start an immediate study of the policy changes needed to ensure the long-term competitiveness of the UK, including the reduction of burdensome regulations on business and, where required, divergence from the EU, while maintaining alignment in areas of national interest.
  • Issue immediate reassurance to all EU nationals residing in the UK to remove any doubts over their future and rights once the UK has left the EU.

Moving to a planned Brexit will allow us to reallocate the £39 billion to implement contingency measures, introduce new systems to ensure long term success and provide a cushion to those areas of the economy which need more time to adjust to the change.

It will also allow us to move beyond the discussion over the flawed backstop arrangement and look for practical solutions for the Northern Irish Border.  The EU has cynically used the backstop to leverage a deal which will allow them to keep the UK tied into their rules indefinitely.  Shifting the focus to a planned Brexit would give a clear focus on the practical arrangements that authorities on both sides of the border need to take to keep the border open.

The current Withdrawal Agreement does not fulfil our vote to leave the EU, is not in our economic interests and, ultimately, its inherent flaws mean that it increases the chances of the UK defaulting into an abrupt no deal Brexit.

It is increasingly clear that an alternative approach is required.  Some have suggested that Norway, ‘Norway for now’, Norway Plus or EFTA/EEA membership could present that alternative, yet this would keep us even more closely tied to the EU and would genuinely ensure that we remain in the EU in all but name. This is not delivering on the referendum and would destroy the public’s faith in democracy.

Without agreement from the EU that it is willing to remove the backstop and accept that the £39 billion payment must be linked to a future trade agreement, a planned and orderly Brexit as outlined above is the only option which prioritises our economic interests, is achievable within the time frame left and which actually delivers on the public vote to leave.

It almost works

Were it not for the backstop, May’s deal would get over the line – with support from an overwhelming majority of Conservatives, including us.

Imagine for a moment that, at some point before Christmas or in the New Year, the backstop was radically amended – that a unilateral exit mechanism were to be slapped on to it.  Then go on to picture the following events.  The revised deal passes through Parliament, and there is no early general election.  And at the end of transition in 2020, a decision is taken about whether or not to extend it. Let’s presume that at this point it is indeed lengthened for, say, six months.  At this point, the backstop duly kicks in.  Then, at the beginning of 2022, the Government leaves the backstop, just in time for the general election of later that year.

During this sequence of events, the first substantial objection to the backstop – that we aren’t free to leave it – would have fallen away this very winter.  The second complaint – that the backstop places a regulatory border in the Irish sea and, given the presence of a backstop within a backstop in the text of the Withdrawal Agreement, a potential customs border too – would last for a mere sixth months or so.  Then the division that it causes within the United Kingdom would end.

From that point, the Government would have the freedom to leave the continuing customs union, and negotiate, sign and effect meaningful trade deals.  For example, the way would be open for it to pursue one with the United States, if it wished: the American Government has made it clear that any such arrangement will be restricted if the backstop is in place.  More broadly, the gains for Britain from May’s deal would at this point no longer be outweighed by the losses.

Let us remind ourselves what these wins would be.  As we wrote in our analysis of the deal after it was agreed, we would regain control of our borders, under its proposed terms, after the end of the transition period, extended or unextended.  Free movement would be no more.  We would also regain control of money.  We would almost certainly want to pay up for participation in specific European programmes.  But automatic payments into the EU budget would come to an end.  A Prime Minister Johnson would be able to tip the entire sum down the gaping maw of the NHS if Parliament so agreed.

There would be a role for the European Court of Justice in relation to EU nationals for eight years.  An arbitration panel would refer points of EU law to the Court, and there is a good case for saying that the panel would then be bound by its rulings.  But it is important not to confuse disputes about the meaning of EU law with those between the UK and the EU more broadly.  These would be resolved by a dispute resolution process.  Meanwhile, the Withdrawal Agreement’s legal underpinning for the backstop would become otiose when the backstop ended.

In short, Theresa May won on borders and money in the negotiation, and minimised the ECJ’s scope on laws, which could reasonably be scored as a points win.  She has won almost no credit for this achievement, first, because she has no media allies or strong public backing, but faces formidable opposition from both second referendum Remainers and UKIP-type Leavers; second, because U-turns and broken pledges elsewhere have bust her credibility and third, of course, because of the backstop.

There is another, big, structural gain from her deal.  Under its terms, we would be tied to developing EU acquis on state aid and competition.  However, we would not be so bound elsewhere – for example, in social or environmental matters.  Some EU27 countries are worried that British governments will be able to undercut their social model in future.  So under the deal’s terms, we will gain freedom of movement for goods – up to a point – without conceding freedom of movement for peoples.  The four freedoms have been prised apart.

Now, there are powerful objections to this rosy scenario.  Frictionless entry to EU for British goods will doubtless be bargained off against permissive entry to the UK for EU citizens, and to British waters for EU fishermen.  Guarantees in the Political Declaration rather than the Withdrawal Agreement lack legal bite.  Even were a unilateral exit to be negotiated from the backstop, we would still have agreed to pay the £39 billion or more agreed under the terms of the agreement – thus reducing our bargaining power during trade negotiations.  Essentially, the EU wants a high-alignment, high-access settlement, and so does our Treasury-led Government.

And the strongest case against our imaginary dropping of a permanent backstop is that it simply isn’t on the table: that the EU will not shaft a remaining member, Ireland, for the sake of a departing one, the UK, as this morning’s news confirms.  We concede the point at once.  Were Leo Varadkar not determined to take a high-risk gamble that the UK/Ireland land border will end up no harder than now – and had the Government rumbled him earlier and treated Ireland more attentively – matters might not have reached this pass.  Still, we are where we are.  This Prime Minister is most unlikely to win any worthwhile backstop concession in the New Year.

Why sketch out this scenario at all, then, if it almost certainly won’t happen?  The answer is: to make a point well worth making – namely, that only a single obstacle prevents May from winning the backing of her Party for her deal.  Most of the hostility to it would collapse were there a uniteral exit mechanism.  The list of objectors would then shrink from the 71 we clocked to a much smaller number: fewer than 20, at a guess.  Most would swallow a limited role for the ECJ, and reject the other objections that we have listed.

Sure, they would say, the EU will seek to gain entry for their citizens and fishermen.  But it would have no automatic right to either – and that’s what the referendum was all about, wasn’t it? – taking back control.  Yes, we would have lose some bargaining power by agreeing to part with £39 billion.  None the less, we would retain some too, because of our power to refuse access to our country and waters.  All in all, a reformed backstop would be allow the Conservatives and Labour to square off against each other on EU policy in future elections.

For were the UK free of the backstop come 2022, the Tory election manifesto would reflect its Eurosceptic centre of gravity, by proposing a Canada-type policy for future trade talks.  Labour’s, meanwhile, would be more Norwegian in flavour.  These two visions would then compete at the polls – at least to the degree that both parties, and voters, wanted to fix their attention on the future of Brexit.

As we say, this won’t happen – at least under this Prime Minister.  Her deal and the backstop march together in step.  And admittedly, even with a right to unilateral exit, this Government would be likely to exercise it if no deal waited on the other side of the door.

None the less, that exit would be there – which, ultimately, is what matters.  We’ve said before that Brexit isn’t a still photo, but a moving film – or should be.  Where Britain will be on day one isn’t where we will be in year ten.  The backstop freezes that film and prevents it from playing.  Provide a sure means of escape from it, and the film begins to roll.  And May’s deal thus becomes acceptable.

Unfortunately, there is vanishingly little prospect of that.  The backstop lies between her and success like a hollow in the path of a runner.  It is so narrow as almost to be leapable. But it plunges many, many miles deep.

Shailesh Vara: This Better Deal would solve the backstop problem

Our plan is supported by remainers like me, by leavers such as David Davis and Dominic Raab and, crucially, by the DUP.

Shailesh Vara is a former Northern Ireland Minister, and is MP for North West Cambridgeshire.

I voted to remain in the EUU referendum, but I believe the largest ever public mandate should be respected. Parliament should deliver what the people wanted and that is to leave the European Union. In so doing, it is important that we get the very best deal possible.

The current Withdrawal Agreement is clearly unsatisfactory, and that is why I resigned from my ministerial post in the Northern Ireland Office. The bedrock of dissent has been about the backstop.

It strikes at our nation’s soul and imperils our Union by treating Northern Ireland differently to the rest of the UK. If we signed up to it, we would be trapped under the thumb of the EU as its satellite, obeying its laws without a say, unless the EU and its members gave permission for us to leave.

The backstop would place the UK in a “single customs territory”, causing two fundamental problems for our post-Brexit trading relationships. 

First, it would stop us from being able to strike trade deals with non-EU countries, as it would bar us from controlling our tariffs and regulations. Without control in these areas, we would be useless to any prospective trading partner.

Second, with regard to the UK-EU trading relationship, the backstop would create a climate which lends itself to continued EU belligerence. The EU would have no incentive to make concessions in future trade negotiations. 

Once member states have the ability to wield the threat of plunging us into the backstop – and keeping us there indefinitely – we will have no alternative but to make concessions we don’t want to. The Spanish could use Gibraltar as a bargaining chip and the French could demand continued access by EU boats to UK fishing waters.  We can’t possibly let the backstop hold our future trade talks hostage in this way.

So we need a new approach – A Better Deal – and that what’s been published by a team of legal and customs experts. It is supported by remainers like me, by leavers such as David Davis and Dominic Raab and crucially, the DUP. It doesn’t throw out the Prime Minister’s plan. Indeed, it retains the vast majority of the draft Withdrawal Agreement, whilst identifying and removing the poison pills that have prevented it from finding cross-party support.

A Better Deal provides the Government with an alternative vision to present to Brussels.  It is likely to command support in Parliament, closely resembles the offer made by the EU itself last March and honours the referendum result.

Our proposal would restore – rather than destroy – the UK’s leverage for future trade talks with the EU. It safeguards the integrity of the United Kingdom, since it doesn’t treat Northern Ireland differently to the rest of the UK, and it would allow us to be a credible trade partner for third countries after 29th March 2019.

A Better Deal bins the divisive and ill-thought-through Northern Ireland Protocol and replaces it with an extendable backstop. The new backstop would allow us to control our own tariff schedules and regulations – so it’s not an inherently negative situation for the UK to be in. 

In fact, some may even argue that under our proposal the backstop becomes a “front stop” – and for that reason, no EU country could use it to cajole us into having to agree to a set of appalling terms from Brussels which would let British consumers and businesses down.

The new backstop would provide for tariff-free trade in goods; it would bring about regulatory cooperation between us and the EU as well as regulatory recognition based on “deemed equivalence” – making use of the unique fact that our regulations will be identical on day one of Brexit.

This new and reformed backstop include an agreement to deploy advanced customs and trade facilitation measures, including any specific measures necessary for the Northern Ireland/Ireland border, in addition to normal, free trade agreement-style level playing field provisions on labour, the environment, competition and state aid – unlike the hugely one-sided commitments in the Withdrawal Agreement.  And importantly, it will include a commitment by all parties not to place infrastructure on the border – nobody wants to see that.

Brussels wants to do a deal with us. They offered us a free trade deal back in March, and I suspect that the EU negotiators have been surprised at our inability to grab what is on offer. 

We have a chance to put our future prosperity in our hands as we become a great, self-governing, free trading nation once again. The proposals in A Better Deal will, I believe, meet with the approval of many of my colleagues in Parliament as well as the public. It stays loyal to the Belfast Agreement, avoids a hard border and allows us to leave the arrangement, should we wish to do so. The UK is crying out for a better deal.  Let’s make sure we deliver it.

Here’s how to solve the Irish border issue and make the Withdrawal Agreement acceptable

It is now clear that there is very little support in Parliament for the Prime Minister’s Withdrawal Agreement. The most important objection is the so-called Irish backstop in Protocol 9 which essentially keeps Northern Ireland in the EU indefinitely and binds the UK into a customs union from which there is no release unless the […]

The post Here’s how to solve the Irish border issue and make the Withdrawal Agreement acceptable appeared first on BrexitCentral.

It is now clear that there is very little support in Parliament for the Prime Minister’s Withdrawal Agreement. The most important objection is the so-called Irish backstop in Protocol 9 which essentially keeps Northern Ireland in the EU indefinitely and binds the UK into a customs union from which there is no release unless the EU says so – which it would have little incentive to do. Even under our present terms, we can leave if we choose.

Other options such as another referendum, or some version of “Norway” are for various reasons unworkable. It is equally clear that neither side wants a “no deal” scenario. However, if a solution could be found that preserves the transition period and most of the Withdrawal Agreement, it must be considered, for the sake of continuity, good relations with the EU and the island of Ireland.

This week, I – along with Robert MacLean and Hans Maessen – have laid before policy-makers an alternative that we believe would remove those aspects of the Withdrawal Agreement which are unacceptable, and yet retain the genuine progress achieved to date. This is not to say that there is nothing else in the Withdrawal Agreement which is objectionable, including its one-sided structure. However, in the spirit of compromise, we do not pursue those matters, but offer a solution to the heart of the problem. This, we believe, solves the Irish border issue on a permanent basis, enables a backstop to exist on a basis acceptable to all reasonable stakeholders and builds on the EU’s offer to the UK of an advanced Free Trade Agreement with regulatory cooperation, customs facilitations and Irish border facilitations. This is part of a bigger project to propose the real legal text of a Free Trade Agreement between the UK and EU.

First, the proposed backstop needs to be replaced, with an alternative based on a basic Free Trade Agreement in goods and agri-food, with a chapter on Customs and Trade Facilitation, and Irish Border Facilitations, which would in due course become part of the ultimate comprehensive Free Trade Agreement which the UK and EU will seek to negotiate, with some additional provisions for regulatory cooperation, and stand-alone dispute settlement mechanisms. Our proposed backstop could last for a fixed period, say ten years – on any view long enough for a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement to be negotiated between the UK and EU. In other words, our backstop can function as a front-stop, should the need arise, unlike the EU’s, which gives them no incentive to release the UK from de facto EU control. Since the backstop is the ultimate permanent arrangement, there is no loss of negotiating leverage for the UK to remain in it, nor is it a threat.

Contrary to what the Government has claimed, this does not involve the use of “magical” new technology but existing customs facilitation procedures already in use across the world. It avoids a hard border – which in any event all sides have pledged to do – respects the Good Friday Agreement and removes the challenge to the territorial integrity of the UK posed by the creation of “UKNI” in the existing Withdrawal Agreement, aptly described as “a new country”. From the EU point of view, it enables a smooth UK withdrawal and avoids an attempt to exercise jurisdiction in the territory of a non-Member State.

We also believe that, if the current flawed and legalistic process is allowed to hit the buffers, there is an opening for a more political solution driven by European heads of state, since neither side wants a no-deal outcome. Naturally, the UK Government must prepare for no deal, since there is always the possibility of no deal, through no fault of the UK. The UK Parliament cannot control the actions of the EU and therefore for the UK Parliament to decree that there shall be no deal is pointless; it is also extremely damaging, as it tells the EU that the UK will accept any deal. We must become serious negotiators and understand that being prepared for no deal is a way of ensuring a better deal for both the UK and the EU.

We must also be prepared to push back against the fear and risk-aversion, and ask for what we want, presenting a draft Withdrawal Agreement to back it up. We have done altogether too much negotiating with ourselves.

From an EU point of view, any failure by the EU to reach a deal acceptable to its nearest neighbour, closest ally and largest third-country market will have enormously adverse political and economic consequences, within the EU and around the world. There are significant and powerful economic forces at play, and not all are in the EU’s favour. For example, one aspect of the EU’s very large favourable balance of trade with the UK – now seriously at risk – is the EU’s need to maintain its high market share in UK markets for its agricultural exports. The farm lobby is the most powerful in Brussels, and in Member States. The EU must know that no responsible UK government could, or would need to, allow no deal to mean food price inflation, and that we would have to either apply a third-country tariff of zero for certain agri-foods, or open the relevant trade quotas to other countries (on a first come, first served basis). Irish beef farmers, French beef and dairy, and Bavarian dairy farmers would lose market share almost instantly and this will have a massive impact on them. For the UK, lower food prices could well be the unexpected bonus of the rejection of the present Withdrawal Agreement.

While there will no doubt be those who say that what we are offering is not enough to save a very bad deal, there will also be those who say it is too much for the EU to accept. But our aims are straightforward: to put on the table the necessary changes to the Withdrawal Agreement, a concrete future framework for a trade agreement that builds on their offer to us and, shortly, the full text of such an agreement, specifically noting what the EU has already agreed in other contexts. Let us lift our eyes to a higher vision of what this relationship should look like, instead of the myopic approach all sides have adopted thus far. Let us also recognise that it is impossible to determine the full conditions of our withdrawal, without knowing much more about the future relationship. Indeed, that is the inherent illogic of the EU’s negotiating mandate, which is partly responsible for the current predicament, but that cannot politically bind us at this late stage.

Nonetheless, we have produced a concept of what the Alternative to the Withdrawal Agreement might look like. We strongly advise the Government to present this to the EU immediately, along with a clear framework of a Trade Agreement, the full legal text of which we will also shortly table. Since this builds on what has already been offered, there is very little reason for the EU to reject it. We badly need to show our peoples on both sides of the Channel and the Irish Sea that we have momentum and are moving towards a good resolution. We have a huge responsibility: future generations will not forgive us if we fail them.

As explained, the text we will shortly circulate essentially replaces the proposed common customs territory with a Free Trade Agreement and comprehensive customs and trade arrangements that can serve as the backstop, or if you prefer, front stop, in Ireland. Some changes may be necessary to the Political Declaration, in order to conform to our changes to the Withdrawal Agreement, but most of it can stand, as can much of the Withdrawal Agreement, for example citizens’ rights and financial matters, subject to the money being based on benchmarks and milestones related to progress on the free trade agreement. Some issues, such as Geographical Indications, belong in the future trading arrangements, rather than the Withdrawal Agreement. The UK must also be able to negotiate its WTO modification by itself without having to consult with the EU, and then be free to operate in the WTO as an independent player. We have also turned the non-regression clauses into the sorts of mutual disciplines you would see in a typical Free Trade Agreement and ensured that they are mutual. We have provided that the transition period may be extended by agreement but there is no need to provide for extension now. Deadlines in trade negotiations are important, and concentrate negotiators’ minds. We see no reason to prolong business uncertainty for years.

The changes we have outlined allow a deal to the benefit of all European citizens to be reached before 29th March 2019.

The post Here’s how to solve the Irish border issue and make the Withdrawal Agreement acceptable appeared first on BrexitCentral.

We must intensify plans for trading on WTO terms and then negotiate a UK-EU trade deal on those sure foundations

Pulling the vote on its Withdrawal Agreement at the eleventh hour, the Government acknowledged what we already knew: the Backstop proposal is completely unacceptable and the Agreement stood no chance of winning the support of Parliament. But rather than simply seeking “reassurances” on this issue – which, though a central objective, is but one of […]

The post We must intensify plans for trading on WTO terms and then negotiate a UK-EU trade deal on those sure foundations appeared first on BrexitCentral.

Pulling the vote on its Withdrawal Agreement at the eleventh hour, the Government acknowledged what we already knew: the Backstop proposal is completely unacceptable and the Agreement stood no chance of winning the support of Parliament.

But rather than simply seeking “reassurances” on this issue – which, though a central objective, is but one of many – the Government needs to consider more boldly the possible alternative arrangements which might command Parliament’s support. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, offered just such an alternative in March: a wide-ranging, zero-tariff trade agreement.

That deal foundered on the question of the Northern Ireland border, but existing techniques and processes can resolve this.

This view is endorsed by the professional customs body, CLECAT. They recommend we acknowledge the present state of customs technology, using procedures based on intelligence and risk management available in current EU law. These are currently used to manage the border which already exists – for VAT, tax, currency, excise and security – and can form the foundation for continued seamless trade.

From my October meeting with Michel Barnier and senior officials, I know that a willingness exists on the EU side to explore these possibilities more fully. The meeting also confirmed that Tusk’s offer is still on the table.

Rather than cling hopelessly to the Withdrawal Agreement, the Government must return to that offer. By resolving the border question with existing techniques, we can immediately start negotiating an optimal, wide-ranging Free Trade Agreement. I have already presented the Government with a Trade Facilitation Chapter and new Border Protocol to catalyse this process.

In parallel, we must intensify our preparations for trading on WTO terms. This is no cause for alarm, and those doubting this should look to the UK’s booming exports – up by nearly £100bn since before the referendum. The latest ONS figures put exports to non-EU countries at £342bn, compared to exports to EU countries of £274bn.

Much of that boom is through expansion into new markets. Since 1998, UK goods exports to non-EU countries have grown 16 times faster than its exports to the EU.

Yet scaremongering has clouded our perception of WTO rules. We are told that just-in-time supply chains will be unable to continue across customs borders. But in reality the operation of these chains is as dependent upon non-EU goods as on those from the EU. 21% of UK automotive manufacturers’ bought-in supply chain comes from outside the EU – compared to 36% from the EU and 43% from the UK – yet the customs procedures required for that sizeable proportion do not pose an insurmountable problem.

We are told that even minor customs delays will cause unprecedented queues on the M20 and economic disaster. But Operation Stack – limiting access to the Channel Tunnel and the Port of Dover – was activated for seven months in total between 1998 and 2015, without any of the “catastrophes” now imagined.

Responding to these Project Fear claims, we must always ask: why? Why would a rules-based organisation like the EU suddenly start behaving illegally, to the detriment of its people and in defiance of international agreements? As Xavier Bertrand, President of the Hauts-de-France region, has said in dismissing fears of major disruption between Dover and Calais: “Who could believe such a thing? We have to do everything to guarantee fluidity.”

It is true that the EU has trade deals with around 70 countries, which the UK will have to novate. This process has already begun and no country has signalled an unwillingness to co-operate. But remember that many of these agreements are very small. Switzerland alone accounts for half of UK exports to these 70 countries and it, Norway, Turkey and South Korea account for over 75%. Renegotiating a small number of agreements to cover the vast majority of this trade should not be a prohibitive task.

Though not an optimal arrangement, there is thus nothing to fear from WTO rules. Its 164 members represent 98% of world trade. We must be ready to trade on those terms to smooth the transition and demonstrate that we are serious.

That way, we shall be negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the EU on sure foundations. Realistically, of course, a full agreement will not be reached by March, but this need not pose a problem. So long as progress has been made towards an agreement by then, the EU and the UK can jointly notify the WTO as soon as possible after our exit date of our intent to negotiate an FTA. Under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, after notification of a sufficiently detailed FTA with an appropriate plan and schedule, we could maintain zero tariffs and no quantitative restrictions for a “reasonable length of time” (exceeding “10 years only in exceptional cases”) without violating the bar on discriminating against other nations under WTO rules.

So, rather than the Withdrawal Agreement’s choice of a transition period ending in “20XX” or a potentially permanent and definitely intolerable backstop, this proposal would provide stability and clarity for the time-limited negotiating period, delivering a zero-tariff, mutually beneficial trade agreement. That would surely command a majority in Parliament. That is the alternative. That is the way ahead.

This is an extended version of an article originally which appeared in the Daily Telegraph

The post We must intensify plans for trading on WTO terms and then negotiate a UK-EU trade deal on those sure foundations appeared first on BrexitCentral.

Lord Ashcroft: My new Brexit poll. People are tipping further away from the Prime Minister’s deal.

Meanwhile, there is little common ground in which to find a solution which would satisfy many Remainers and Leavers simultaneously.

The vote has been deferred while the Prime Minister seeks “reassurances” from the EU, but her message to the Commons yesterday was clear – this is the only Brexit deal on the table, and there is no realistic prospect of substantially changing it.

Theresa May’s campaign to sell the agreement to sceptical MPs and the public therefore continues. My last survey in late November found that the proposed deal had a cool reception, but with large numbers still to make up their minds. My latest 5,000-sample poll finds shows that more people now have an opinion – but with the balance tipping away from the deal, rather than in its favour.

The deal is done?

An unchanged 19 per cent say the deal honours the referendum result, while the proportion saying it does not has risen to 46 per cent – including six in ten Leave voters and a majority of Conservatives. The public as a whole says the agreement is better than leaving with no deal by 36 per cent to 30 per cent – and while Remain voters think this by a 33-point margin, Tory voters as a whole now say it is worse, and Conservative leavers think so by 49 per cent to 30 per cent.

Half of all voters now think the deal sounds worse than remaining in the EU on our current terms, with just under one in five saying it would be better. Even Conservative Leave voters are closely divided on this question, with 39 per cent saying the deal beats our current membership package and 38 per cent saying it does not.

When we asked in November what people thought MPs should do if they did not like the deal – accept an imperfect compromise and move on to other issues or reject the agreement even if the outcome was then unclear – people as a whole chose the latter by a 20-point margin. That has now widened to 29 points, with a majority now saying MPs unhappy with the deal should reject with unknown consequences. Conservative Remain voters, the only group to prefer compromise, now do so by a much smaller margin.

So now what?

While the alternatives to the draft agreement are not altogether clear, there are several possibilities: these include a delay while the Government seeks a new agreement with Brussels, leaving with no deal, various forms of second referendum, and a general election. We put these to our poll respondents in different combinations and asked them to choose their most and least preferred options each time (a technique called ‘max diff’ or ‘maximum difference’ which is used in the research industry to give the most comprehensive account of people’s preferences when faced with a list of choices).

For voters as a whole, there is very little to choose between the four most popular (or least unpopular) options which are, in order: a referendum to choose between the draft deal and remaining in the EU; a three-option referendum on the draft deal, no deal and remaining; delaying Brexit while the Government seeks a new agreement; and leaving with no deal. Accepting the current draft deal comes slightly further behind, followed by a general election and – least popular of all – a referendum to choose between the draft deal and no deal.

Unfortunately, this overall list masks wide disagreements between groups. For Conservatives and Leavers, the clear first choice is leaving with no deal, followed by a delay to seek a new agreement, with accepting the current draft agreement in third place. Conservative Remainers also put the Government’s deal third – but behind the rather different first choice of a referendum to choose between the draft deal and remain, and in second place, a three-option referendum to choose between the draft deal, no deal, and remain. Remain voters as a whole also put these two referendum options at the top of their list, but with a new deal, rather than the existing deal, in third place.

If there is no agreement as to the best next step, there is at least a consensus as to the most likely one if Parliament ultimately rejects the draft agreement, in whatever form it is finally presented to the House. This is a delay in Brexit while the Government seeks a new agreement with the EU, with a no-deal exit seen as the next most probable. A general election, though less favoured than a second referendum, is regarded as marginally more likely to happen.

Have you got it now?

If there were to be a second referendum of one kind or another, do people feel they are any better informed about the choice at hand than they were in June 2016?

According to my survey, only just over three in ten say they are – in fact a majority say either that they are no more or less clear about the implications and consequences of Brexit than they were during the referendum campaign (40 per cent), or that they are even less clear now than they were then (18 per cent).

Back to basics

With the Brexit debate now dominated by issues of process and procedure, we went back to first principles to ask again which potential outcomes from Brexit were ultimately the most important. Using the same process of asking people which options mattered to them most and least, we found little to choose between the three biggest priorities for voters as a whole: the UK being free to do its own free trade deals, continued free trade with the EU with no customs checks, and the UK making all its own laws without being subject to rulings from the European Court of Justice.

If the EU would protest that this amounts to an admissible combination of cake-having and cake-eating, there is also little agreement between groups: while Remain voters prioritise frictionless EU trade, UK citizens being allowed to move freely to other EU countries to live and work easily, and EU citizens already in the UK being allowed to stay, Leavers most want to see the UK making all its own laws with no ECJ jurisdiction, the UK making its own free trade deals, and the UK no longer paying money to the EU.

Using TURF analysis, a technique used in commercial market research designed to show which products and services would appeal to the greatest number of customers, we see that a deal combining the UK making its own laws and continued free trade with the EU would include at least one element that appealed to 45 per cent of all voters. Combined with an end to payments into the EU, this would extend its appeal to 61 per cent. As if this were not a tall enough order in itself, the competing priorities from different sides mean there is no deal that could please a majority of Remainers and Leavers at the same time.

Don’t panic

Meanwhile, how serious is the Brexit “crisis” in the great scheme of things, if indeed it is a crisis at all? I found a majority of voters thinking the state of affairs over Brexit was equally or more serious than the financial crisis of 2007-8, with nearly as many saying it is at least as serious as the miners’ strike of 1984-85, and the power cuts and three-day week of 1973-74.

Just over four in ten, but a majority of Remain voters, think the situation is at least as serious as the ‘winter of discontent’ in 1978-79. More than one in ten Remainers think things are comparable to the two world wars, and a quarter of them think there is little to choose between Brexit and the Cuban missile crisis, which could quite literally have brought about the end of the world. And to think some say that people are losing a sense of proportion.

> Full details of the research can be found at LordAshcroftPolls.com

Dutch audit agency: No-deal Brexit to cost the Netherlands €2.3B

Britain is the Netherlands’ third-biggest trading partner.

A no-deal Brexit would cost the Netherlands €2.3 billion through 2023, according to research published by the Dutch Court of Audit on Monday.

The court, which carries out official analysis for government decision-making purposes, noted the “intensive” preparations in the Netherlands for Britain’s departure from the European Union, but warned that the customs office still may not be ready in time in a “worst-case scenario” of Britain crashing out of the bloc on March 29, 2019.

Britain is the Netherlands’ third-biggest trading partner.

The direct financial costs for the Netherlands include having to increase its contribution to EU coffers over the long-term to compensate for Britain no longer paying into the EU budget.

The Dutch Economic Policy Analysis bureau has previously forecast that trade lost as a result of Brexit would reduce the economy by an amount increasing to 1.2 percent of GDP annually by 2030, or €10 billion, Reuters reported Monday.


Read this next: Anti-Semitism in EU worse over past 5 years: survey

How to get Brexit back on track when the Withdrawal Agreement is rejected by MPs

The current political turmoil and constitutional crisis has so many twists and turns that it makes House of Cards look pedestrian. Of course the real issue comes down to what happens when – rather than if – the proposed deal is voted down on tomorrow, 11th December (or even dropped). Here there is a clear […]

The post How to get Brexit back on track when the Withdrawal Agreement is rejected by MPs appeared first on BrexitCentral.

The current political turmoil and constitutional crisis has so many twists and turns that it makes House of Cards look pedestrian.

Of course the real issue comes down to what happens when – rather than if – the proposed deal is voted down on tomorrow, 11th December (or even dropped).

Here there is a clear gap opening up between media reports and hard legal reality – what the actual effects are of the political manoeuvring of Dominic Grieve, Sir Keir Starmer and their merry conniving bands. There have been desperate media reports that ‘no deal’ is off the table, when it is actually remains the ‘default position’ as Andrea Leadsom told Radio 4 just last week.

Let’s assume Conservative MPs think there is enough turkey on Christmas menus not to be part of the required two-thirds majority needed to vote for a General Election, and that the EU have indeed ruled out any major renegotiation.

The bottom line is that the various options being desperately pushed by those who want ‘anything but a true Brexit’ are just not viable. There is:

  • ‘Norway Plus’ – even worse that the slavish EEA, which adds back membership of the customs union, thereby killing all future UK trade deals, and with no control of immigration, no say over EU laws, and large payments;
  • A ‘Second Referendum’ – with its totally confused offer: ‘tell us if this final 2,000-page deal is better than staying in the EU when we’ve already left. Oh, and by the way you will have to join the euro and lose the rebate’. Pointless too in that Leave is predicted to win again; or 
  • Extending Article 50 to allow more muddle time – which will either mess up the EU by landing the Brexit issue right in the middle of European Parliament elections in May or mess up all the groups, chairmanships and procedures of the European Parliament in the farcical situation of British MEPs being elected for a few months.

But all such amendments to the motion are not legally binding anyway – they can only be advisory. They might bring political pressure, but they do not have legal effect. As the Commons Chief Clerk, Sir David Natzler, confirmed: whatever MPs vote on by way of motion “has no statutory significance”, as they do not constitute “a vote on whether to accept or reject no deal.” That requires new legislation. The actual law – in the EU Withdrawal Act – states clearly that we will leave on 29th March 2019.

Given that reality, and bearing in mind how rash it is to try to indicate a way forward in this maelstrom, this is what I propose now as the best next steps:

1) Assuming the vote fails on 11th December, or is put off, I believe the Government should make a statement immediately saying that preparations for a ‘no deal’ option – better called a ‘Clean Global Brexit’ or ‘World Trade Deal’ – will go into SuperDrive. Sorry, but defer Christmas!

Where there’s a will, there’s a way: in the Falklands War, the Ministry of Defence managed to put together a task force of 100 ships in just 48 hours. We can manage this process, and thousands of civil servants have been on the case for years. Like the Millennium Bug, claims of Armageddon and planes falling out the sky gave way to nothing happening on 1st January 2000.

2) The UK should then go back to Brussels, not to renegotiate this current draft Withdrawal Agreement, but to agree a pared-down, bare bones emergency series of bilateral agreements covering only the essential ‘must haves’: aviation, customs, citizens’ rights, medical products, European Investment Bank assets etc. The beauty of this is that if one agreement falls, then the others are not lost. The DUP’s Arlene Foster has proposed bilaterals. These bilaterals could be agreed by Westminster and the EU by March, and would any sane MP or MEP dare to seek to derail any such vital preparation in these circumstances? They should hold all further Westminster business, such as the Immigration and Trade bills, that may be hijacked.

3) The UK should also formally advise the EU that it wishes to accept the offer made not once but three times by the EU: that of a SuperCanada/CETA+++ Free Trade Agreement with 100% tariff- and quota-free access to the EU Single Market plus comprehensive services (first offered by Donald Tusk on 7th March), and which we could start negotiating from the day we become a ‘third country’ – 30th March next year.

We can build on the three pages on trade in the more appealing draft Political Declaration, but drop all notion of a ‘Single Customs Territory’ – the UK must firmly leave the EU’s Customs Union and Single Market. We are in a unique position to negotiate an FTA fast – as all our laws are convergent at present and we don’t have to spend years wrangling over which tariffs to keep or get rid of, as others do.

4) Having initiated moves to agree a SuperCanada FTA, the UK and EU can now jointly notify the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that in the light of working to agree a comprehensive FTA and future Political Declaration, we are invoking Article 24 of GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

This is important because Article 24 allows us to maintain the same tariff-free access to both our markets without breaching WTO discriminatory Most Favoured Nation (MFN) laws. Article 24 allows “an interim agreement leading to a formation of a free trade area” and allows “a reasonable length of time” – up to 10 years – to negotiate it.

So, we whilst we will need customs declarations under WTO, we will be able to maintain the same zero tariffs as now with the EU – the free trade area will remain. EU exporters to the UK would save £13 billion in tariffs (and our consumers too) and UK exporters £5 billion. We will also be free to lower tariffs for other trading partners as we wish – something specifically excluded in the Backstop. Nor should there be any Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) either under WTO agreements.

We can also enact the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement which recently came into force that obliges the EU27 to adopt measures like authorised economic operators (trusted traders), which are part of the solution for the Northern Ireland border issue along with electronic declarations and remote checks away from the border.

5) As a sign of Britain’s free trade intent, we can now immediately initiate full and unfettered negotiations with international trade partners such as the USA, China and India, without these deals being torpedoed by being tied into the EU Customs Union, Chequers or the Backstop. The picture would be clear at last, and not be delayed by unending years of transition. Similarly, we will seek to build on current work to ‘roll over’ the benefits and obligations of existing EU trade deals such as that with South Korea.

6) So, on 30th March the UK can be cleanly out of the European Union and back into the world, with an acceptable and managed World Trade Deal option in place, free of years more wrangling over transitional arrangements, cost demands, alternative models and heightened business uncertainty – and with negotiations underway for a closer SuperCanada trade deal. We can reallocate much of the £39 billion payment lost by the EU to compensate UK-based companies legally in terms of R&D, regional aid and transport infrastructure – helping to stimulate our economy.

Like an operation we know needs doing, let us get on with the surgery quickly and speed up the recovery process.

This is indeed a Clean Global Brexit. Brexit could be over in a few months, rather than drag on for years on end.

And, for all our sakes – both Remainer and Brexiteer – let’s just get it done.

The post How to get Brexit back on track when the Withdrawal Agreement is rejected by MPs appeared first on BrexitCentral.

‘No deal’ merely means trading with the EU on WTO terms – and trade on WTO terms is the norm

The alternative to Theresa May’s deal is not no Brexit, but no deal. Britain could leave the EU on 29th March 2019 without a deal and trade with EU member countries on World Trade Organisation terms. These are the terms on which we trade with non-EU countries already, without falling off any cliff. No deal […]

The post ‘No deal’ merely means trading with the EU on WTO terms – and trade on WTO terms is the norm appeared first on BrexitCentral.

The alternative to Theresa May’s deal is not no Brexit, but no deal. Britain could leave the EU on 29th March 2019 without a deal and trade with EU member countries on World Trade Organisation terms. These are the terms on which we trade with non-EU countries already, without falling off any cliff. No deal is Brexit. Her deal is no Brexit.

‘No deal’ merely means trading on WTO terms. Trade on WTO terms is the norm. 90 per cent of world trade is done on WTO terms. 60 per cent and rising of our trade with other countries is done on WTO terms. Our exports to the countries we trade with on WTO terms have grown three times as fast as our exports to the EU’s Single Market. Our businesses trading with the USA trade on WTO terms and we run a trade surplus with the USA. Our businesses trading with the EU trade on its Single Market terms and we run a trade deficit with the EU. WTO rules give us full access to the EU’s Single Market. Access does not require membership. It would be illegal for the EU to restrict our access to the Single Market.

No deal is far better than the alternatives, like Canada Plus, the Norway option etc. With no deal, there is no punishing transition period and no £39 billion given away and Brexit would come two years earlier. The average tariff British exporters would pay is 4 per cent. But applying EU tariffs to our imports from EU countries would yield possibly £13 billion, which we could use to compensate any firm losing out.

The French authorities in Calais have no intention of imposing a go-slow on British vehicles, rightly calling it ‘economic suicide’. Deliberate delays would breach three treaties – the WTO treaty, the Trade Facilitation Agreement and the Lisbon Treaty, which requires the EU to behave in a neighbourly way towards adjacent states. Do pro-EU enthusiasts really think the EU would use illegal bullying to punish us? If so, how can they urge us to re-join this body?

The Government, pro-EU MPs and peers, the stock markets, most business leaders and much of the media have been waging an incessant and hugely costly campaign informing us that leaving with no deal will be a disaster. Typically, Good Morning Britain presenter Piers Morgan casually referred to the “financial Armageddon of no deal” just last week (27th November).

We all remember the non-existent Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq that the Blair Government and much of the media warned us about. The same people now warn us about the mass economic destruction that awaits us on 29th March 2019.

Robert Azevedo, the WTO’s Director General, said after our vote that Britain’s leaving the EU will be ‘relatively straightforward’ and ‘smooth’:

“The UK is a member of the WTO today, it will continue to be a member tomorrow. There will be no discontinuity in membership… Trade will not stop, it will continue, and members negotiate the legal basis under which that trade is going to happen. But it doesn’t mean that we’ll have a vacuum or a ‘disruption’ in terms of trade flows or anything of the kind.”

We demand the Brexit we voted for: Leave on 29th March, keep the country united, keep our £39 billion the EU wants and trade with its members on WTO terms, as we and others trade with the rest of the world.

The post ‘No deal’ merely means trading with the EU on WTO terms – and trade on WTO terms is the norm appeared first on BrexitCentral.

The UK’s unnoticed export boom underlines why a no-deal Brexit is nothing to fear

A true economic miracle is happening. An extraordinary leap in the UK’s global export trade has occurred – a complete reverse of the ‘Doomsday’ predictions of the Treasury, Bank of England and Department for Business in London both before after the Brexit vote. According to figures published by the UK Office of National Statistics in […]

The post The UK’s unnoticed export boom underlines why a no-deal Brexit is nothing to fear appeared first on BrexitCentral.

A true economic miracle is happening. An extraordinary leap in the UK’s global export trade has occurred – a complete reverse of the ‘Doomsday’ predictions of the Treasury, Bank of England and Department for Business in London both before after the Brexit vote.

According to figures published by the UK Office of National Statistics in November – in the second calendar year following the EU referendum – exports to non-EU countries were £342 billion while exports to EU countries were £274 billion.

In the same period, the growth in exports continued to outstrip the growth in imports, almost halving the UK’s trade deficit from £23.4 billion to £15.8 billion. Most exceptionally, since the referendum, exports have increased by £111 billion to £610 billion.

Doubters will say it is a temporary blip caused by the falling pound. Not true. The boom is in new markets, and largely in new products and services, too. UK exports not just increased but doubled in hitherto obscure countries such as Oman and Macedonia. Exports to distant Kazakhstan climbed to $2 billion, only slightly less than the UK’s exports to Austria, worth $2.43 billion in 2017, which like many EU nations buys very little from the UK.

In the 12 months to September, the value of UK exports grew by some 4.4%, including strong growth in the manufacturing sector. Indeed, HMRC stated that exports of goods had shown “robust growth in every single region of the UK”. The number of Welsh SMEs which export doubled during the last two years to 52%.

Curiously, none of this has been spotted by any of the UK’s headline media – the BBC, Sky News or the FT. Not a peep from the new editor of the Daily Mail. Even The Economist was asleep on the job. Meanwhile, various government departments are spending much of their time issuing ‘Death in Brexit’ forecasts in a co-ordinated campaign with the Bank of England and other allies – and rarely champion our achievements.

Four years ago I was interviewed by Richard Cockett, The Economist’s UK business editor. I told him the UK was experiencing an unparalleled SME boom. How did I know, he asked? Since leaving the FT as a technology correspondent and columnist in 2003, my small team in central London has maintained a uniquely comprehensive database of more than 70,000 UK smaller companies.

As a result, daily we receive an avalanche of success stories. In the food and drink sector alone, if you want whisky marmalade or beetroot ketchup, or 500 new gin varieties or more than 1,000 new craft beers launched since 2011, our very brave, risk-adoring micro-SMEs will deliver.

If a New York cathedral needs a new, hand-made organ that £3 million contract comes to Britain. We sell sand to Saudi Arabia, china to China, and Turkish delight to Turkey. In the ultra-competitive auto components sector, UK exports are up 20%. Luxury goods, consumer goods, clever instrumentation for NASA and crucial cerebral input into US defence projects are all avidly listed in our dataset.

And yet, in our view the true importance of the export boom is as much political as economic. It proves that a No-Deal exit from the EU – or what I much prefer to call ‘Our Own Deal’ – is by far the best option, and far less damaging and disruptive than the ‘experts’ at the Bank of England, IoD, CBI, OECD and World Bank have forecast.

Far from being the ‘poverty and isolation’ scenario predicted by the chin tremblers who endlessly appear on Radio 4, the UK will be far much dependent on the EU in as little as five years.

Fears about UK-made cars from Japanese firms such as Nissan and Toyota being cut off from Europe are groundless. First, the UK could retaliate against BMW and VW – something no post-Merkel German politician would tolerate. Any anti-Japanese actions by the French would result in the rapid diminution of the £4 billion annual exports of French cosmetics to Japan. And the French know it, no matter what Macron might bluster.

But the export explosion is not the only piece of recent great news for the UK – there is more. First, in October 2018 Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, invited the UK to become part of the Pacific free trade pact – although this is dependent on the UK leaving the EU’s Customs Union. It would make the UK the sole geographically-distant member of the grouping, helping the country to rebuild trading links around the Pacific Ocean that stretch back more than two centuries.

Next, BP’s huge Claire Ridge oilfield, west of the Shetlands, just came on stream, providing no less than £42 billion in revenues over the next 25 years. It is a development much envied across energy-starved Europe – and there are more oilfields to come.

At this critical moment in the Brexit saga, it is vital the UK now wakes up to the much brighter future it has outside of the EU, and vital that Mrs May copies the bravery of our SME exporters. The so-called ‘No-Deal’, a term that needlessly frightens ordinary citizens, should indeed be re-named ‘Our Own Deal’, in which we invite all nations to trade with us on fair trade, low or no tariff, basis.

The UK economy will soon be in a solidly secure position to refuse any damaging ‘deal’ from the European Commission. Perhaps it was always the height of imbecility to think we could ever get a good deal from the Commission.

Finally, the tide of history is in our favour, even in Europe. The current, sub-optimal generation of European politicians – Cameron, Merkel, Juncker – will soon ‘be history’. Merkel goes next year – and every EU Commissioner will be replaced, too.

As Brexit talks limp from one embarrassment to the next, a No-Deal option will not be the doomsday Theresa May, the financial and property elites, and the heads of the UK’s top organisations and PLCs have long predicted. In fact the UK should never have negotiated with the Commission – from whom no fair deal was ever possible. The UK should introduce its own deal, ‘Our Deal Now’, in which we offer all nations fair trade agreements with no or low tariffs.
For hundreds of thousands of small UK companies, a complete split from the EU can’t come soon enough.

The post The UK’s unnoticed export boom underlines why a no-deal Brexit is nothing to fear appeared first on BrexitCentral.